CrowdSentinels-AI-MCP
AI-powered threat hunting and incident response MCP server for Elasticsearch/OpenSearch
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Install instructions from the README
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Install from PyPI (recommended)
# Install with pip pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server # Or install with uv uv pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server # Download detection rules, Chainsaw, and Sigma rules (one-time) crowdsentinel setup # Validate connector configuration and readiness (offline, no external calls) crowdsentinel doctor
**Optional extras:**
# Velociraptor live endpoint forensics (adds 25 MCP tools) pip install 'crowdsentinel-mcp-server[velociraptor]' # Long-tail deobfuscation coverage via chepy (XOR, exotic encodings). # The stdlib decoder core works without this — chepy only extends it. pip install 'crowdsentinel-mcp-server[deobf]'
Detection rules (6,060 Lucene + EQL + ES|QL) are **bundled with the package** — no download needed. The `setup` command downloads additional tools: - Chainsaw binary for EVTX analysis - 3,000+ Sigma rules for Chainsaw
Downloaded tools are stored in `~/.crowdsentinel/` and persist across package upgrades.
**System dependency for PCAP analysis:**
# Required for network traffic analysis and cross-tool IoC correlation sudo apt install tshark # Debian/Ubuntu/Kali sudo dnf install wireshark-cli # Fedora/RHEL brew install wireshark # macOS
Run directly with uvx (no install needed)
# Elasticsearch 8.x (default) uvx crowdsentinel-mcp-server # Other backends uvx crowdsentinel-mcp-server-es7 # Elasticsearch 7.x uvx crowdsentinel-mcp-server-es9 # Elasticsearch 9.x uvx opensearch-mcp-server # OpenSearch 1.x/2.x/3.x
Install from source
git clone https://github.com/thomasxm/CrowdSentinels-AI-MCP.git cd CrowdSentinels-AI-MCP chmod +x setup.sh && ./setup.sh # Or install everything, including all optional extras (deobf/chepy, velociraptor) ./setup.sh --full
The setup script will: - Install dependencies (pipx, uv, Claude Code CLI if needed) - Bundle 6,060 detection rules and download Chainsaw binary - Prompt for Elasticsearch credentials (never hardcoded) - Configure the MCP server with Claude Code - Validate your connection
With `--full`, every optional extra is installed too, so all 139 MCP tools have their dependencies available — the recommended mode for a production-ready server.
Installed Size
CrowdSentinel bundles 6,060 detection rules and integrates with external analysis tools. Below is the full disk space breakdown so you can plan accordingly.
**Core package (via `pip` or `uvx`):**
| Component | Size | Notes | |---|---|---| | **CrowdSentinel package** | **49 MB** | The server itself | | — Bundled Sigma rules (`src/rules/`) | 30 MB | 6,060 pre-converted detection rules | | — Elastic TOML rules (`src/detection-rules/`) | 17 MB | Original TOML format rules + hunting queries | | — Python code (clients, tools, etc.) | 2 MB | Actual application code | | **Dependencies** | **64 MB** | All transitive deps | | — `cryptography` | 14 MB | Largest dependency (TLS) | | — `elasticsearch` | 8.3 MB | ES Python client | | — `pygments` | 5.2 MB | Syntax highlighting | | — `pydantic_core` | 5 MB | Validation engine | | — `opensearchpy` | 3.6 MB | OpenSearch client | | — Others (27 packages) | ~28 MB | mcp, fastmcp, httpx, anthropic, etc. | | **Core total** | **113 MB** | `pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server` |
**Additional tools (via `crowdsentinel setup`):**
| Component | Download | Installed | Notes | |---|---|---|---| | Chainsaw binary (v2.13.1) | ~3 MB | ~15 MB | EVTX log analysis engine | | Sigma rules (SigmaHQ) | ~3 MB | ~30 MB | 3,000+ Sigma rules for Chainsaw | | Chainsaw mappings | — | <1 MB | Event log source mappings | | **Setup total** | **~6 MB** | **~46 MB** | Stored in `~/.crowdsentinel/` |
**System dependency (via package manager):**
| Component | Installed | Install Command | Notes | |---|---|---|---| | tshark + Wireshark libs | ~132 MB | `sudo apt install tshark` | PCAP network analysis — required for cross-tool IoC correlation |
**Full installation summary:**
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- <!-- mcp-name: io.github.thomasxm/crowdsentinel-mcp-server -->
- <div align="center">
- <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/thomasxm/crowdsentinel-assets/main/logo.png" alt="CrowdSentinel Logo" width="400"/>
- # CrowdSentinel MCP Server
- ### AI-Powered Threat Hunting & Incident Response Framework
- [](https://pypi.org/project/crowdsentinel-mcp-server/)
- [](https://pypi.org/project/crowdsentinel-mcp-server/)
- [](https://pypi.org/project/crowdsentinel-mcp-server/)
- [](LICENSE)
- [](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/)
- [](https://github.com/thomasxm/CrowdSentinels-AI-MCP)
- [](https://github.com/thomasxm/CrowdSentinels-AI-MCP)
- [](https://pypi.org/project/crowdsentinel-mcp-server/)
- [MCP Official Registry](https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0/servers?search=io.github.thomasxm/crowdsentinel-mcp-server) · [PyPI Package](https://pypi.org/project/crowdsentinel-mcp-server/)
- **Open-source threat hunting orchestrator connecting LLMs to enterprise security data via Model Context Protocol (MCP)**
- [Quick Start](#quick-start) · [Installation](#installation) · [CLI Usage](#cli-usage) · [Features](#key-features) · [Architecture](#architecture) · [Documentation](#documentation) · [Examples](#usage-examples)
- </div>
- > **Warning**
- > This project is in active development and intended for **security testing, research, and educational purposes only**. It is not production-ready. Do not deploy in production environments. APIs, tool interfaces, and data formats may change without notice. Use at your own risk.
- ---
- ## Demo
- https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0d0381f0-5b68-43b2-8630-19ec130885b2
- ---
- ## What is CrowdSentinel?
- **CrowdSentinel** transforms traditional SIEM querying into intelligent, framework-driven investigations using natural language. It serves as a unified security intelligence layer that connects large language models to enterprise security data sources, enabling:
- - **Natural Language Threat Hunting** — Query Elasticsearch using plain English
- - **AI-Guided Investigation Workflows** — Built-in prompts guide agents through proper IR methodology
- - **Persistent Investigation State** — Memory-managed IoC tracking, forensic timelines, and cross-query correlation that survives across sessions (8GB FIFO storage)
- - **Cross-Tool IoC Correlation** — IoCs discovered in one tool are automatically available to all others
- - **Multi-Source Analysis** — Elasticsearch, EVTX logs (Chainsaw), PCAP files (Wireshark), live endpoint forensics (Velociraptor), local host forensics (osquery)
- - **Velociraptor Endpoint Forensics** — 25 MCP tools for live artefact collection (processes, network, persistence, execution evidence, NTFS MFT, SRUM, remote EVTX) with automatic IoC extraction
- - **Encoded-Command Deobfuscation** — Automatically peels base64/UTF-16LE/gzip/hex layers off encoded commands (e.g. PowerShell `-EncodedCommand`) so C2 addresses hidden inside them surface as IoCs
- - **Adaptive Schema Intelligence** — Data-driven schema registry (ECS, Sysmon, Windows Security, auditd, Zeek, Packetbeat, AWS CloudTrail) adapts hunts to each index's field conventions
- - **DFIR Knowledge Resources** — 9 MCP resources exposing investigation playbooks, Pyramid of Pain reference, and cross-correlation guidance directly to connected AI agents
- - **Standalone CLI** — Full threat hunting from the terminal without an MCP client
- ---
- <a name="installation"></a>
- ## Installation
- ### Install from PyPI (recommended)
- ```bash
- # Install with pip
- pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server
- # Or install with uv
- uv pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server
- # Download detection rules, Chainsaw, and Sigma rules (one-time)
- crowdsentinel setup
- # Validate connector configuration and readiness (offline, no external calls)
- crowdsentinel doctor
- ```
- **Optional extras:**
- ```bash
- # Velociraptor live endpoint forensics (adds 25 MCP tools)
- pip install 'crowdsentinel-mcp-server[velociraptor]'
- # Long-tail deobfuscation coverage via chepy (XOR, exotic encodings).
- # The stdlib decoder core works without this — chepy only extends it.
- pip install 'crowdsentinel-mcp-server[deobf]'
- ```
- Detection rules (6,060 Lucene + EQL + ES|QL) are **bundled with the package** — no download needed. The `setup` command downloads additional tools:
- - Chainsaw binary for EVTX analysis
- - 3,000+ Sigma rules for Chainsaw
- Downloaded tools are stored in `~/.crowdsentinel/` and persist across package upgrades.
- **System dependency for PCAP analysis:**
- ```bash
- # Required for network traffic analysis and cross-tool IoC correlation
- sudo apt install tshark # Debian/Ubuntu/Kali
- sudo dnf install wireshark-cli # Fedora/RHEL
- brew install wireshark # macOS
- ```
- ### Run directly with uvx (no install needed)
- ```bash
- # Elasticsearch 8.x (default)
- uvx crowdsentinel-mcp-server
- # Other backends
- uvx crowdsentinel-mcp-server-es7 # Elasticsearch 7.x
- uvx crowdsentinel-mcp-server-es9 # Elasticsearch 9.x
- uvx opensearch-mcp-server # OpenSearch 1.x/2.x/3.x
- ```
- ### Install from source
- ```bash
- git clone https://github.com/thomasxm/CrowdSentinels-AI-MCP.git
- cd CrowdSentinels-AI-MCP
- chmod +x setup.sh && ./setup.sh
- # Or install everything, including all optional extras (deobf/chepy, velociraptor)
- ./setup.sh --full
- ```
- The setup script will:
- - Install dependencies (pipx, uv, Claude Code CLI if needed)
- - Bundle 6,060 detection rules and download Chainsaw binary
- - Prompt for Elasticsearch credentials (never hardcoded)
- - Configure the MCP server with Claude Code
- - Validate your connection
- With `--full`, every optional extra is installed too, so all 139 MCP tools have their dependencies available — the recommended mode for a production-ready server.
- ### Installed Size
- CrowdSentinel bundles 6,060 detection rules and integrates with external analysis tools. Below is the full disk space breakdown so you can plan accordingly.
- **Core package (via `pip` or `uvx`):**
- | Component | Size | Notes |
- |---|---|---|
- | **CrowdSentinel package** | **49 MB** | The server itself |
- | — Bundled Sigma rules (`src/rules/`) | 30 MB | 6,060 pre-converted detection rules |
- | — Elastic TOML rules (`src/detection-rules/`) | 17 MB | Original TOML format rules + hunting queries |
- | — Python code (clients, tools, etc.) | 2 MB | Actual application code |
- | **Dependencies** | **64 MB** | All transitive deps |
- | — `cryptography` | 14 MB | Largest dependency (TLS) |
- | — `elasticsearch` | 8.3 MB | ES Python client |
- | — `pygments` | 5.2 MB | Syntax highlighting |
- | — `pydantic_core` | 5 MB | Validation engine |
- | — `opensearchpy` | 3.6 MB | OpenSearch client |
- | — Others (27 packages) | ~28 MB | mcp, fastmcp, httpx, anthropic, etc. |
- | **Core total** | **113 MB** | `pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server` |
- **Additional tools (via `crowdsentinel setup`):**
- | Component | Download | Installed | Notes |
- |---|---|---|---|
- | Chainsaw binary (v2.13.1) | ~3 MB | ~15 MB | EVTX log analysis engine |
- | Sigma rules (SigmaHQ) | ~3 MB | ~30 MB | 3,000+ Sigma rules for Chainsaw |
- | Chainsaw mappings | — | <1 MB | Event log source mappings |
- | **Setup total** | **~6 MB** | **~46 MB** | Stored in `~/.crowdsentinel/` |
- **System dependency (via package manager):**
- | Component | Installed | Install Command | Notes |
- |---|---|---|---|
- | tshark + Wireshark libs | ~132 MB | `sudo apt install tshark` | PCAP network analysis — required for cross-tool IoC correlation |
- **Full installation summary:**
- | Scenario | Total Disk Space |
- |---|---|
- | Core only (`pip install`) | ~113 MB |
- | Core + setup (`crowdsentinel setup`) | ~159 MB |
- | Full platform (+ tshark) | **~291 MB** |
- > **Note:** PyPI download size is only **8.9 MB** (wheel) thanks to compression of the bundled detection rules.
- ---
- <a name="quick-start"></a>
- ## Quick Start
- ### 1. Set environment variables
- ```bash
- export ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS="https://localhost:9200"
- export ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY="your_api_key"
- # Or use username/password:
- # export ELASTICSEARCH_USERNAME="elastic"
- # export ELASTICSEARCH_PASSWORD="your_password"
- export VERIFY_CERTS="false"
- ```
- ### 2. Connect to an MCP Client
- CrowdSentinel works with any MCP-compatible AI agent. Choose your client below:
- <details>
- <summary><b>Claude Code (CLI)</b></summary>
- ```bash
- claude mcp add crowdsentinel \
- -e ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS="https://localhost:9200" \
- -e ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY="your_api_key" \
- -e VERIFY_CERTS="false" \
- -- uvx crowdsentinel-mcp-server
- ```
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Claude Desktop</b></summary>
- Edit `~/.config/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json` (Linux) or `~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json` (macOS):
- ```json
- {
- "mcpServers": {
- "crowdsentinel": {
- "command": "uvx",
- "args": ["crowdsentinel-mcp-server"],
- "env": {
- "ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS": "https://localhost:9200",
- "ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY": "your_api_key",
- "VERIFY_CERTS": "false"
- }
- }
- }
- }
- ```
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>VS Code Copilot</b></summary>
- Create `.vscode/mcp.json` in your workspace:
- ```json
- {
- "servers": {
- "crowdsentinel": {
- "command": "uvx",
- "args": ["crowdsentinel-mcp-server"],
- "env": {
- "ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS": "https://localhost:9200",
- "ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY": "your_api_key",
- "VERIFY_CERTS": "false"
- }
- }
- }
- }
- ```
- Then enable MCP in VS Code settings: `"chat.mcp.enabled": true`
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Cursor</b></summary>
- Create or edit `~/.cursor/mcp.json`:
- ```json
- {
- "mcpServers": {
- "crowdsentinel": {
- "command": "uvx",
- "args": ["crowdsentinel-mcp-server"],
- "env": {
- "ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS": "https://localhost:9200",
- "ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY": "your_api_key",
- "VERIFY_CERTS": "false"
- }
- }
- }
- }
- ```
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Roo Code (VS Code Extension)</b></summary>
- Create `.roo/mcp.json` in your workspace:
- ```json
- {
- "mcpServers": {
- "crowdsentinel": {
- "command": "uvx",
- "args": ["crowdsentinel-mcp-server"],
- "env": {
- "ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS": "https://localhost:9200",
- "ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY": "your_api_key",
- "VERIFY_CERTS": "false"
- }
- }
- }
- }
- ```
- Or configure via Roo Code settings panel: Settings > MCP Servers > Add Server.
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>5ire</b></summary>
- In 5ire settings (v0.15.0+), add an MCP server with:
- - **Command**: `uvx`
- - **Arguments**: `crowdsentinel-mcp-server`
- - **Environment Variables**:
- - `ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS` = `https://localhost:9200`
- - `ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY` = `your_api_key`
- - `VERIFY_CERTS` = `false`
- > **Note:** 5ire v0.14.0 has known MCP compatibility issues. Use v0.15.0+ for reliable operation.
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Any MCP Client (Generic)</b></summary>
- **stdio transport** (default — works with most clients):
- ```json
- {
- "mcpServers": {
- "crowdsentinel": {
- "command": "uvx",
- "args": ["crowdsentinel-mcp-server"],
- "env": {
- "ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS": "https://localhost:9200",
- "ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY": "your_api_key",
- "VERIFY_CERTS": "false"
- }
- }
- }
- }
- ```
- **SSE transport** (for web-based clients):
- ```bash
- crowdsentinel-mcp-server --transport sse --port 8001
- # Connect to: http://localhost:8001/sse/
- ```
- **HTTP transport** (for REST API clients):
- ```bash
- crowdsentinel-mcp-server --transport streamable-http --port 8001
- # Connect to: http://localhost:8001/mcp/
- ```
- </details>
- ### 3. Or use the CLI directly
- ```bash
- # Download rules and tools (one-time)
- crowdsentinel setup
- # Check cluster health
- crowdsentinel health
- # Hunt for threats
- crowdsentinel hunt "powershell encoded" -i winlogbeat-*
- # Run detection rules
- crowdsentinel rules -p windows --tactic credential_access
- crowdsentinel detect windows_builtin_win_alert_mimikatz_keywords_lucene -i winlogbeat-*
- # Analyse PCAP files
- crowdsentinel pcap overview capture.pcap
- crowdsentinel pcap beaconing capture.pcap
- # Hunt EVTX logs with Chainsaw
- crowdsentinel chainsaw hunt /path/to/evtx/ --sigma-rules /path/to/sigma/
- ```
- ---
- <a name="cli-usage"></a>
- ## CLI Usage
- CrowdSentinel provides a full CLI for threat hunting from the terminal:
- ```bash
- pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server
- crowdsentinel setup # Download rules, Chainsaw, Sigma (one-time)
- crowdsentinel --help
- ```
- ### Available Commands
- | Command | Description | Example |
- |:--------|:------------|:--------|
- | `setup` | Download detection rules, Chainsaw, and Sigma rules | `crowdsentinel setup` |
- | `health` | Show cluster health | `crowdsentinel health` |
- | `indices` | List all indices | `crowdsentinel indices` |
- | `hunt` | IR-focused threat hunt with IoC extraction | `crowdsentinel hunt "powershell" -i winlogbeat-*` |
- | `eql` | Execute an EQL query | `crowdsentinel eql "process where process.name == 'cmd.exe'" -i winlogbeat-*` |
- | `esql` | Execute an ES\|QL query | `crowdsentinel esql "FROM logs-* \| LIMIT 10"` |
- | `detect` | Execute a detection rule by ID | `crowdsentinel detect win_susp_logon -i winlogbeat-*` |
- | `rules` | List available detection rules | `crowdsentinel rules -p windows --tactic credential_access --type eql` |
- | `schema` | Detect schema for an index pattern | `crowdsentinel schema -i winlogbeat-*` |
- | `ioc` | Hunt for a specific Indicator of Compromise | `crowdsentinel ioc 203.0.113.42 --type ip -i winlogbeat-*` |
- | `analyse` | Analyse search results from stdin (JSON) | `cat results.json \| crowdsentinel analyse -c "context"` |
- | `analyse --mcp` | AI agent analysis using all 139 MCP tools | `crowdsentinel hunt "query" \| crowdsentinel analyse --mcp -c "context"` |
- | `auth` | Manage LLM authentication for agent mode | `crowdsentinel auth login` |
- | `pcap` | Analyse PCAP files (overview, beaconing, lateral movement) | `crowdsentinel pcap beaconing capture.pcap` |
- | `chainsaw` | Hunt EVTX logs with Chainsaw and Sigma rules | `crowdsentinel chainsaw hunt /path/to/evtx/` |
- | `doctor` | Validate connector configuration and readiness (offline — no external calls) | `crowdsentinel doctor` |
- ### Output Formats
- All commands support `--output/-o` with three formats:
- ```bash
- crowdsentinel hunt "failed login" -i winlogbeat-* -o json # Structured JSON (default)
- crowdsentinel hunt "failed login" -i winlogbeat-* -o table # Human-readable table
- crowdsentinel hunt "failed login" -i winlogbeat-* -o summary # Condensed summary
- ```
- ### Agent Mode (`--mcp`)
- The `analyse --mcp` flag replaces deterministic analysis with an AI agent that autonomously uses all 139 MCP tools to investigate. The agent follows the 4-phase IR methodology: hunt, analyse, correlate, report.
- **Authentication:**
- ```bash
- # Option 1: Browser sign-in (ChatGPT subscription — no API billing)
- crowdsentinel auth login
- # Option 2: Anthropic (setup-token or API key)
- crowdsentinel auth login --provider anthropic
- # Option 3: Environment variable
- export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY="sk-ant-..." # or OPENAI_API_KEY
- # Option 4: Local models (Ollama, vLLM — free)
- crowdsentinel analyse --mcp --model-url http://localhost:11434/v1 --model llama3.1
- # Check auth status
- crowdsentinel auth status
- ```
- **Agent flags:**
- | Flag | Default | Description |
- |:-----|:--------|:------------|
- | `--mcp` | off | Enable AI agent with MCP tools |
- | `--mcp-server NAME:CMD` | none | Add external MCP server (e.g., VirusTotal) |
- | `--model` | auto-detect | LLM model to use |
- | `--model-url` | none | OpenAI-compatible API endpoint |
- | `--max-steps` | 30 | Maximum tool calls |
- | `--timeout` | 300 | Maximum seconds |
- ### Pipeline Examples
- **Deterministic analysis (no API key needed):**
- ```bash
- # Hunt then analyse
- crowdsentinel hunt "powershell encoded" -i winlogbeat-* -o json | \
- crowdsentinel analyse -c "Encoded PowerShell commands" -o summary
- # Investigate failed authentication attempts
- crowdsentinel hunt "event.code:4625" -i winlogbeat-* -o json | \
- crowdsentinel analyse -c "Failed login brute force investigation" -o summary
- # Triage process execution and privilege escalation
- crowdsentinel hunt "event.code:4688 OR event.code:4672 OR event.code:1" -i winlogbeat-* -o json | \
- crowdsentinel analyse -c "Process execution and privilege escalation" -o summary
- ```
- **AI agent investigation (requires auth):**
- ```bash
- # Credential dumping investigation — agent hunts, analyses kill chain, checks adjacent stages
- crowdsentinel hunt "mimikatz OR lsass OR procdump" -i winlogbeat-* -o json | \
- crowdsentinel analyse --mcp -c "Credential dumping tools investigation" --max-steps 15 -o summary
- # Encoded PowerShell — full IR workflow with kill chain and adjacent stage hunting
- crowdsentinel hunt "powershell -enc OR FromBase64String" -i winlogbeat-* -o json | \
- crowdsentinel analyse --mcp -c "Full IR workflow: encoded PowerShell" --max-steps 30 -o table
- # Process execution with detection rules
- crowdsentinel hunt "event.code:4688" -i winlogbeat-* -o json | \
- crowdsentinel analyse --mcp -c "Execute detection rules against process creation" --max-steps 20 -o summary
- # PCAP beaconing — agent generates IoCs and maps to kill chain
- crowdsentinel pcap beaconing capture.pcap -o json | \
- crowdsentinel analyse --mcp -c "Investigate beaconing for C2 infrastructure" --max-steps 10 -o summary
- # Anti-forensics investigation
- crowdsentinel hunt "event.code:1102" -i winlogbeat-* -o json | \
- crowdsentinel analyse --mcp -c "Security log cleared - anti-forensics" --max-steps 10 -o summary
- # With external MCP server (e.g., VirusTotal)
- crowdsentinel hunt "powershell" -i winlogbeat-* -o json | \
- crowdsentinel analyse --mcp --mcp-server "vt:uvx virustotal-mcp-server" \
- -c "Check IoCs against VirusTotal" -o summary
- ```
- ---
- <a name="key-features"></a>
- ## Key Features
- <table>
- <tr>
- <td width="50%">
- ### 139 MCP Tools
- Threat hunting, detection rules, forensics, endpoint collection, network analysis, cross-correlation, command deobfuscation, and IoC enrichment — all accessible via natural language
- ### 6,060 Detection Rules
- Pre-built Lucene, EQL & ES|QL rules with automatic MITRE ATT&CK mapping
- ### Investigation State
- Persistent IoC tracking across tools and sessions with cross-source correlation and FIFO storage
- </td>
- <td width="50%">
- ### 4 Security Frameworks
- - Cyber Kill Chain (7 stages)
- - Pyramid of Pain (6 levels)
- - Diamond Model (4 vertices)
- - MITRE ATT&CK (automatic mapping)
- ### 5 Data Sources + Threat Intel
- - Elasticsearch / OpenSearch (SIEM)
- - Velociraptor (live endpoint forensics)
- - osquery (local host forensics)
- - EVTX logs (Chainsaw + Sigma)
- - PCAP files (Wireshark/TShark)
- - IoC enrichment (Shodan, VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, ThreatFox)
- - MISP (export events, search attributes)
- </td>
- </tr>
- </table>
- ---
- <a name="architecture"></a>
- ## Architecture
- ```
- ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
- │ LLM Client / Claude Code CLI │
- └─────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘
- │ MCP Protocol (stdio/SSE/HTTP)
- │ HTTP: Origin validation (anti DNS-rebinding)
- │ + transport-level audit logging
- ▼
- ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
- │ CrowdSentinel MCP Server │
- │ ┌───────────────┐ ┌───────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────┐ │
- │ │ 139 Tools │ │ 6,060 Rules │ │ Security Frameworks │ │
- │ │ - Hunting │ │ - Lucene │ │ - Cyber Kill Chain │ │
- │ │ - Detection │ │ - EQL │ │ - Pyramid of Pain │ │
- │ │ - Forensics │ │ - ES|QL │ │ - Diamond Model │ │
- │ │ - Endpoint │ │ │ │ - MITRE ATT&CK │ │
- │ │ - Network │ ├───────────────┤ │ │ │
- │ │ - Enrichment │ │ Schema │ │ 9 MCP Resources │ │
- │ │ - Correlation │ │ Registry │ │ (DFIR knowledge base) │ │
- │ │ - Deobfuscate │ │ (data-driven) │ │ │ │
- │ └───────────────┘ └───────────────┘ └───────────────────────┘ │
- │ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐│
- │ │ Investigation State (Persistent) ││
- │ │ Cross-source IoC sharing, auto-capture, STIX 2.1 export ││
- │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘│
- └─────┬──────────┬──────────┬──────────────┬─────────────┬────────┘
- │ │ │ │ │
- ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
- ┌───────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌────────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌───────────┐
- │Elastic- │ │Velocirap-│ │osquery │ │ Chainsaw │ │ Wireshark │
- │search/ │ │tor │ │(local │ │(EVTX/ │ │ (PCAP) │
- │OpenSearch │ │(EDR/DFIR)│ │ host) │ │ Sigma) │ │ (Network) │
- │ (SIEM) │ │(Endpoint)│ │ │ │(Offline) │ │ │
- └───────────┘ └──────────┘ └────────┘ └───────────┘ └───────────┘
- │
- ┌───────────────────────┼───────────────────────┐
- ▼ ▼ ▼
- ┌───────────────┐ ┌───────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────┐
- │ Shodan │ │ VirusTotal │ │ AbuseIPDB + ThreatFox │
- │ InternetDB │ │ (v3) │ │ + MISP (export/search) │
- │ (free/no key)│ │ (free tier) │ │ (free tier) │
- └───────────────┘ └───────────────┘ └───────────────────────────┘
- │
- ▼ (Roadmap)
- ┌───────────────┐ ┌───────────────┐ ┌───────────────┐
- │ Splunk │ │ Wazuh │ │ Zeek │
- │ │ │ (EDR/XDR) │ │ (NSM/IDS) │
- └───────────────┘ └───────────────┘ └───────────────┘
- ```
- ---
- ## What's Included
- ### Tool Categories (139 Tools)
- | Category | Tools | Description |
- |:---------|:-----:|:------------|
- | **Elasticsearch Core** | 19 | Index, document, cluster, alias, data stream, raw API operations |
- | **Threat Hunting** | 8 | Attack pattern detection, kill-chain stage hunting, timeframe hunts, anomaly detection |
- | **EQL & ES\|QL Hunting** | 11 | Event-sequence queries, ES\|QL pipes, saved hunt history, capability detection |
- | **Asset Discovery & Schema Intelligence** | 12 | Index discovery, data-driven schema detection (ECS, Sysmon, auditd, Zeek, CloudTrail…), smart search |
- | **IoC Analysis & Deobfuscation** | 6 | IoC extraction, encoded-command decoding, kill-chain mapping, investigation reports |
- | **Detection Rules** | 9 | 6,060 rule library — list, execute, validate, suggest, batch execution |
- | **Investigation Prompts** | 5 | Fast triage spine — 10 critical IR questions |
- | **Chainsaw (EVTX)** | 5 | Sigma rule hunting, iterative IoC discovery |
- | **Wireshark (PCAP)** | 11 | Network forensics, beaconing, lateral movement detection, traffic decoding |
- | **Threat Intelligence** | 5 | IoC enrichment (Shodan, VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, ThreatFox) + MISP export/search |
- | **Investigation State** | 10 | Persistent IoCs, cross-tool sharing, STIX 2.1 export, reporting |
- | **Velociraptor (Endpoint)** | 25 | Live forensic artefact collection — processes, network, persistence, execution evidence, MFT, SRUM |
- | **osquery (Local Host)** | 4 | SQL-based local host forensics — processes, sockets, users, ad-hoc queries |
- | **Cross-Source Correlation** | 5 | SIEM ↔ endpoint pivots, IoC-driven endpoint hunts, unified timelines, time correlation |
- | **Workflow Guidance & Status** | 4 | Next-step guidance, progressive disclosure, system status, storage cleanup |
- > Velociraptor tools register when `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_CONFIG` is set; osquery tools register when a local `osqueryi` binary is present; the 10 high-risk write tools are hidden when `DISABLE_HIGH_RISK_OPERATIONS=true`.
- ### Security Frameworks
- | Framework | Purpose |
- |:----------|:--------|
- | **Cyber Kill Chain** | Hunt by attack stage (7 stages), predict adversary's next move |
- | **Pyramid of Pain** | Prioritise IoCs by difficulty for attackers to change (6 levels) |
- | **Diamond Model** | Map adversary, capability, infrastructure, victim relationships |
- | **MITRE ATT&CK** | Automatic technique mapping for all detections |
- ### Detection Rules (6,060 Rules)
- | Type | Count | Source | Description |
- |:-----|------:|:-------|:------------|
- | **Lucene** | 1,966 | Sigma-converted | Fast pattern matching queries |
- | **EQL** | 3,963 | Sigma-converted + Elastic | Event sequences and correlations |
- | **ES\|QL** | 131 | Elastic TOML rules | Pipe-based query language (ES 8.11+) |
- **Platforms:** Windows, Linux, macOS, Cloud (AWS/Azure/GCP), Network, Identity
- **Log Sources:** PowerShell, Sysmon, Security Events, Process Creation, Audit logs
- ### Encoded-Command Deobfuscation
- Real intrusions hide C2 addresses and URLs inside encodings the SIEM stores verbatim — most commonly PowerShell `-EncodedCommand` (base64 of UTF-16LE), but also `FromBase64String`, base64→gzip, bare base64, and hex blobs. CrowdSentinel decodes these layers automatically during IoC extraction and via the dedicated `decode_command` tool, so the inner indicators surface instead of staying buried:
- - **Zero extra dependencies** — the decoder core uses only the Python standard library (`base64`/`zlib`/`codecs`/`binascii`)
- - **Optional long tail** — install the `deobf` extra (`pip install 'crowdsentinel-mcp-server[deobf]'`) to add [chepy](https://github.com/securisec/chepy) for XOR and exotic encodings; its absence degrades gracefully
- - **Provenance** — every decode records its recipe (e.g. `base64->utf-16le`) for the IR report
- - **Safe by design** — decode-only (nothing is executed), with depth and output-size bounds so a decompression bomb cannot hang the server
- ---
- ## Configuration
- ### Environment Variables
- ```bash
- # Connection (required — choose one)
- ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS="https://localhost:9200" # Self-hosted
- # OR
- ELASTICSEARCH_CLOUD_ID="deployment:base64..." # Elastic Cloud
- # Authentication — choose one (in priority order):
- ELASTICSEARCH_BEARER_TOKEN="service_token_here" # Service/bearer token
- ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY="your_api_key" # API key (recommended)
- ELASTICSEARCH_USERNAME="elastic" # Basic auth
- ELASTICSEARCH_PASSWORD="your_password"
- # TLS / Certificate verification
- VERIFY_CERTS="true" # Verify against system CA bundle
- # VERIFY_CERTS="/path/to/ca.crt" # Verify against custom CA certificate
- # ELASTICSEARCH_CA_CERT="/path/to/ca.crt" # Explicit CA certificate path
- # ELASTICSEARCH_CLIENT_CERT="/path/to/client.crt" # Client certificate (mTLS)
- # ELASTICSEARCH_CLIENT_KEY="/path/to/client.key" # Client private key (mTLS)
- # Options
- REQUEST_TIMEOUT="30" # Request timeout in seconds
- DISABLE_HIGH_RISK_OPERATIONS="true" # Block all write operations
- # HTTP/SSE transport security (stdio unaffected)
- # MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS="https://app.example.com" # Extra allowed Origins (comma-separated); loopback always allowed
- # Velociraptor endpoint forensics (optional — enables 25 extra tools)
- # VELOCIRAPTOR_API_CONFIG="/path/to/api_client.yaml"
- # Threat Intelligence (optional — Shodan InternetDB works without any key)
- VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY="your_vt_key" # Free: 500 lookups/day
- ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY="your_abuse_key" # Free: 1,000 lookups/day
- THREATFOX_API_KEY="your_tf_key" # Free: unlimited
- # MISP Integration (optional — offline JSON export works without a server)
- MISP_URL="https://misp.example.org" # MISP instance URL
- MISP_API_KEY="your_misp_key" # MISP API key (40-char hex)
- # MISP_SSL_VERIFY="true" # Set "false" for self-signed (dev only)
- ```
- > **Security Warning:** Never use `VERIFY_CERTS="false"` or plain-text passwords in production. Use API keys or service tokens with TLS certificate verification enabled. For self-signed certificates, set `ELASTICSEARCH_CA_CERT` to your CA certificate path.
- ### Production Configuration Examples
- <details>
- <summary><b>Elastic Cloud</b></summary>
- ```bash
- ELASTICSEARCH_CLOUD_ID="my-deployment:dXMtY2VudHJhbC0x..."
- ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY="your_cloud_api_key"
- VERIFY_CERTS="true"
- ```
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Self-Hosted with Custom CA</b></summary>
- ```bash
- ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS="https://es-cluster.internal:9200"
- ELASTICSEARCH_API_KEY="your_api_key"
- ELASTICSEARCH_CA_CERT="/etc/elasticsearch/certs/ca.crt"
- VERIFY_CERTS="true"
- ```
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Mutual TLS (mTLS)</b></summary>
- ```bash
- ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS="https://es-cluster.internal:9200"
- ELASTICSEARCH_CA_CERT="/etc/elasticsearch/certs/ca.crt"
- ELASTICSEARCH_CLIENT_CERT="/etc/elasticsearch/certs/client.crt"
- ELASTICSEARCH_CLIENT_KEY="/etc/elasticsearch/certs/client.key"
- VERIFY_CERTS="true"
- ```
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Development / Testing (insecure)</b></summary>
- ```bash
- ELASTICSEARCH_HOSTS="http://localhost:9200"
- ELASTICSEARCH_USERNAME="elastic"
- ELASTICSEARCH_PASSWORD="test123"
- VERIFY_CERTS="false"
- ```
- > This configuration is **not suitable for production**. Use API keys with TLS in production environments.
- </details>
- ### Transport Modes
- | Mode | Use Case | Command |
- |:-----|:---------|:--------|
- | **stdio** (default) | MCP clients (Claude Code, etc.) | Auto-configured by setup.sh |
- | **SSE** | Web/streaming clients | `--transport sse --port 8000` |
- | **HTTP** | REST API access | `--transport streamable-http` |
- The HTTP transports are hardened at the transport layer:
- - **Origin validation (anti DNS-rebinding)** — browser requests are rejected unless their `Origin` is loopback or listed in `MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` (comma-separated; `*` alone disables the check). Requests without an `Origin` header — every non-browser MCP client — are unaffected.
- - **Audit logging** — every HTTP exchange is logged at the transport boundary (JSON-RPC method, tool name, body size, path), including requests the tool layer never sees, such as unknown tools or protocol errors. Logs are metadata-only, memory-bounded, and sanitised against log forgery.
- ### Disabling Write Operations
- For read-only access (recommended for production):
- ```bash
- DISABLE_HIGH_RISK_OPERATIONS="true"
- ```
- This hides destructive tools: `create_index`, `delete_index`, `index_document`, `delete_document`, `delete_by_query`, `create_data_stream`, `delete_data_stream`, `put_alias`, `delete_alias`, `general_api_request`
- ---
- <a name="usage-examples"></a>
- ## Usage Examples
- ### Example 1: Hunt for Brute Force Attacks
- ```
- You: Hunt for brute force attacks in the last hour
- CrowdSentinel: Searching for failed authentication attempts...
- [Calls hunt_by_timeframe with attack_types=["brute_force"]]
- Found 47 failed login attempts from 3 source IPs targeting the "admin" account.
- Top sources:
- - 192.168.1.105: 28 attempts
- - 10.0.0.42: 15 attempts
- - 172.16.0.8: 4 attempts
- ```
- ### Example 2: Investigate a Suspicious Host
- ```
- You: Show me all activity on host DESKTOP-ABC123 in the last 24 hours
- CrowdSentinel: Generating a forensic timeline for that host...
- [Calls get_host_activity_timeline]
- Timeline shows:
- - 09:15: User "jsmith" logged in (Event 4624)
- - 09:17: PowerShell executed encoded command
- - 09:18: New scheduled task created "WindowsUpdate"
- - 09:22: Outbound connection to 203.0.113.42:443
- - 09:25: LSASS memory access detected
- ```
- ### Example 3: Kill Chain Analysis
- ```
- You: We found C2 beaconing. What should we hunt for next?
- CrowdSentinel: Hunting adjacent kill chain stages...
- [Calls hunt_adjacent_stages with current_stage="COMMAND_AND_CONTROL"]
- Looking backwards (Installation stage):
- - Found scheduled task persistence on 3 hosts
- - Registry Run key modifications detected
- Looking forwards (Actions on Objectives):
- - Lateral movement to 2 additional hosts via SMB
- - Credential dumping attempts detected
- ```
- ### Example 4: Network Traffic Analysis
- ```
- You: Analyse this PCAP for C2 beaconing
- CrowdSentinel: Checking for regular connection intervals...
- [Calls detect_beaconing on the PCAP file]
- Detected beaconing pattern:
- - Host: 192.168.1.50 → 203.0.113.100:443
- - Interval: 60 seconds (±2s jitter)
- - Duration: 4 hours
- - Confidence: HIGH
- Recommend blocking 203.0.113.100 and investigating 192.168.1.50.
- ```
- ### Example 5: CLI Threat Hunt
- ```bash
- # Hunt for encoded PowerShell
- crowdsentinel hunt "powershell -enc" -i winlogbeat-* --timeframe 1440 -o json
- # Pipe results to analysis
- crowdsentinel hunt "event.code:4625" -i winlogbeat-* -o json | \
- crowdsentinel analyse -c "Failed authentication investigation"
- # Search detection rules for lateral movement
- crowdsentinel rules --tactic lateral_movement -p windows
- ```
- ---
- ## Compatibility
- | Package | Backend | Install |
- |:--------|:--------|:--------|
- | `crowdsentinel-mcp-server` | Elasticsearch 8.x (default) | `pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server` |
- | `crowdsentinel-mcp-server-es7` | Elasticsearch 7.x | `pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server-es7` |
- | `crowdsentinel-mcp-server-es9` | Elasticsearch 9.x | `pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server-es9` |
- | `opensearch-mcp-server` | OpenSearch 1.x, 2.x, 3.x | `pip install opensearch-mcp-server` |
- ---
- ## For Developers
- <details>
- <summary><b>Project Structure</b></summary>
- ```
- crowdsentinel-mcp-server/
- ├── src/
- │ ├── server.py # MCP server entry point
- │ ├── version.py # Version constant
- │ ├── risk_config.py # Write operation controls
- │ ├── transport_security.py # Origin validation for HTTP transports (anti DNS-rebinding)
- │ ├── transport_audit.py # Transport-level audit logging (every HTTP exchange)
- │ │
- │ ├── cli/ # Standalone CLI
- │ │ └── main.py # CLI entry point (argparse) — 15 commands incl. doctor
- │ │
- │ ├── agent/ # `analyse --mcp` AI agent mode (multi-provider LLM auth)
- │ ├── config/ # Connector configuration
- │ │
- │ ├── clients/ # Backend logic layer
- │ │ ├── base.py # Base client, authentication
- │ │ ├── exceptions.py # Exception handling decorators
- │ │ └── common/
- │ │ ├── client.py # Unified SearchClient (multiple inheritance)
- │ │ ├── threat_hunting.py # Threat hunting queries
- │ │ ├── ioc_analysis.py # IoC extraction & analysis
- │ │ ├── deobfuscate.py # Encoded-command decoding (stdlib core + optional chepy)
- │ │ ├── cyber_kill_chain.py # Kill chain logic
- │ │ ├── rule_loader.py # Detection rule loading
- │ │ ├── chainsaw_client.py # EVTX/Sigma integration
- │ │ ├── osquery_client.py # Local osquery execution (sqlglot-validated SQL)
- │ │ ├── misp_client.py # MISP export/search
- │ │ ├── threat_intel.py # Shodan/VirusTotal/AbuseIPDB/ThreatFox enrichment
- │ │ └── schemas/ # Data-driven schema registry
- │ │ ├── ecs.py, sysmon.py, windows_security.py, auditd.py
- │ │ └── defs/ # JSON schema defs (zeek, packetbeat, aws_cloudtrail, …)
- │ │
- │ ├── tools/ # MCP tool interfaces (25 modules, 139 tools)
- │ │ ├── register.py # Dynamic tool registration
- │ │ ├── threat_hunting.py # Hunting tool definitions
- │ │ ├── rule_management.py # Rule management tools
- │ │ ├── velociraptor_tools.py # Live endpoint forensics (25 tools)
- │ │ ├── osquery_tools.py # Local host forensics (4 tools)
- │ │ ├── cross_correlation.py # SIEM ↔ endpoint correlation (5 tools)
- │ │ ├── chainsaw_hunting.py # Chainsaw tools
- │ │ ├── wireshark_tools.py # Network analysis tools
- │ │ ├── threat_intel.py # Enrichment + MISP tools
- │ │ └── investigation_state_tools.py # State management tools
- │ │
- │ ├── storage/ # Persistent investigation state
- │ │ ├── investigation_state.py # Core state management
- │ │ ├── storage_manager.py # File system storage (8GB FIFO)
- │ │ └── models.py # Pydantic models (IoC, Investigation)
- │ │
- │ ├── utils/ # Shared utilities
- │ │
- │ └── wireshark/ # Network traffic analysis
- │ ├── core/ # TShark execution, PCAP parsing
- │ ├── hunting/ # Beaconing, lateral movement, IoC hunting
- │ ├── baseline/ # Traffic baseline creation
- │ ├── extraction/ # File carving from traffic
- │ └── reporting/ # NCSC-style reports, timelines
- │
- ├── rules/ # 6,060 detection rules (EQL + Lucene)
- ├── chainsaw/ # Chainsaw binary + 3,000+ Sigma rules
- ├── skills/ # Claude Code agent skills
- ├── Makefile # Test pyramid + release automation
- └── tests/ # Tiered test suite (unit / integration / api / e2e / system)
- ```
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Design Patterns</b></summary>
- | Pattern | Usage |
- |:--------|:------|
- | **Multiple Inheritance** | `SearchClient` composes all specialised clients |
- | **Decorator** | Exception handling via `@handle_exceptions` |
- | **Factory** | `create_search_client()` creates appropriate client |
- | **Plugin Architecture** | Tools registered dynamically via `ToolsRegister` |
- | **Auto-Capture** | Tool results automatically analysed for IoCs |
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Adding a New Tool</b></summary>
- 1. **Create client method** in `src/clients/common/your_module.py`:
- ```python
- class YourClient(SearchClientBase):
- def your_method(self, param: str) -> dict:
- # Implementation
- return results
- ```
- 2. **Add to SearchClient** in `src/clients/common/client.py`:
- ```python
- class SearchClient(YourClient, OtherClients, ...):
- pass
- ```
- 3. **Create tool wrapper** in `src/tools/your_tools.py`:
- ```python
- class YourTools:
- def __init__(self, client, mcp):
- self.client = client
- self.mcp = mcp
- def register_tools(self):
- @self.mcp.tool()
- def your_tool(param: str) -> str:
- """Tool description for LLM."""
- result = self.client.your_method(param)
- return json.dumps(result)
- ```
- 4. **Register in server** in `src/server.py`:
- ```python
- from src.tools.your_tools import YourTools
- def _register_tools(self):
- # ... existing tools ...
- YourTools(self.client, self.mcp).register_tools()
- ```
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Running Tests</b></summary>
- The test suite is a bottom-up pyramid (see `tests/README.md`): hermetic unit tests, then live tiers that spin up a real Elasticsearch (via [testcontainers](https://testcontainers-python.readthedocs.io/)) and the real MCP server.
- ```bash
- make test-unit # fast hermetic loop (default developer command)
- make coverage # unit tier + coverage policy gate
- make check-tests # policy: every new function vs origin/main has a test
- make test-integration # real ES via testcontainers (Docker required)
- make test-api # + real MCP server subprocess over streamable-http
- make test-e2e # + real MCP client journey over the wire
- make test-suite # the whole pyramid, bottom-up, with a summary table
- ```
- | Tier | What it proves | Backing services |
- |:-----|:---------------|:-----------------|
- | Unit | Function-level behaviour, fail-fast validation | None (hermetic) |
- | Integration | App ↔ Elasticsearch trust boundary (auth, TLS, seeded data) | Real ES via testcontainers |
- | API | MCP-over-HTTP contract (schemas, errors, Origin security, audit logs) | Real ES + real server subprocess |
- | E2E | Full analyst journey via a real MCP client | Real ES + real server + `fastmcp.Client` |
- | System | Full pipeline against your own range cluster | BYO Elasticsearch |
- Live tiers are opt-in (`--run-integration` / `--run-api` / `--run-e2e` / `--run-system`), so plain `pytest tests/` stays fast and hermetic.
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><b>Local Testing Environment</b></summary>
- ```bash
- # Start Elasticsearch
- docker-compose -f docker-compose-elasticsearch.yml up -d
- # Start OpenSearch
- docker-compose -f docker-compose-opensearch.yml up -d
- ```
- **Default credentials (testing only):**
- - Elasticsearch: `elastic` / `test123`
- - OpenSearch: `admin` / `admin`
- </details>
- ---
- ## Roadmap
- | Feature | Status | Description |
- |:--------|:------:|:------------|
- | **Velociraptor Integration** | **Done** | 25 live endpoint forensics tools + 5 cross-correlation tools via the Velociraptor API |
- | **osquery Integration** | **Done** | SQL-based local host forensics (processes, sockets, users, ad-hoc queries) |
- | **Encoded-Command Deobfuscation** | **Done** | Recover IoCs hidden in base64/UTF-16LE/gzip/hex-encoded commands (optional chepy for the long tail) |
- | **Threat Intel Enrichment** | **Done** | IoC enrichment via Shodan InternetDB, VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, ThreatFox + STIX 2.1 export |
- | **MISP Integration** | **Done** | Export investigation IoCs as MISP events, search MISP attributes (offline JSON export without a server) |
- | **Zeek Integration** | Partial | Zeek logs indexed into ES are hunted via the data-driven schema registry; native NSM integration planned |
- | **Wazuh Integration** | Planned | Open-source EDR/XDR — its indexer is OpenSearch-based, so CrowdSentinel's existing OpenSearch client can hunt Wazuh alerts and agent telemetry |
- | **Splunk Integration** | Planned | Add Splunk as a data source alongside Elasticsearch |
- | **Sigma Rule Converter** | Planned | Convert Sigma rules to native ES/Splunk queries |
- | **Case Management** | Planned | Export investigations to TheHive, JIRA |
- | **Custom Rule Builder** | Planned | Create detection rules via natural language |
- See [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md) for detailed version history.
- ---
- ## Velociraptor Integration (Live Endpoint Forensics)
- CrowdSentinel integrates with [Velociraptor](https://docs.velociraptor.app/) for live endpoint forensic artefact collection. When configured, 25 additional MCP tools and 5 cross-correlation tools become available.
- ### Setup
- ```bash
- # Install optional dependencies
- pip install crowdsentinel-mcp-server[velociraptor]
- # Set the Velociraptor API config path
- export VELOCIRAPTOR_API_CONFIG="/path/to/api_client.yaml"
- ```
- The API client config is generated from the Velociraptor server:
- ```bash
- velociraptor config api_client --name crowdsentinel --role administrator,api \
- --config server.config.yaml /path/to/api_client.yaml
- ```
- ### Available Tools
- | Category | Tools | Use Case |
- |:---------|:------|:---------|
- | **Discovery** | `velociraptor_client_info`, `velociraptor_list_clients`, `velociraptor_list_artifacts` | Resolve hostnames, enumerate enrolled endpoints, discover available artefacts |
- | **Generic Collection** | `velociraptor_collect_artifact`, `velociraptor_get_collection_results` | Collect any Velociraptor artefact and fetch its results |
- | **Live State** | `velociraptor_pslist`, `velociraptor_netstat`, `velociraptor_users`, `velociraptor_groups`, `velociraptor_mounts` | Running processes, active network connections, accounts, groups, mounted volumes |
- | **Execution Evidence** | `velociraptor_prefetch`, `velociraptor_amcache`, `velociraptor_shimcache`, `velociraptor_userassist`, `velociraptor_bam`, `velociraptor_srum` | Forensic proof of programme execution and resource usage |
- | **Persistence** | `velociraptor_services`, `velociraptor_scheduled_tasks`, `velociraptor_autoruns` | Service, scheduled task, and autorun persistence mechanisms |
- | **User Activity** | `velociraptor_shellbags`, `velociraptor_recentdocs`, `velociraptor_lnk`, `velociraptor_evidence_of_download` | User browsing, document access, link files, file downloads |
- | **Filesystem & Logs** | `velociraptor_ntfs_mft`, `velociraptor_evtx` | MFT search by name/path/timestamp, remote EVTX queries |
- | **Cross-Correlation** | `correlate_siem_with_endpoint`, `endpoint_to_siem_pivot`, `endpoint_hunt_from_ioc`, `correlate_by_time`, `build_unified_timeline` | Validate SIEM findings on endpoints, pivot from endpoint IoCs to fleet-wide SIEM searches, unified timelines |
- ### Cross-Source IoC Sharing
- IoCs extracted from Velociraptor artefacts are automatically captured into the active investigation alongside SIEM, Chainsaw, and Wireshark findings. Use `get_shared_iocs` to retrieve the combined indicator set for cross-source correlation.
- ```
- SIEM (Elasticsearch) Endpoint (Velociraptor)
- │ │
- hunt_by_timeframe() velociraptor_pslist()
- │ │
- auto_capture ──────► Investigation State ◄────── auto_capture
- │
- get_shared_iocs()
- ```
- ### DFIR Knowledge Resources
- 9 MCP resources provide structured investigation reference data directly to connected AI agents:
- | Resource | Content |
- |:---------|:--------|
- | `crowdsentinel://investigation-workflow` | Mandatory 4-phase IR workflow |
- | `crowdsentinel://ioc-reference` | IoC types ranked by Pyramid of Pain |
- | `crowdsentinel://ioc-reference/data` | Machine-readable IoC reference data |
- | `crowdsentinel://cross-correlation-playbooks` | 5 investigation playbooks (suspicious process, brute force, lateral movement, persistence, exfiltration) |
- | `crowdsentinel://velociraptor-guide` | Artefact reference tables and "found X in SIEM → check Y on endpoint" decision tree |
- | `crowdsentinel://data-sources` | All data source capabilities and investigation decision matrix |
- | `crowdsentinel://tool-recommendations` | Which tool to reach for at each investigation step |
- | `crowdsentinel://schemas` | Supported log-source schemas (ECS, Sysmon, Windows Security, auditd, Zeek, …) |
- | `crowdsentinel://schemas/list` | Machine-readable schema listing |
- ---
- <a name="documentation"></a>
- ## Documentation
- ### User Guides
- | Document | Description |
- |:---------|:------------|
- | [FIRST_TIME_SETUP.md](FIRST_TIME_SETUP.md) | Detailed first-time setup instructions |
- | [HOW_TO_USE.md](HOW_TO_USE.md) | Comprehensive usage guide |
- | [QUICK_START.md](QUICK_START.md) | 5-minute quick start |
- | [TRANSPORT_MODES.md](TRANSPORT_MODES.md) | stdio, SSE, HTTP configuration |
- ### Feature Guides
- | Document | Description |
- |:---------|:------------|
- | [THREAT_HUNTING_GUIDE.md](THREAT_HUNTING_GUIDE.md) | Threat hunting workflows |
- | [DETECTION_RULES_GUIDE.md](DETECTION_RULES_GUIDE.md) | Using 6,060 detection rules |
- | [CYBER_KILL_CHAIN_GUIDE.md](CYBER_KILL_CHAIN_GUIDE.md) | Kill chain analysis |
- | [CHAINSAW_GUIDE.md](CHAINSAW_GUIDE.md) | EVTX log analysis with Sigma |
- | [INVESTIGATION_PROMPTS_GUIDE.md](INVESTIGATION_PROMPTS_GUIDE.md) | Fast triage spine |
- | [AI_AGENT_INTEGRATION.md](AI_AGENT_INTEGRATION.md) | Workflow guidance for AI agents |
- ### Developer Guides
- | Document | Description |
- |:---------|:------------|
- | [ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md) | Detailed architecture documentation |
- | [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) | Contribution guidelines |
- ---
- ## Contributing
- Contributions are welcome! Please see [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for guidelines.
- ---
- ## Licence
- GNU General Public Licence v3.0 — See [LICENSE](LICENSE) for details.
- ---
- ## Cyber Range
- CrowdSentinel ships with a companion **[crowdsentinel-range](https://github.com/thomasxm/crowdsentinel-range)** — a fully ephemeral AWS lab that generates ground-truth-labeled attack telemetry so you can investigate real detections rather than synthetic data.
- ### Current range (v1) — 2-host AWS lab
- ```
- ┌──────────────────────────── AWS VPC (private subnet) ────────────────────────────────┐
- │ │
- │ ┌──────────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
- │ │ Linux SIEM (Ubuntu 22.04) │ │ Windows Range Box (Server 2022) │ │
- │ │ Elasticsearch 8.x (TLS) │◄─────│ Sysmon (olafhartong) + Winlogbeat 9 │ │
- │ │ Auditbeat + Filebeat │ │ Atomic Red Team + PurpleSharp │ │
- │ └──────────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
- │ SSM VPC endpoints — no inbound ports open │
- └───────────────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────--┘
- │ SSM port-forward :19200
- ┌──────────▼──────────────────────┐
- │ ./range-mcp.sh → CrowdSentinel │
- │ MCP Server → Claude Code │
- └─────────────────────────────────┘
- ```
- **3 commands to go from zero to hunting:**
- ```bash
- cd crowdsentinel-range && make up && make attack-windows
- cd .. && ./range-mcp.sh
- # then in Claude Code: /mcp → "investigate potential intrusions on the windows machine"
- ```
- > Demo: [73,328 events triaged in ~40 seconds](https://github.com/thomasxm/crowdsentinel-range/blob/main/docs/demo-windows-triage-investigation.md) — 2 shellcode payloads decoded, C2 IP extracted from raw bytes, full IR report with 19 MITRE techniques.
- ---
- ### Future range (v2) — enterprise AD environment
- The next range generation targets **full Active Directory kill-chain coverage**: initial access → lateral movement → domain compromise, with a network security monitor layer, runtime security instrumentation, centralised vulnerability management, and deception infrastructure. Inspired by [DetectionLab](https://github.com/clong/DetectionLab), [Ludus](https://docs.ludus.cloud/), and [SimuLand](https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand).
- ```
- ┌───────────────────────────────────── AWS / Multi-VPC ───────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
- │ │
- │ ┌──── Attacker Subnet ────┐ ┌───────────── Corporate Subnet ──────────────────────────────────────┐ │
- │ │ │ │ │ │
- │ │ Kali Linux (C2 server) │ │ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ │ │
- │ │ Caldera + Metasploit │ │ │ Domain │ │ Windows 11 │ │ Windows 11 │ │ │
- │ │ Covenant C2 │──▶│ │ Controller │ │ Workstation 1 │ │ Workstation 2 │ │ │
- │ │ │ │ │ (AD DS, DNS) │ │ (domain-joined) │ │ (domain-joined) │ │ │
- │ └──────────────────────────┘ │ └─────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ │ │
- │ │ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │
- │ ┌──── DMZ Subnet ─────────┐ │ │ Linux File/Web Server (IIS / Apache, SMB share) │ │ │
- │ │ │ │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │
- │ │ Nginx reverse proxy │ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
- │ │ Simulated internet SVC │ │
- │ └──────────────────────────┘ ┌───────────── Management / SIEM Subnet ──────────────────────────┐ │
- │ │ │ │
- │ │ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ │
- │ │ │ Elasticsearch + │ │ Zeek / Suricata │ │ │
- │ │ │ Kibana (SIEM) │ │ (NSM — full packet + alerts) │ │ │
- │ │ └─────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ │
- │ │ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ │
- │ │ │ Velociraptor │ │ Falco (runtime security) │ │ │
- │ │ │ (live EDR/forensics)│ │ eBPF probe (CO-RE, default) │ │ │
- │ │ └─────────────────────┘ │ + kernel module fallback │ │ │
- │ │ ┌─────────────────────┐ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ │
- │ │ │ DefectDojo │ ┌───────────────────────────────┐ │ │
- │ │ │ (vuln management) │ │ Honeypots + Canary tokens │ │ │
- │ │ │ Falco·Zeek·scanners │ │ (deception layer) │ │ │
- │ │ └─────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────────┘ │ │
- │ │ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ │
- │ │ │ Grafana — centralized dashboards + alerting │ │ │
- │ │ │ ES · Falco · Suricata · Velociraptor · DefectDojo │ │ │
- │ │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │ │
- │ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
- │ VyOS router — inter-subnet ACLs + egress filter │
- └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
- │ SSM / VPN
- CrowdSentinel MCP + Claude Code
- ```
- **v2 target capabilities:**
- | Capability | v1 (current) | v2 (planned) |
- |------------|-------------|--------------|
- | Hosts | 2 (Linux SIEM + Windows) | 7–10 (DC + 2× WS + Linux + NSM + attacker + SIEM) |
- | Network segments | 1 (private subnet) | 4 (attacker / corp / DMZ / management) |
- | Active Directory | — | Full AD DS domain + GPO + Kerberos |
- | Lateral movement coverage | Limited | Pass-the-Hash, Kerberoasting, DCSync |
- | Network detection | — | Zeek (NSM) + Suricata IDS |
- | Runtime security | — | Falco; modern eBPF probe (CO-RE, bundled, default) + kernel module fallback; syscall-level host + container detection |
- | Endpoint forensics | — | Velociraptor live triage |
- | Vuln management | — | DefectDojo; aggregates Falco alerts, Zeek/Suricata findings, scanner results (OpenVAS, Trivy) into unified tracking + remediation workflow |
- | Dashboards | — | Grafana; centralised metrics + alert visualisation across ES, Falco, Suricata, Velociraptor, and DefectDojo |
- | Deception layer | — | Honeypot + canary tokens |
- | C2 infrastructure | ART atomics only | Caldera + Metasploit + Covenant |
- | Attack scenarios | Windows atomics + EVTX replay | Full kill-chain: initial access → domain compromise |
- | CrowdSentinel coverage | ES hunt + IR | ES + Zeek/Suricata + Falco + Velociraptor cross-source correlation; DefectDojo/Grafana as upstream context |
- **Design references:** [DetectionLab](https://github.com/clong/DetectionLab) (Sysmon+WEF+Splunk convergence), [Ludus](https://docs.ludus.cloud/) (modular Proxmox/Ansible, VLAN segmentation), [SimuLand](https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand) (multi-domain AD forest, cloud-native), [SANS FOR508](https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-courses/advanced-incident-response-threat-hunting-training/) (artifact-first DFIR workflow), [Falco](https://falco.org/docs/concepts/falco-kernel-testing/) (CO-RE eBPF probe architecture, kernel module fallback).
- ## Acknowledgements
- CrowdSentinel stands on the shoulders of outstanding open-source projects. Thank you to all of their maintainers and contributors.
- **Protocol & server framework**
- - [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/) — the protocol connecting LLMs to tools, by Anthropic
- - [FastMCP](https://github.com/jlowin/fastmcp) — the Python MCP server framework this project is built on
- **Analysis engines & forensic tools**
- - [Chainsaw](https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/chainsaw) — EVTX log analyser by WithSecure Labs
- - [Velociraptor](https://docs.velociraptor.app/) — live endpoint forensics and DFIR platform by Velocidex/Rapid7
- - [osquery](https://osquery.io/) — SQL-powered host instrumentation by the osquery Foundation
- - [Wireshark / TShark](https://www.wireshark.org/) — network protocol analysis by the Wireshark Foundation
- - [Chepy](https://github.com/securisec/chepy) — CyberChef-like decoding library powering optional long-tail deobfuscation
- - [sqlglot](https://github.com/tobymao/sqlglot) — SQL parser used to safely validate osquery queries
- **Detection content**
- - [Sigma / SigmaHQ](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma) — the community detection rule standard and rule corpus
- - [Elastic detection-rules](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules) — Elastic's prebuilt EQL/ES|QL detection rules
- - Community-contributed Sigma and custom rules
- **Data platforms & threat intelligence**
- - [Elasticsearch](https://github.com/elastic/elasticsearch-py) and [OpenSearch](https://github.com/opensearch-project/opensearch-py) Python clients
- - [MISP / PyMISP](https://github.com/MISP/PyMISP) — open-source threat intelligence platform and client
- - [stix2](https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-python-stix2) — OASIS STIX 2.1 library for structured IoC export
- - [Shodan InternetDB](https://internetdb.shodan.io/), [VirusTotal](https://www.virustotal.com/), [AbuseIPDB](https://www.abuseipdb.com/), and [abuse.ch ThreatFox](https://threatfox.abuse.ch/) — IoC enrichment services with free tiers
- **Development & testing**
- - [testcontainers-python](https://github.com/testcontainers/testcontainers-python) — real Elasticsearch containers for the live test tiers
- - [pytest](https://pytest.org/), [Ruff](https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff), [Bandit](https://github.com/PyCQA/bandit) — test runner, linting, and SAST
- **Methodology frameworks**
- - Cyber Kill Chain (Lockheed Martin), Pyramid of Pain (David J. Bianco), Diamond Model (Caltagirone, Pendergast & Betz), [MITRE ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/)
- ---
- <div align="center">
- **Made for the security community by [medjedtxm](https://github.com/thomasxm)**
- [](https://github.com/thomasxm/CrowdSentinels-AI-MCP)
- [](https://pypi.org/project/crowdsentinel-mcp-server/)
- </div>
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