sysknife
An AI that administers Linux through typed, approval-gated, Ed25519-audited actions. The model selects the action; the daemon builds the command.
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Install instructions from the README
As written by the repo's author. findsafeskills has not verified these steps.
The fastest path is the setup wizard. It installs the daemon and wires SysKnife into your AI IDE — Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI — so you can plan and execute from chat.
npx sysknife-setup
Needs **Node 22 or newer**; older Node releases no longer receive security fixes. On Ubuntu 22.04 `apt install nodejs` gives Node 12, which is too old; the installer says so and how to get a current Node. No Rust toolchain and no compile: it downloads verified prebuilt binaries.
What this does:
1. **Downloads the prebuilt `sysknife` + `sysknife-daemon` binaries** for your architecture (x86_64 / aarch64) from GitHub Releases, **SHA-256-verifies** each against the release checksum file — a mismatch aborts the install — and places them in `~/.local/bin` (no sudo). Pass `--no-binary` to skip the download and build from source instead. 2. Asks for your **LLM provider, key, and model** — OpenAI / Anthropic / Gemini / Ollama / Groq / DeepSeek / Mistral / xAI (Ollama needs no key). The key prompt is skipped when the matching env var is already set. 3. Asks **which AI integration** to wire up (or pick `--claude` / `--cursor` / `--codex` / `--all`) and your **daemon target(s)** — socket, plus an optional vsock token for a remote VM. 4. **Writes the integration-specific MCP config** (merging into any existing file, never clobbering) so the next chat session sees the `sysknife_*` tools — `sysknife_plan`, `sysknife_execute`, `sysknife_history`, `sysknife_doctor`, `sysknife_audit_verify`, and distro-compatible direct read-only queries such as `sysknife_get_disk_usage` — as first-class tools. 5. **Installs and starts the daemon as a service** (last step) — a systemd *user* service by default (no sudo; kept alive across logout via linger). That service runs as you, so read-only actions work but **mutating ones do not**: installing packages or restarting services needs the system-level service, whose sudoers grants belong to the `sysknife` system user. Pick the system service on any host where you intend to change something, and pass `--daemon-mode=system|user|skip` to choose without a prompt. `--daemon-mode=system` does not install the system service from the wizard — it needs root-owned sudoers, polkit and helper policy that `sudo make install` owns — so it prints the exact sequence and reports the daemon as not yet installed.
To verify the download against a checksum list you trust independently of the release, set `SYSKNIFE_PINNED_SHA256SUMS=/path/to/sums`; see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md#release-artefact-trust).
| Client | Files written | |-----------------|------------------------------------------------------| | **Claude Code** | `.mcp.json` + `.claude/hookify.*.local.md` | | **Cursor** | `.cursor/mcp.json` + `.cursor/rules/sysknife.mdc` | | **Codex CLI** | `~/.codex/config.toml` (appended) + `AGENTS.md` |
Then in your chat: ask for what you want and review the plan with risk pills. Approve each transaction with `sysknife approve <transaction-id>` in a terminal, return the one-time receipts, and watch it execute. The daemon, not the prompt, enforces the receipt boundary.
> **Prefer the standalone CLI?** Same engine, no IDE — see the > [CLI guide](docs/cli.md) for `sysknife "..."`, `--dry-run`, `--json`, > approval prompts, and audit-log inspection.
<details> <summary><strong>Manual install — Ubuntu 20.04+</strong></summary>
Needs Rust stable **and a C compiler** (`build-essential`): the TLS and SQLite dependencies build native code, so a rustup-only machine stops at `error: linker cc not found`. `cmake` is not required. Budget 7 to 12 minutes for the ~400-crate build (6m56s on Ubuntu 24.04, 11m43s on 22.04).
sudo apt-get install -y build-essential git clone https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife cd sysknife
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- <p align="center">
- <a href="https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife">
- <img src="assets/logo/sysknife.svg" alt="SysKnife" width="170" height="170"/>
- </a>
- </p>
- <h1 align="center">SysKnife</h1>
- <p align="center">
- <em>The Linux sysadmin MCP server. Plan. Approve. Audit.</em>
- </p>
- <p align="center">
- <a href="https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/actions"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/actions/workflow/status/lacs-project/sysknife/ci.yml?branch=main&style=flat-square&logo=github&label=CI" alt="CI"></a>
- <a href="https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/license/lacs-project/sysknife?style=flat-square" alt="License"></a>
- <a href="https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/stargazers"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/lacs-project/sysknife?style=flat-square&logo=github" alt="Stars"></a>
- <a href="https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/issues"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/issues/lacs-project/sysknife?style=flat-square" alt="Issues"></a>
- <a href="https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/discussions"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/discussions/lacs-project/sysknife?style=flat-square&label=discuss" alt="Discussions"></a>
- <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/sysknife-setup"><img src="https://img.shields.io/npm/v/sysknife-setup?style=flat-square&logo=npm&label=npx%20setup" alt="npm version"></a>
- <a href="https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/lacs-project/sysknife"><img src="https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/lacs-project/sysknife/badges/score.svg" alt="Glama MCP server quality score"></a>
- <a href="https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/tests/evidence/workspace-tests.json"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/dynamic/json?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2Flacs-project%2Fsysknife%2Fmain%2Ftests%2Fevidence%2Fworkspace-tests.json&query=$.tests&label=Rust%20tests&style=flat-square&color=2f855a" alt="Rust test count, read from the recorded baseline"></a>
- <a href="https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/blob/main/tests/evidence/workspace-tests.json"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/dynamic/json?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2Flacs-project%2Fsysknife%2Fmain%2Ftests%2Fevidence%2Fworkspace-tests.json&query=$.frontend_tests&label=frontend%20tests&style=flat-square&color=2f855a" alt="Frontend test count, read from the recorded baseline"></a>
- </p>
- <p align="center">
- <strong>Distros</strong>
- <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Ubuntu%2020.04%2B-supported-2f855a?style=flat-square&logo=ubuntu&logoColor=white" alt="Ubuntu 20.04 and later supported">
- <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Ubuntu%2022.04%20%7C%2024.04%20%7C%2026.04-VM%20validated-2f855a?style=flat-square&logo=ubuntu&logoColor=white" alt="Ubuntu 22.04, 24.04 and 26.04 VM validated">
- <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Fedora%20Atomic%2041%2B-eligible%2C%20unvalidated-b7791f?style=flat-square&logo=fedora&logoColor=white" alt="Fedora Atomic 41 and later eligible but not VM validated">
- </p>
- <p align="center">
- <a href="#mcp-server">MCP server</a> ·
- <a href="#install">Install</a> ·
- <a href="#how-it-works">How it works</a> ·
- <a href="#why-not-just-x">Why not <em>X</em>?</a> ·
- <a href="docs/distro-support.md">Distro matrix</a> ·
- <a href="ROADMAP.md">Roadmap</a> ·
- <a href="CONTRIBUTING.md">Contribute</a> ·
- <a href="https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/discussions">Discuss</a>
- </p>
- <p align="center">
- <img src="assets/demo/ubuntu-flow.gif" alt="SysKnife in Claude Code via MCP on Ubuntu 24.04: UfwAllow, AptInstall and UfwStatus through terminal-issued receipts" width="900"/>
- </p>
- <p align="center">
- <em>A deterministic reproduction of the Claude Code MCP flow on Ubuntu 24.04, rendered offline by
- <a href="assets/demo/ubuntu-flow-mock.sh">ubuntu-flow-mock.sh</a> so it replays identically from a
- fresh checkout. Every action name, risk level and command shown is the one the catalogue
- carries. The same flow works in Cursor and Codex CLI.</em><br/>
- <em>On an atomic host the plan uses rpm-ostree instead:
- <a href="assets/demo/mcp-flow.gif">the Fedora Atomic recording</a>.
- Looking for the standalone CLI? See <a href="docs/cli.md">the CLI guide</a>.</em>
- </p>
- > **Describe what you want in plain language.** Review a typed plan with risk
- > levels. Approve explicitly. Watch it execute with live output. Atomic-host
- > changes (rpm-ostree) roll back automatically on failure. Every action is
- > Ed25519-signed and audited.
- The AI never supplies a command. Every action is a **typed operation** with a
- formal risk level, and the daemon builds the command line itself from the
- action's own definition — some actions do run through `sh -c`, but the shell
- fragment is constructed by SysKnife, never by the model. The AI cannot touch
- your system directly. A privileged daemon executes only what you approve, writes
- a tamper-evident Ed25519-signed audit chain, and rolls back atomic-host
- (rpm-ostree) changes automatically on failure.
- **Why typed actions and not a guarded shell?** Red-team research (GuardFall)
- found that **10 of 11 AI agents bypass raw-string shell guards** — an allowlist
- or regex is filtering a language rich enough to hide intent. SysKnife removes
- the shell string entirely: the model emits
- [typed actions](docs/typed-actions.md), and a
- [public-key-verifiable audit chain](docs/the-audit-chain.md) records every one.
- ---
- ## MCP server
- SysKnife is an MCP server first. Point Claude Code, Cursor or Codex CLI at it and
- your assistant gets typed, risk-classified sysadmin tools in place of a shell:
- | Tool | What it does |
- |---|---|
- | `sysknife_plan` | Turns plain language into typed steps, each with a risk level, a resolved command and a daemon transaction ID |
- | `sysknife_execute` | Runs steps that carry a one-time receipt, and nothing else |
- | `sysknife_history` | Reads past runs out of the signed audit log |
- | `sysknife_doctor` | Reports daemon, provider and audit-chain health |
- | `sysknife_audit_verify` | Walks the Ed25519 chain and says whether it is intact |
- | `sysknife_get_disk_usage`, and the rest of the read-only catalogue | Direct queries, selected for the distro you are on |
- ```sh
- npx sysknife-setup
- ```
- One command wires the server into your client and installs the daemon.
- [Install](#install) has the detail, and [MCP protocol](#mcp-protocol) has the
- wire behaviour.
- **Your assistant cannot approve its own work.** `sysknife_plan` hands back a
- transaction ID and stops there. The receipt `sysknife_execute` demands comes
- from `sysknife approve <transaction-id>`, typed in your terminal, on a channel
- the model does not sit on. Missing, expired, mismatched and replayed receipts
- are all refused.
- Prefer to stay in the shell? [The CLI](#prefer-the-terminal-the-cli-is-a-first-class-path)
- is the same engine with no client in front of it.
- ---
- ## Install
- The fastest path is the setup wizard. It installs the daemon and wires
- SysKnife into your AI IDE — Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI — so you can
- plan and execute from chat.
- ```sh
- npx sysknife-setup
- ```
- Needs **Node 22 or newer**; older Node releases no longer receive security fixes.
- On Ubuntu 22.04 `apt install nodejs` gives Node 12, which is too old; the installer
- says so and how to get a current Node. No Rust
- toolchain and no compile: it downloads verified prebuilt binaries.
- [](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sysknife-setup)
- What this does:
- 1. **Downloads the prebuilt `sysknife` + `sysknife-daemon` binaries** for your
- architecture (x86_64 / aarch64) from GitHub Releases, **SHA-256-verifies**
- each against the release checksum file — a mismatch aborts the install — and
- places them in `~/.local/bin` (no sudo). Pass `--no-binary` to skip the
- download and build from source instead.
- 2. Asks for your **LLM provider, key, and model** — OpenAI / Anthropic / Gemini
- / Ollama / Groq / DeepSeek / Mistral / xAI (Ollama needs no key). The key
- prompt is skipped when the matching env var is already set.
- 3. Asks **which AI integration** to wire up (or pick `--claude` / `--cursor` /
- `--codex` / `--all`) and your **daemon target(s)** — socket, plus an optional
- vsock token for a remote VM.
- 4. **Writes the integration-specific MCP config** (merging into any existing
- file, never clobbering) so the next chat session sees the `sysknife_*` tools —
- `sysknife_plan`, `sysknife_execute`, `sysknife_history`, `sysknife_doctor`,
- `sysknife_audit_verify`, and distro-compatible direct read-only queries such
- as `sysknife_get_disk_usage` — as first-class tools.
- 5. **Installs and starts the daemon as a service** (last step) — a systemd
- *user* service by default (no sudo; kept alive across logout via linger).
- That service runs as you, so read-only actions work but **mutating ones do
- not**: installing packages or restarting services needs the system-level
- service, whose sudoers grants belong to the `sysknife` system user. Pick the
- system service on any host where you intend to change something, and pass
- `--daemon-mode=system|user|skip` to choose without a prompt. `--daemon-mode=system`
- does not install the system service from the wizard — it needs root-owned
- sudoers, polkit and helper policy that `sudo make install` owns — so it prints
- the exact sequence and reports the daemon as not yet installed.
- To verify the download against a checksum list you trust independently of the
- release, set `SYSKNIFE_PINNED_SHA256SUMS=/path/to/sums`; see
- [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md#release-artefact-trust).
- To check where a release binary was built, download it from the release page and
- run `gh attestation verify sysknife-vX.Y.Z-linux-x86_64 --repo lacs-project/sysknife`.
- It succeeds only if the file matches a provenance statement GitHub signed for a
- build of this repository by `release.yml`. Each release also ships that
- provenance as `sysknife-vX.Y.Z-linux-<arch>.intoto.jsonl`, so the same check works
- with `--bundle`; see [Verify the published release](docs/release.md#verify-the-published-release).
- | Client | Files written |
- |-----------------|------------------------------------------------------|
- | **Claude Code** | `.mcp.json` + `.claude/hookify.*.local.md` |
- | **Cursor** | `.cursor/mcp.json` + `.cursor/rules/sysknife.mdc` |
- | **Codex CLI** | `~/.codex/config.toml` (appended) + `AGENTS.md` |
- Then in your chat: ask for what you want and review the plan with risk pills.
- Approve each transaction with `sysknife approve <transaction-id>` in a
- terminal, return the one-time receipts, and watch it execute. The daemon, not
- the prompt, enforces the receipt boundary.
- > **Prefer the standalone CLI?** Same engine, no IDE — see the
- > [CLI guide](docs/cli.md) for `sysknife "..."`, `--dry-run`, `--json`,
- > approval prompts, and audit-log inspection.
- <details>
- <summary><strong>Manual install — Ubuntu 20.04+</strong></summary>
- Needs Rust stable **and a C compiler** (`build-essential`): the TLS and SQLite
- dependencies build native code, so a rustup-only machine stops at
- `error: linker cc not found`. `cmake` is not required. Budget 7 to 12
- minutes for the ~400-crate build (6m56s on Ubuntu 24.04, 11m43s on 22.04).
- ```sh
- sudo apt-get install -y build-essential
- git clone https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife
- cd sysknife
- make build # builds sysknife (CLI) + sysknife-daemon
- sudo make install # installs both; daemon runs as a system service
- sudo systemctl enable --now sysknife-daemon
- # Join the socket group and one role group, or every request is refused with
- # "Permission denied" before any role check runs: /run/sysknife is 0750
- # sysknife:sysknife, and a sudo admin is not in that group automatically.
- # Role groups: sysknife-observer (read-only), sysknife-dev (medium risk),
- # sysknife-admin (high risk). Members of wheel are treated as admin.
- sudo usermod -aG sysknife,sysknife-admin "$USER"
- newgrp sysknife # or log out and back in
- # Then wire your IDE — --no-binary skips the download since you just built them
- # (--daemon-mode=skip: make install already set the service up)
- npx sysknife-setup --no-binary --daemon-mode=skip
- ```
- ### Uninstall
- Whichever way you installed, there is one command for it.
- ```sh
- # Removes the user service, the binaries in ~/.local/bin, and the SysKnife
- # entries in the MCP and agent config it wrote: Claude Code's in the current
- # directory, .cursor/mcp.json and .cursor/rules/sysknife.mdc, the sysknife block
- # in ~/.codex/config.toml, and the SysKnife block in AGENTS.md.
- npx sysknife-setup --uninstall
- # See exactly what that would touch, without touching it.
- npx sysknife-setup --uninstall --dry-run
- ```
- **Your audit history is kept by default.** Removing the software should not
- destroy the record of what it did, so the audit database, the safety-audit log
- and `~/.config/sysknife` are left in place and their paths printed. Delete those
- too, only if you mean to, with:
- ```sh
- npx sysknife-setup --uninstall --purge # names each file before deleting it
- ```
- If you installed the **system** service with `sudo make install`, remove it with
- the Makefile that owns its sudoers grants, polkit rules and privileged helpers.
- `--uninstall` deliberately will not touch those, because half a removed
- privilege boundary is worse than none:
- ```sh
- sudo make uninstall
- ```
- All three Ubuntu LTS releases record a live-VM run of <!-- fig:lts_story_total -->79<!-- /fig --> stories from the Ubuntu
- suite (which has since grown to <!-- fig:stories_ubuntu floor=10 -->90+<!-- /fig -->), and each run has a replay twin that reproduces it: 22.04, 24.04 and 26.04
- all at <!-- fig:lts_story_rate -->79/79<!-- /fig -->, every twin serving every call with zero misses. The runs are in
- `tests/evidence/story-runs/`. The suite grew from 50 when every Debian-only
- action got a story, `GetHostState` first.
- Fedora Atomic is the rpm-ostree target; `make install` does not complete on
- rpm-ostree yet ([#301](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/issues/301)), and
- a release needs a current Silverblue 44 VM run before it counts as validated. Plain Fedora Workstation and
- Server remain experimental until the `dnf` action family ships. See the
- [`distro support matrix`](docs/distro-support.md) for evidence and scope.
- </details>
- <details>
- <summary><strong>Dry run — plan only, nothing executes</strong></summary>
- ```sh
- # Requires the sysknife binary (see manual install above, or `npx sysknife-setup`).
- # Plans only: no daemon, no approval, no execution.
- export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
- sysknife --dry-run "show disk usage and list services that ate cpu in the last hour"
- ```
- </details>
- ## Prefer the terminal? The CLI is a first-class path
- Same engine, no IDE and no MCP client — plain language to a typed plan to live
- execution, straight from your shell, with `--dry-run`, `--json`, `--yes` up to a
- risk ceiling, and `sysknife audit verify`. This is a fully supported way to run
- SysKnife, not an afterthought. See the [CLI guide](docs/cli.md).
- <p align="center">
- <img src="assets/demo/demo.gif" alt="sysknife CLI — plan, approve, and execute in the terminal" width="900"/>
- </p>
- <p align="center">
- <em>A deterministic reproduction of a real planning and execution session, rendered offline by
- <a href="assets/demo/demo-mock.sh">demo-mock.sh</a>. Live LLM calls are nondeterministic and the
- tape has to render with no daemon or provider configured, so the recording is scripted rather
- than captured; the output styling is generated from the same code paths as the real CLI.</em>
- </p>
- > **Also: a desktop GUI — development paused.** An experimental Tauri desktop
- > app (`sysknife-shell`) wraps the same plan → approve → execute loop in a
- > window. **Its development is paused for now**, and effort is going to Ubuntu
- > across its supported versions instead. The code stays in the tree and still
- > builds, but it is not being reviewed, tested, or extended, so reach for it
- > only if you specifically want a graphical approval flow and can live with
- > that. The MCP integration and the CLI are the maintained surfaces.
- ## How it works
- ```
- sysknife-brain → approval gate → sysknife-daemon
- (planner) (you, in a (executor)
- talks to LLM terminal) only privileged
- never to OS shows the plan, process; signs
- takes y/n every action
- ```
- The approval gate is a surface, not a component, and it depends on how you
- reach SysKnife:
- - **MCP:** a plan from an AI client needs a receipt from
- `sysknife approve <transaction-id>`, typed in your terminal, so the client
- cannot approve its own plan.
- - **The standalone CLI:** `sysknife "<intent>"` asks about each step at its own
- prompt, or approves up to `--max-risk` under `--yes`. It never calls
- `sysknife approve`.
- - **An agent with a shell on your account** can drive the CLI by itself. In that
- case the daemon's role limits
- ([SECURITY.md, layer 3](SECURITY.md#layer-3--role-based-authorization-sysknife-daemon))
- are the boundary that holds.
- The paused Tauri GUI (`sysknife-shell`) is a third implementation of the gate,
- not a step the other two route through.
- 1. You type a natural-language request.
- 2. The brain proposes a plan — each step is a **typed action** with
- a risk level (`Low` · `Medium` · `High`).
- 3. The shell shows the plan with previews, side-effects, and rollback
- metadata.
- 4. You approve each step explicitly (or set `--yes` up to a risk ceiling).
- 5. The daemon executes, streams live output, and rolls back atomic-host
- (rpm-ostree) changes automatically on failure.
- 6. Every execution is logged to a hash-chained SQLite or Postgres audit
- trail you can verify with `sysknife audit verify`.
- The brain *proposes*; only the daemon is privileged. The daemon *enforces*
- policy, executes typed actions, writes the signed chain, and triggers
- atomic-host rollback (rpm-ostree) on failure. The trust boundary is
- mechanical: no shell strings cross the wire.
- ## Why not just X?
- | Tool | The gap |
- |---|---|
- | **Open Interpreter** | Runs arbitrary Python/Shell. No formal risk model. No audit chain. |
- | **Goose / Continue** | General-purpose. Ad-hoc confirmation, not typed risk levels. |
- | **Claude Computer Use** | Uncontrolled desktop automation, not system administration. |
- | **Ansible** | YAML written in advance. Not conversational. No risk classification. |
- | **shell-gpt / Copilot** | Suggests raw shell commands. You still run raw shell. |
- | **AIShell-Gate** | Closest peer, but proprietary and closed; audit is symmetric HMAC (the verifier holds the signing secret, so a proof convinces no one else). No rollback. |
- | **Manual** | No audit trail. No rollback. One typo = lost work. |
- SysKnife is different by construction: typed actions, an Ed25519-signed audit
- chain, explicit approval gate, automatic rollback for atomic-host (rpm-ostree)
- changes, a privilege boundary scoped per action across sudo and polkit. The AI
- never holds a shell. See the
- full [SysKnife vs. alternatives](docs/comparison.md) breakdown (AIShell-Gate,
- gate-oc-audit, MCP gateways, generic mcp-shell).
- ## Status
- The trust chain is built, tested, and shipping. Multi-distro is the active
- milestone.
- | Component | State |
- |---|---|
- | `sysknife-brain` — LLM planner, tool loop, safety fence | ✅ |
- | `sysknife-daemon` — <!-- fig:typed_actions floor=10 -->190+<!-- /fig --> typed actions, auth, preview, transactions | ✅ |
- | Live IPC + streaming + atomic-host rollback (rpm-ostree) | ✅ |
- | Terminal approval gate — one-time, TTL-bounded receipts | ✅ |
- | MCP server (Claude Code / Cursor / any MCP client) | ✅ |
- | Tamper-evident Ed25519-signed audit chain | ✅ |
- | RFC 5424 syslog forwarding (Splunk / Sentinel / QRadar) | ✅ |
- | Postgres backend (RDS / Cloud SQL / Neon / Supabase) | ✅ |
- | **Ubuntu support** — <!-- fig:story_run:ubuntu-22.04-gpt-oss-120b -->79/79<!-- /fig --> stories on a live 22.04 VM, recorded in `tests/evidence/story-runs/` | ✅ |
- | **Every Ubuntu LTS validated** — 22.04, 24.04 and 26.04 all at <!-- fig:lts_story_rate -->79/79<!-- /fig -->, each with a replay twin that reproduces it | ✅ |
- | Telegram approval interface | 📋 roadmap |
- **<!-- fig:rust_tests floor=1000 -->2,000+<!-- /fig --> Rust tests and <!-- fig:frontend_tests floor=10 -->70+<!-- /fig --> frontend tests** form the current deterministic
- release baseline.
- ## Configure your LLM
- SysKnife works with **Ollama** (no key, recommended for privacy / offline /
- homelab) or **OpenAI**, **Anthropic**, **Gemini**, **Groq**, **DeepSeek**,
- **Mistral**, **xAI**.
- ```toml
- # ~/.config/sysknife/config.toml
- [llm]
- provider = "ollama" # or anthropic / openai / gemini / groq / ...
- model = "qwen3:8b" # provider-specific
- ollama_url = "http://localhost:11434"
- max_turns = 10
- [daemon]
- socket = "/run/sysknife/daemon.sock"
- database = "/var/lib/sysknife/daemon.sqlite"
- [storage] # production-recommended
- backend = "postgres"
- url = "postgres://sysknife:${PG_PASSWORD}@db.example.com/audit?sslmode=verify-full"
- ```
- Env vars always win over the config file. Full reference in
- [`docs/configuration.md`](docs/configuration.md).
- ## MCP protocol
- SysKnife implements the [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/)
- and exposes approval-gated planning and execution tools. `sysknife_plan`
- returns a daemon-issued transaction ID for each step. After reviewing the
- plan, the user runs `sysknife approve <transaction-id>` in a real terminal and
- gives the one-time receipt to the agent. `sysknife_execute` rejects missing,
- expired, mismatched, or replayed receipts. The MCP server cannot mint approval
- receipts itself.
- Use the setup wizard (above) to wire it into Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI.
- All config files that may contain API keys are created with `chmod 0600`.
- ## Roadmap
- See [ROADMAP.md](ROADMAP.md) for the full milestone breakdown.
- - ✅ **Ubuntu 22.04** — <!-- fig:story_run:ubuntu-22.04-gpt-oss-120b -->79/79<!-- /fig --> stories on a live VM (recorded in `tests/evidence/story-runs/`)
- - ✅ **Ubuntu 24.04 and 26.04** — <!-- fig:story_run:ubuntu-24.04-gpt-oss-120b -->79/79<!-- /fig --> and <!-- fig:story_run:ubuntu-26.04-gpt-oss-120b -->79/79<!-- /fig --> on live VMs; every LTS run has a replay twin that reproduces it
- - ✅ `sysknife audit export` — stored signed chain rows as JSON with `--since` / `--limit`
- - 📋 Telegram inline-button approvals
- - 📋 CEF / NDJSON output modes for SIEM ingest
- - 📋 Fleet plan/execute (one plan, N targets, parallel approval)
- ## Protocol
- SysKnife is the reference implementation of the **LACS (Linux Agent Control
- Standard)** protocol — typed actions, risk classification, approval gates,
- audit requirements. The spec is CC0 (public domain):
- → **[lacs-project/specification](https://github.com/lacs-project/specification)**
- Other implementations for other distros and languages are explicitly
- encouraged.
- ## Contributing
- We want help. **Multi-distro** is the highest-impact area to plug into right
- now — see [`docs/distro-support.md`](docs/distro-support.md) for the
- roadmap matrix and [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md) for the workflow.
- Issues labelled
- [`good first issue`](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/labels/good%20first%20issue)
- are scoped with clear acceptance criteria.
- ### Thanks
- Patches so far from [@ITSMERNB](https://github.com/ITSMERNB),
- [@QinXi-ai](https://github.com/QinXi-ai), [@Osheun](https://github.com/Osheun),
- [@danial-razi](https://github.com/danial-razi),
- [@vsolano9](https://github.com/vsolano9) and
- [@Georgefifth](https://github.com/Georgefifth). Every release names who fixed
- what in [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md).
- If you send a patch, watching
- [Releases](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/releases) is the quickest way
- to see it ship and to catch new `good first issue` entries as they land. A star
- helps other people find the project.
- ## Documentation
- - [Typed actions — why never a shell string](docs/typed-actions.md)
- - [Action reference — every action, generated from the code](docs/action-reference.md)
- - [The audit chain — Ed25519, public-key verifiable](docs/the-audit-chain.md)
- - [Automatic rollback](docs/automatic-rollback.md)
- - [SysKnife vs. alternatives](docs/comparison.md)
- - [Architecture overview](docs/architecture.md)
- - [Distro support matrix](docs/distro-support.md)
- - [Configuration](docs/configuration.md)
- - [Audit storage and recovery](docs/storage-cloud.md)
- - [Developer guide](docs/developer-guide.md)
- - [Testing guide](docs/contributing/testing.md)
- - [VM daemon setup](docs/vm-daemon-setup.md)
- - [Security policy](SECURITY.md)
- - [Release readiness checklist](docs/release-readiness.md)
- - [Roadmap](ROADMAP.md)
- - [ADR 0001 — System boundaries](docs/adr/0001-system-boundaries.md)
- - [ADR 0002 — Brain provider layer](docs/adr/0002-brain-provider-layer.md)
- - [ADR 0003 — IPC wire protocol](docs/adr/0003-ipc-wire-protocol.md)
- ## Where to find SysKnife
- | Channel | Install | Notes |
- |---------|---------|-------|
- | **npm** | `npx sysknife-setup` | [npmjs.com/package/sysknife-setup](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sysknife-setup) — setup wizard; needs Node 22+, no compile |
- | **crates.io** | `cargo install sysknife-cli` / `cargo install sysknife-daemon` | Needs `build-essential`; ~7-12 min build. Published by reviewed version tags; see [docs/release.md](docs/release.md) |
- | **MCP Registry** | `io.github.lacs-project/sysknife` | [registry.modelcontextprotocol.io](https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io) — resolves to the crates.io install above. Directory pages that sandbox a server list every tool but cannot call the ones needing the daemon; [docs/mcp-registry.md](docs/mcp-registry.md#what-a-directory-sandbox-can-and-cannot-tell-you) explains the split |
- | **GitHub Releases** | Download from [Releases](https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/releases) | Prebuilt x86_64 + aarch64 binaries with SHA-256 checksums on every tag |
- ## License
- [MIT](LICENSE). Free to use, modify, distribute, and embed in proprietary
- products without restriction.
- The [LACS specification](https://github.com/lacs-project/specification) is
- [CC0 1.0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) — public domain.
- ---
- <p align="center">
- Built by <a href="https://github.com/vladimirrott">Vladimir Rotariu</a>.
- ·
- Issues, ideas, war stories — <a href="https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife/discussions">come say hi</a>.
- </p>
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