Containarium
Open-source agent runtime — SSH-native isolation, eBPF egress policy, Kubernetes + LXC backends, GPU passthrough, MCP-native CLI
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One path, three steps, with a check at the end of each. You're done when a box exists, `ssh alice` gets you a shell in it, and your agent can run commands inside it.
**Before you start:** a fresh Ubuntu 24.04 VM you can `sudo` on (see [System requirements](#system-requirements)). You need Containarium **v0.96.0 or later**; the installer fetches the latest release. `sudo` is only needed to run the installer and to read the admin token. Every other command runs as your normal user and goes through the daemon's API.
1. Install, then create your first box
On the VM:
curl -fsSL https://containarium.dev/install.sh | sudo bash
✅ **Check:** the daemon is running and the CLI is on your `PATH`.
systemctl is-active containarium # → active containarium version # → v0.96.0 or later
Point the CLI at the local daemon, using the admin token the installer saved, and create a box called `alice`:
export CONTAINARIUM_HTTP=true export CONTAINARIUM_SERVER=http://localhost:8080 export CONTAINARIUM_TOKEN="$(sudo cat /etc/containarium/admin.token)" containarium quickstart alice --no-mcp
`quickstart` does four things: it creates the box; it reuses your `~/.ssh` key or generates a managed one (`~/.ssh/containarium_ed25519`); it writes `~/.containarium/ssh_config`; and it adds the single `Include ~/.containarium/ssh_config` line to `~/.ssh/config`. Passing `--no-mcp` leaves the agent wiring for step 3. It's safe to run again.
✅ **Check:** `quickstart` ends with `✓ quickstart complete`, and the box is listed as running.
containarium list # → a row for alice-container, STATUS running
2. Connect to the box
Choose the variant that matches where you're typing.
**Variant A: on the VM.** This works on a fresh install. Step 1 already wrote the config. Re-sync whenever your boxes change:
containarium ssh-config sync --identity ~/.ssh/containarium_ed25519 # leave out --identity if quickstart reused your own ~/.ssh key
✅ **Check:**
ssh alice hostname # → alice-container
**Variant B: from your laptop. Needs a sentinel or `--ssh-host`.** A fresh single-VM install doesn't advertise a public SSH host. A laptop-side sync would therefore write the box's private bridge IP, and `ssh alice` couldn't connect. Use this variant when your deployment has a [sentinel](#sentinel--sshpiper--caddy--proxy-protocol) or the daemon runs with `--ssh-host`. Making this work out of the box is tracked in [#2249](https://github.com/FootprintAI/Containarium/issues/2249).
# On your laptop: install the client only. curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/footprintai/containarium/main/hacks/install-cli.sh | sudo bash # Reach the daemon's API through an SSH tunnel to the VM. ssh -fN -L 8080:localhost:8080 <you>@<vm-host> export CONTAINARIUM_HTTP=true export CONTAINARIUM_SERVER=http://localhost:8080 export CONTAINARIUM_TOKEN="$(ssh <you>@<vm-host> sudo cat /etc/containarium/admin.token)" # Leave out --sentinel when the daemon runs with --ssh-host. containarium ssh-config sync --sentinel <sentinel-host>
Then make `Include ~/.containarium/ssh_config` the first line of your laptop's `~/.ssh/config`. Your laptop's public key also has to be on the box (see `containarium collaborator add --help`).
✅ **Check:**
containarium ssh-config show --sentinel <sentinel-host> | grep '^Host ' # → Host alice
3. Wire your agent to the box
Your agent reaches the box through `agent-box`, an MCP server that runs inside it. `code install` puts it there, along with Claude Code. Run it on the VM, in the same shell as step 1:
containarium code install alice
✅ **Check:** the install prints `agent-box installed at …/.local/bin/agent-box`, and the binary is there:
ssh alice 'test -x ~/.local/bin/agent-box && echo agent-box ready' # → agent-box ready
Then register the box with your agent, on the machine where the agent
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- # Containarium — Agent Runtime
- > **Open-source agent runtime** · SSH-native isolation · eBPF egress policy · Kubernetes + LXC · MCP-native CLI · GPU passthrough
- **The open-source, self-hostable agent runtime for AI agents.**
- Each agent gets a persistent, SSH-reachable box in an unprivileged container, with an opt-in per-tenant eBPF egress policy, audit-logged denials, and a model gateway that keeps provider API keys out of the box. What is on by default, and what each claim rests on, is in [`docs/security/CLAIMS.md`](docs/security/CLAIMS.md).
- Bring your own agent — Cursor, Claude Code, OpenCode, your own MCP client.
- We run the box.
- ```
- agent: "create me a sandbox called 'blog'" → containarium create
- agent: "wire up SSH so I can reach it" → containarium ssh-config sync
- agent: "install Caddy on :8080 inside the box" → shell_exec (via agent-box MCP)
- agent: "expose that on blog.example.com" → containarium expose-port
- curl https://blog.example.com → hello world
- ```
- [](LICENSE)
- [](go.mod)
- [](https://scorecard.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/FootprintAI/Containarium)
- [](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/FootprintAI/Containarium)
- [](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/FootprintAI/Containarium)
- [](https://stackfingerprint.vercel.app/?repo=FootprintAI/Containarium)
- [](https://youtu.be/IBDDD_tb8FY)
- 🌐 **Project site:** [containarium.dev](https://containarium.dev) · 🎬 **55s demo:** [youtu.be/IBDDD_tb8FY](https://youtu.be/IBDDD_tb8FY) · 🚀 **Live app:** [helloworld.demo.containarium.dev](https://helloworld.demo.containarium.dev)
- ---
- ## Choose your path
- | Path | You end up with | Go to |
- |------|-----------------|-------|
- | **Hosted cloud** | a box you can `ssh` into with your agent wired to it, no server to run | [Sign up at cloud.containarium.dev](https://cloud.containarium.dev) |
- | **Self-host on a VM** | the same, on your own Ubuntu VM (about 5 minutes) | [Quick start](#quick-start) |
- | **See the end result** | a live app served from a box, which is what you end up with | [helloworld.demo.containarium.dev](https://helloworld.demo.containarium.dev) |
- ---
- ## Why an agent runtime?
- AI agents are increasingly the primary user of dev infrastructure. They
- want to build, install, deploy, and verify — not on the human's laptop
- (too noisy, too risky, too local) but on a persistent runtime that's:
- - **Persistent**: state survives between agent runs.
- - **Separate from your machine**: a misbehaving install doesn't touch your laptop or your cluster. (Tenant-to-tenant isolation is not on by default; see [`docs/security/CLAIMS.md`](docs/security/CLAIMS.md).)
- - **Real**: a full Linux environment with `systemd`, real networking,
- and the ability to host things on the open internet.
- - **Driven by structured tools**: not by an agent typing commands into a
- TTY hoping nothing scrolls off-screen, but by MCP — typed,
- bounded, safe.
- - **Blast-radius-bounded**: the agent holds an SSH key, not a
- kube-apiserver token. It can't reach the cluster control plane, the
- host OS, or other tenants' boxes.
- That's the runtime Containarium gives you. It runs as a self-hosted
- platform on LXC or Kubernetes, exposes its admin surface over MCP, and
- ships a second MCP server that lives *inside* the box so the agent can
- `shell_exec` and edit files directly.
- You bring the agent. We run the box.
- ---
- ## Quick start
- One path, three steps, with a check at the end of each. You're done when a
- box exists, `ssh alice` gets you a shell in it, and your agent can run
- commands inside it.
- **Before you start:** a fresh Ubuntu 24.04 VM you can `sudo` on (see
- [System requirements](#system-requirements)). You need Containarium
- **v0.96.0 or later**; the installer fetches the latest release. `sudo` is
- only needed to run the installer and to read the admin token. Every other
- command runs as your normal user and goes through the daemon's API.
- ### 1. Install, then create your first box
- On the VM:
- ```bash
- curl -fsSL https://containarium.dev/install.sh | sudo bash
- ```
- ✅ **Check:** the daemon is running and the CLI is on your `PATH`.
- ```bash
- systemctl is-active containarium # → active
- containarium version # → v0.96.0 or later
- ```
- Point the CLI at the local daemon, using the admin token the installer
- saved, and create a box called `alice`:
- <!-- The published installer (https://containarium.dev/install.sh) now carries
- `--quickstart <name>` (checked 2026-10-15; #2244 is closed). Flip this
- block to the one-liner (`… | sudo bash -s -- --quickstart alice`) once a
- fresh-VM run of it has been recorded — not before. -->
- ```bash
- export CONTAINARIUM_HTTP=true
- export CONTAINARIUM_SERVER=http://localhost:8080
- export CONTAINARIUM_TOKEN="$(sudo cat /etc/containarium/admin.token)"
- containarium quickstart alice
- ```
- `quickstart` creates the box, reuses your `~/.ssh` key or generates a
- managed one (`~/.ssh/containarium_ed25519`), writes
- `~/.containarium/ssh_config`, adds the single
- `Include ~/.containarium/ssh_config` line to `~/.ssh/config`, and wires
- the box into your agent's MCP config (Claude Code by default). It's safe
- to run again, including to repair an older quickstart's MCP command.
- ✅ **Check:** `quickstart` ends with `✓ quickstart complete`, and the box is
- listed as running.
- ```bash
- containarium list # → a row for alice-container, STATUS running
- ```
- ### 2. Connect to the box
- Choose the variant that matches where you're typing.
- **Variant A: on the VM.** This works on a fresh install. Step 1 already
- wrote the config. Re-sync whenever your boxes change:
- ```bash
- containarium ssh-config sync --identity ~/.ssh/containarium_ed25519
- # leave out --identity if quickstart reused your own ~/.ssh key
- ```
- ✅ **Check:**
- ```bash
- ssh alice hostname # → alice-container
- ```
- **Variant B: from your laptop.** On a single VM, `ssh-config sync` adds a
- `ProxyJump` through the VM's per-user jump account when the daemon doesn't
- advertise `ssh_host`. If the API is reached directly, the jump host defaults
- to the API hostname, on SSH port 22. With the API tunnel below, name the
- actual VM with `--jump-host` (use `<vm-host>:<ssh-port>` for a custom SSH port).
- Deployments with a [sentinel](#sentinel--sshpiper--caddy--proxy-protocol) can
- use `--sentinel <sentinel-host>` instead; a daemon's `--ssh-host` still takes
- precedence over the jump route.
- ```bash
- # On your laptop: install the client only.
- curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/footprintai/containarium/main/hacks/install-cli.sh | sudo bash
- # Reach the daemon's API through an SSH tunnel to the VM.
- ssh -fN -L 8080:localhost:8080 <you>@<vm-host>
- export CONTAINARIUM_HTTP=true
- export CONTAINARIUM_SERVER=http://localhost:8080
- export CONTAINARIUM_TOKEN="$(ssh <you>@<vm-host> sudo cat /etc/containarium/admin.token)"
- containarium ssh-config sync --jump-host <vm-host>
- ```
- Then make `Include ~/.containarium/ssh_config` the first line of your
- laptop's `~/.ssh/config`. Use the key whose public half was supplied when
- creating the box: that key is authorized on both the box and its VM jump
- account. Add `--identity ~/.ssh/<your-private-key>` to sync if needed; it
- applies to both SSH connections.
- ✅ **Check:**
- ```bash
- ssh alice-container hostname # → alice-container
- ```
- ### 3. Wire your agent to the box
- Your agent reaches the box through `agent-box`, an MCP server that runs
- inside it. `code install` puts it there, along with Claude Code. Run it on
- the VM, in the same shell as step 1:
- ```bash
- containarium code install alice
- ```
- ✅ **Check:** the install prints `agent-box installed at …/.local/bin/agent-box`,
- and the binary is there:
- ```bash
- ssh alice 'test -x ~/.local/bin/agent-box && echo agent-box ready' # → agent-box ready
- ```
- On the machine where your agent runs, `quickstart` wires the MCP config
- automatically. Step 1 already did this for Claude Code on the VM. If your
- agent runs on your laptop, run this there using the API connection from
- step 2; it reuses the existing box:
- ```bash
- containarium quickstart alice --agent claude
- # For Gemini or Codex, use --agent gemini or --agent codex instead.
- ```
- For Cursor, add the server to `~/.cursor/mcp.json` manually:
- ```jsonc
- {
- "mcpServers": {
- "containarium-box": {
- "command": "ssh",
- "args": ["alice", "sh -c 'PATH=\"$HOME/.local/bin:/usr/local/bin:$PATH\" exec agent-box'"]
- }
- }
- }
- ```
- This command sets the box's `PATH` for non-interactive SSH and supports
- both user-level and system-wide installs of `agent-box`.
- ✅ **Check:** your agent lists `containarium-box` as a connected MCP server
- (in Claude Code, `claude mcp list`). Asking it to *"run `uname -a` in the
- box"* returns a Linux kernel line from `alice-container`. It now has
- `shell_exec`, `read_file`, `write_file`, `list_directory`, `move_file` and
- `delete_file` inside the box.
- **That's your first box.** Next:
- [run the agent on the box](#run-the-agent-on-the-box) ·
- [run pi inside the box](#run-pi-inside-the-box) ·
- [put the box on a public hostname](#put-the-box-on-a-public-hostname) ·
- [build a site in one command](#build-a-site-in-one-command).
- ---
- ## After your first box
- ### Run the agent on the box
- `code install` (step 3) already put Claude Code on the box. It installs
- **no credential**: sign-in goes through Anthropic's own flow, never through
- us. Choose one of these, once:
- ```bash
- # interactive: sign in inside the box (device code)
- ssh alice
- claude
- # or headless: your own key in the "env" block of ~/.claude/settings.json on the box
- # {"env": {"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": "<your key>"}}
- ```
- Then:
- ```bash
- containarium code run alice --prompt "add a health endpoint and run the tests"
- ```
- `code run` streams output to your terminal as it's produced, but it isn't a
- pipe. The run is detached on the box and its output is captured to a log;
- your terminal is a *resumable reader* over that log. Close your laptop, lose
- wifi, press Ctrl-C: the run keeps going, and `containarium code attach alice`
- picks the stream back up **byte-exact**, with nothing missing and nothing
- repeated.
- ```bash
- containarium code attach alice # reconnect; replays what you missed
- containarium code status alice # liveness, and the exit code once it finishes
- containarium code stop alice # reap it; the log stays readable
- ```
- The difference from the MCP wiring in step 3 is where the agent runs. There,
- the agent is on your machine and reaches into the box. Here, the agent *is*
- on the box, so the work survives your machine sleeping, and the tests run
- next to the code instead of over a network hop.
- ### Run pi inside the box
- If your agent has no MCP client, run it *inside* the box instead. See
- [docs/integrations/pi.md](docs/integrations/pi.md) for the
- [pi](https://pi.dev) walkthrough (installs, keys, code sync, sessions).
- ### Put the box on a public hostname
- ```bash
- containarium expose-port alice \
- --container-port 8080 \
- --domain blog.example.com
- ```
- Caddy on the sentinel terminates TLS for `blog.example.com` and forwards to
- `alice-container:8080`. `curl https://blog.example.com` then hits whatever
- `alice` is serving on port 8080.
- ### Build a site in one command
- Run from your laptop against a server you can reach (see step 2, variant B),
- `quickstart` does steps 1–3 in one go: it creates the box and wires SSH and
- your agent (`claude`, `gemini` or `codex`). With `--prompt` it also exposes
- `--domain` and launches your local agent on the build:
- ```bash
- containarium quickstart alice --server <your-server> \
- --prompt "a coffee-shop landing page" --domain coffee.example.com
- ```
- `containarium quickstart --help` lists every option.
- ---
- ## The four primitives
- Every action in Containarium has a CLI verb (canonical) AND an MCP tool
- (thin wrapper that delegates to the same Go function). See
- [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md) for the convention.
- ### `agent-box` — in-the-box MCP server
- Runs inside every container. Reached over stdio (typically wrapped by
- SSH on the client side). Exposes Linux-native operations:
- | Tool | What it does |
- |---|---|
- | `shell_exec` | Run a shell command, capture stdout/stderr/exit, bounded by timeout (default 30s, max 10min) and 256 KiB output cap |
- | `read_file` | Byte range OR `head=N` lines OR `tail=N` lines |
- | `write_file` | Atomic write with `mkdirp` (temp + rename) |
- | `list_directory` | Type/size/mtime, hidden filtering |
- | `move_file` | Atomic rename with `mkdirp` on destination |
- | `delete_file` | Single-file remove (refuses directories so recursive deletes go via `shell_exec` where blast radius is explicit) |
- Resources (read-only data the agent fetches via MCP `resources/read`):
- | URI | What it returns |
- |---|---|
- | `containarium://ci-context` | JSON metadata about the current CI run (PR number, commit SHA, failing test, etc.) when the box was kept alive by the FootprintAI/containarium-run GitHub Action after a failed CI run. Returns `{"available": false}` on non-CI boxes so callers never have to special-case errors. |
- | `containarium://ci-prompt` | Static markdown playbook telling agents how to debug a failing CI run inside this box (what to read first, how to iterate, what not to do). Same body on every box; pair with `ci-context` for the per-run data. |
- Optional sandbox: when `AGENTBOX_ROOT` is set, every file-ops path is
- resolved against that root with a boundary-aware prefix check. Default
- unset = no constraint. See
- [`internal/agentbox/`](internal/agentbox/) for the Go implementation.
- ### `mcp-server` — platform MCP server
- Runs on the host. Exposes the platform's outside-the-box operations as
- MCP tools — about a hundred of them, one per CLI verb: container lifecycle
- (`create_container`, `list_containers`, `start_container`,
- `stop_container`, `delete_container`, `resize_container`), networking
- (`expose_port`, `sync_ssh_config`, passthrough routes), coding-agent runs
- (`code_run`, `code_attach`, `code_status`, `code_stop`), secrets, backups,
- recipes, security scans, tracker connections, and `get_metrics` /
- `get_system_info`. A token's scopes decide which ones a client sees. See
- [`cmd/mcp-server/`](cmd/mcp-server/) and
- [`internal/mcp/`](internal/mcp/) for the catalog.
- ### `containarium` CLI
- Same surface as the platform MCP, plus deeper administration. The verbs
- this README uses (the CLI has about ninety — `containarium --help` lists
- them all):
- ```
- containarium quickstart Create a box, wire SSH + your agent, optionally build a site
- containarium create Create a new container
- containarium list List all containers
- containarium wake / sleep Start a stopped box / stop a running one
- containarium stop --hold Stop a box and keep it stopped until an explicit `wake`
- containarium delete Delete a container
- containarium code Run a coding agent ON a box (install / run / attach / logs / runs / status / stop / egress-policy)
- containarium expose-port Expose container:port on a public hostname
- containarium ssh-config Generate self-contained ssh_config (show / sync)
- containarium route Manage proxy routes (low-level)
- containarium passthrough-route Manage TCP/UDP passthrough routes (daemon API)
- containarium token Issue, inspect, refresh and revoke JWT tokens
- containarium login / connect Device-flow sign-in to a server; open a shell on a box with that token
- containarium info Container or system info
- containarium version Print version
- ```
- Host-side verbs (`daemon`, `sentinel`, `passthrough`, `audit`, `doctor`,
- …) live in `containariumd` — see [Two binaries](#two-binaries-containarium-vs-containariumd).
- Run `containarium <verb> --help` for full options.
- ### Sentinel — sshpiper + Caddy + PROXY-protocol
- The sentinel is a tiny always-on VM (e2-micro on GCP free tier works)
- that:
- - Receives SSH on port 22 (sshpiper routes to the right backend by
- username).
- - Receives HTTPS on 443 (Caddy with TLS-passthrough or
- PROXY-protocol-aware forwarding to backend Caddy).
- - Survives spot-VM termination on the backend with a maintenance page.
- - Holds the static IP / DNS A-record so backends can be ephemeral.
- See [docs/SENTINEL-DESIGN.md](docs/SENTINEL-DESIGN.md) for the full
- design.
- ---
- ## Architecture
- ```
- Agent (Cursor / Claude Code / OpenCode)
- │
- │ JWT (access; tt=access, jti, scopes)
- │ MCP over stdio ──┐
- │ │ ┌── refresh ──> POST /v1/tokens/refresh
- v ▼ │ (single-use; old jti revoked)
- ssh user@box → sshpiper → agent-box (in container)
- │
- │ HTTPS (mTLS upstream; PROXY-protocol v2)
- v
- Sentinel (e2-micro, always-on)
- ├── sshpiper (port 22) : routes by username; fail2ban per-user
- ├── Caddy + PROXY-protocol (443) : routes by hostname / SNI suffix
- └── /wake/ source-IP allowlist : trusted-proxy only
- │
- v
- +-------------------------------------------------+
- | Backend VM (spot or bare-metal GPU node) |
- | |
- | Incus (LXC) ── containers |
- | ├── alice-container : SSH + agent-box |
- | │ └── /run/secrets/* : tmpfs, 0440 alice |
- | └── bob-container : ZFS-backed storage |
- | |
- | Containarium daemon |
- | ├── JWT auth (iss/aud/jti/scopes) |
- | ├── Admin RBAC + container-owner authz |
- | ├── Image-digest gate (REQUIRE + VERIFY) |
- | ├── Secrets ── Postgres (envelope-encrypted) |
- | │ │ |
- | │ v |
- | │ KMS ── Vault Transit / GCP KMS |
- | │ (master key retirable post-cutover)
- | └── Audit log ── Postgres + SHA-256 hash |
- | chain (verify CLI) |
- +-------------------------------------------------+
- ```
- A single sentinel can front multiple backend VMs — a "pool" — and a
- single deployment can run multiple pools (each with its own backends). See
- [docs/MULTI-POOL.md](docs/MULTI-POOL.md).
- **Security control surface** (all opt-in via env, default-off for
- upgrade safety; see [`docs/security/OPERATOR-SECURITY-RUNBOOK.md`](docs/security/OPERATOR-SECURITY-RUNBOOK.md)):
- | Env var | Layer | Effect |
- | --- | --- | --- |
- | `CONTAINARIUM_REQUIRE_IMAGE_DIGEST=true` | API | refuse images without `@sha256:<64hex>` | <!-- claim-row: Image-registry allow-list and digest verification. -->
- | `CONTAINARIUM_VERIFY_IMAGE_DIGEST=true` | API | verify digest against the registry index (pre- + post-pull) |
- | `CONTAINARIUM_ALLOWED_IMAGE_REGISTRIES` | API | restrict which simplestreams remotes the daemon will pull from |
- | `CONTAINARIUM_KMS_BACKEND={none,inproc,vault,gcp}` | Secrets | envelope-encrypt DEKs through an external KMS |
- | `CONTAINARIUM_REQUIRE_ENVELOPE=true` | Secrets | refuse legacy master-key-only rows (Phase E retirement gate) |
- | `CONTAINARIUM_POSTGRES_URL_FILE` / `_PASSWORD_FILE` | Secrets | DB creds from disk rather than env |
- | `CONTAINARIUM_WAKE_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | Sentinel | source-IP allowlist for `/wake/` |
- | `OTEL_BEARER_REQUIRED=true` | Telemetry (collector-side; set on the OTel collector, not the daemon) | collector rejects un-bearered OTLP submissions |
- ---
- ## How it's different
- ### vs. SaaS-only sandboxes (e2b, Modal, Replit)
- These give you sandboxes for AI agents, but only as hosted SaaS:
- - **Self-hostability**: Containarium runs on your own infrastructure
- (a $5 VM, your homelab, your enterprise data center). e2b, Modal,
- and Replit are SaaS-only — your code, your data, and your customers
- go through their compute.
- - **License**: Apache 2.0, no CLA. Fork it, sell it, run it.
- - **Surface**: full Linux containers with `systemd`, real network
- namespaces, GPU passthrough. Not a process-per-call sandbox.
- - **Transport**: MCP-native from day one, not a custom SDK with MCP
- bolted on.
- ### vs. Docker AI Sandboxes (`sbx`)
- Docker's `sbx run claude` and Containarium both call themselves
- "AI sandboxes," but they sit on opposite ends of the same spectrum:
- - **Locality**: `sbx` runs the sandbox on the developer's laptop
- (microVM, host-isolation). Containarium runs the sandbox on a VM
- you host (LXC, multi-tenant, public-internet reachable via the
- sentinel).
- <!-- claim-exempt: describes another product's locality, not a Containarium claim -->
- - **Persistence**: `sbx` is session-shaped (workspace mount, no
- documented "give me a box that survives reboot and has a
- hostname"). Containarium containers persist indefinitely, with
- ZFS snapshots and 30-day retention.
- - **Public reach**: `containarium expose-port alice --domain
- blog.example.com` is one verb. `sbx` is laptop-local; no
- public-hostname story.
- - **Agent surface**: `sbx` is CLI-first (`sbx run <agent>`).
- Containarium is MCP-native — two MCP servers (in-the-box
- `agent-box` + platform `mcp-server`) plus the same surface via
- CLI, SSH, REST/gRPC, and a web UI.
- - **License**: `sbx` CLI is free; team policy (Docker Admin Console)
- is a paid subscription. Containarium is Apache 2.0 — including
- the audit log, RBAC, KMS integrations, and everything else on
- this page.
- If you're stopping an agent from `rm -rf`-ing the laptop it's
- running on, `sbx` is the lighter tool. If you're giving your agent
- (or your customer's agent) a persistent Linux box on the public
- internet, Containarium is the shape.
- ### vs. OSS Kubernetes agent runtimes (agent-sandbox, OpenShell)
- [`kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox`](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox)
- and [`NVIDIA/OpenShell`](https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell) are the
- closest open-source peers on Kubernetes:
- - **SSH-native vs. exec-based**: both agent-sandbox and OpenShell reach
- the sandbox via `kubectl exec` or a proprietary client, which requires
- the agent to hold a kube-apiserver token or cluster credentials.
- Containarium reaches the pod over SSH through sshpiper — the agent has
- no path to the cluster control plane at all.
- - **MCP-native**: agent-sandbox and OpenShell expose REST APIs or custom
- SDKs. Containarium's `agent-box` MCP server runs *inside* the box,
- reachable over SSH stdio — any MCP-speaking agent (Claude Code, Cursor,
- OpenCode) works with zero client library.
- - **LXC + K8s, one CLI**: Containarium runs on either Incus/LXC or
- Kubernetes behind the same `containarium` CLI and `--runtime` flag. You
- switch backends without changing anything for the agent.
- - **eBPF egress policy**: Containarium can enforce per-tenant egress
- allowlists at the kernel level via TC_INGRESS eBPF programs once an
- operator arms them (opt-in; see [`docs/security/CLAIMS.md`](docs/security/CLAIMS.md)).
- agent-sandbox has NetworkPolicy; OpenShell has eBPF but is
- NVIDIA-stack-specific. Neither offers a portable, per-tenant eBPF
- allowlist across LXC and K8s backends.
- ### vs. dev environment platforms (Codespaces, Gitpod, Coder)
- Those are persistent IDEs. Containarium is a persistent **box** —
- agent-driven, not developer-driven, no IDE assumption, SSH-as-the-API:
- - Containarium environments are reached by SSH and MCP. Any IDE works
- (Vim, JetBrains Remote, VS Code Remote, Cursor's remote dev — your
- call).
- - Cost: no per-hour billing in the OSS path. Self-host costs are just
- your underlying VM.
- - Persistence: containers survive indefinitely; Codespaces auto-delete
- after inactivity.
- ### vs. application container platforms (Docker, Kubernetes)
- LXC is a **system** container, not an application container. Each
- container has `systemd`, a real init, real users, real package managers,
- real `sudo`. You can run Docker *inside* a Containarium container; the
- reverse isn't really a thing.
- If your agent is going to `apt install` half a Linux distro, edit
- config files in `/etc`, run a database, and reboot — LXC is the right
- shape. If your agent runs a single Python process, Docker or Modal is
- fine.
- It isn't either/or: Containarium can run a box *as a pod* in a
- Kubernetes cluster you already operate — same SSH-native agent contract,
- no kube-apiserver token in the agent's hands. Switch with
- `--runtime=k8s`. See the **Kubernetes backend** section below.
- ---
- ## What's in the box
- Beyond the agent-native primitives, Containarium ships:
- ### Multi-OS
- - **Ubuntu 24.04 LTS** (default)
- - **Rocky Linux 9** (dev/test)
- - **RHEL 9** (production)
- - **Windows Server VMs** via QEMU/KVM with RDP — see
- [docs/WINDOWS-VM-SETUP.md](docs/WINDOWS-VM-SETUP.md)
- ### GPU passthrough
- For ML/AI agent workflows. Works with NVIDIA RTX 3090, RTX 4090, and
- similar. PCI-level passthrough so the container sees the GPU directly.
- Tested on bare-metal GPU nodes connected to the sentinel via tunnel.
- ### Multi-backend
- A single sentinel can front:
- - **GCP spot VMs**: cost-effective cloud backends with auto-recovery
- on preemption.
- - **Bare-metal GPU nodes**: any Linux box you can SSH to; reaches the
- sentinel via outbound tunnel.
- - **Windows VMs**: live alongside Linux backends.
- All containers from all backends appear in a single unified API.
- ### Kubernetes backend (experimental)
- Beyond the LXC/Incus backend, Containarium can run a box as a **pod in a
- Kubernetes cluster you already operate** — reached over SSH exactly like
- an LXC box, so an agent can't tell which substrate it landed on. The
- daemon reconciles a per-tenant namespace + StatefulSet + headless Service
- + default-deny NetworkPolicy, and programs the sshpiper gateway (the
- `Pipe` CRD) so `ssh <tenant>@<gateway>` routes to the right pod.
- What the NetworkPolicy does and does not guarantee is in
- [`docs/security/CLAIMS.md`](docs/security/CLAIMS.md).
- <!-- claim-row: Kubernetes boxes get a default-deny NetworkPolicy. -->
- The pitch isn't "another way to run pods" — it's giving an agent a
- hardened, SSH-native foothold in your cluster **without handing it a
- kube-apiserver token**: the box runs with `automountServiceAccountToken:
- false` and satisfies the `restricted` Pod Security profile. Compare this
- to `kubectl exec`-based runtimes where the agent necessarily holds cluster
- credentials.
- **Runtime selection** (no recompile needed):
- ```bash
- # LXC/Incus (default)
- containariumd daemon
- # Kubernetes — uses in-cluster config or KUBECONFIG
- CONTAINARIUM_RUNTIME=k8s containariumd daemon
- # or
- containariumd daemon --runtime=k8s
- ```
- Both backends share the same CLI, MCP tools, JWT auth, and REST/gRPC API.
- GPU passthrough is supported on K8s via `nvidia.com/gpu` resource limits.
- Local bring-up takes under 5 minutes with `kind` — see
- [docs/KIND-QUICKSTART.md](docs/KIND-QUICKSTART.md).
- Design, topology, and BYO-cluster integration:
- [docs/K8S-AGENT-BOX-RUNTIME-DESIGN.md](docs/K8S-AGENT-BOX-RUNTIME-DESIGN.md).
- ### Web UI
- A basic dashboard at `/webui/` for users who'd rather not type CLI:
- container list, lifecycle controls, metrics, browser-based terminal.
- Polished UI is intentionally a cloud-product concern — the OSS web UI
- is functional, not opinionated.
- ### Persistent storage (ZFS)
- Containers survive VM restarts and spot termination. ZFS handles
- compression, snapshots (daily by default, 30-day retention), and
- checksums.
- ### Sentinel HA
- The sentinel itself is e2-micro (free tier). It:
- - Detects spot preemption in ~10s, serves a maintenance page.
- - Restarts spot VMs automatically (~85s total recovery).
- - Holds the static IP, so DNS doesn't change as backends rotate.
- ### Monitoring & observability
- VictoriaMetrics + Grafana auto-provisioned. Per-container CPU,
- memory, disk, network. Alerting via webhooks. SSH audit logs per
- user (LXC backend; the Kubernetes backend records control-plane API
- audit but not in-box SSH sessions — see #1189).
- <!-- claim-row: SSH session audit logs per user. -->
- ### Security primitives
- - **Unprivileged LXC containers**: container root ≠ host root.
- - **Per-user proxy accounts**: `/usr/sbin/nologin` on the sentinel,
- users can only proxy through to their container.
- - **fail2ban per-user**: an attack on Alice's account doesn't ban
- Bob.
- - **Trivy** image/dependency scanning across backends. **ClamAV** malware scanning is a tenant-run capability (the scan runs inside a box, started by its owner, and the verdict is self-reported); it is being rebuilt in #2631 and is not a platform-wide control today.
- - **AppArmor profiles** per container.
- - **AGENTBOX_ROOT sandbox** to constrain agent-box file ops at runtime.
- **Zero-trust controls** (see [`docs/security/OPERATOR-SECURITY-RUNBOOK.md`](docs/security/OPERATOR-SECURITY-RUNBOOK.md); several are opt-in, see [`docs/security/CLAIMS.md`](docs/security/CLAIMS.md) for what is on by default):
- - **JWT with `iss` / `aud` / `jti` / `tt` / `scopes`**: 32-byte minimum
- secret enforced at startup; refresh tokens are single-use; jti-based
- revocation; per-tool MCP scopes propagate to server-side gates.
- - **Admin RBAC + per-container ownership** on the API surface; cluster
- ops admin-only, container ops owner-only.
- - **KMS envelope encryption for tenant secrets** (Vault Transit or GCP
- Cloud KMS), with a migration tool and master-key retirement gate.
- - **tmpfs `--delivery=file`** for secrets that shouldn't be visible in
- `/proc/<pid>/environ`.
- - **Audit log with SHA-256 hash chain** + `containariumd audit verify`
- (on the host): tamper-evident against an application- or database-level
- attacker. An attacker who can write the database can rewrite the chain
- consistently; the chain root can be anchored to a file outside the database
- (`internal/audit/anchor.go`), which a database credential does not reach, but
- a host-root attacker could still edit both.
- - **Image-registry allowlist + pre-pull simplestreams digest
- verification + post-pull `volatile.base_image` defense-in-depth**
- for supply-chain hardening.
- - **`SECURITY.md`** with a 90-day coordinated-disclosure window;
- `gosec` / `govulncheck` / `trivy` running in CI.
- ---
- ## CLI reference (essentials)
- ### Container lifecycle
- ```bash
- # Create (Ubuntu 24.04, default)
- containarium create alice --ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
- # Create with options
- containarium create ml-dev \
- --ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub \
- --gpu 0 \
- --stack gpu \
- --memory 16GB \
- --cpu 4
- # Lifecycle
- containarium list
- containarium info
- containarium wake alice # start a stopped box
- containarium sleep alice # stop it
- containarium stop --hold alice # stop it and hold it: no autostart, no HTTP wake, until `wake`
- containarium delete alice
- ```
- ### Networking
- ```bash
- # Expose a container port on a public hostname
- containarium expose-port alice \
- --container-port 8080 \
- --domain blog.example.com
- # Lower-level route management
- containarium route add api.example.com --target 10.0.3.42:3000
- containarium route list
- containarium route delete api.example.com
- # Raw TCP/UDP passthrough via local iptables (on the host, so it's a
- # containariumd verb)
- containariumd passthrough add --port 50051 \
- --target-ip 10.0.3.150 --target-port 50051
- # Raw TCP/UDP passthrough via the daemon API (works against a remote box)
- containarium passthrough-route add --port 9443 \
- --target-ip 10.0.3.150 --target-port 50051 --server <host:port>
- containarium passthrough-route list --server <host:port>
- containarium passthrough-route remove --port 9443 --server <host:port>
- ```
- ### SSH config
- ```bash
- # Print to stdout (preview)
- containarium ssh-config show
- # Write to ~/.containarium/ssh_config (one-line `Include` to wire in)
- containarium ssh-config sync
- containarium ssh-config sync --sentinel sentinel.example.com # via sentinel
- containarium ssh-config sync --identity ~/.ssh/containarium_ed25519
- # From a client machine, against a remote server (the bare form above
- # only reaches a local Incus socket)
- containarium ssh-config sync --http --server <host:port>
- ```
- ### Authentication
- ```bash
- # Issue an access + refresh pair (CLI-only; never exposed via API).
- # Access tokens are short-lived (default 15 min) and authenticate the
- # API. Refresh tokens are long-lived and single-use — exchange via
- # POST /v1/tokens/refresh for a new pair.
- containarium token generate \
- --username admin \
- --roles admin \
- --secret-file /etc/containarium/jwt.secret
- # Use the access token
- curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <access-token>" http://localhost:8080/v1/containers
- # Exchange the refresh token for a new pair (same as POST /v1/tokens/refresh;
- # the refresh token is the credential, so no --token)
- containarium token refresh --refresh-token "$REFRESH" --server <host:port>
- # Inspect a token's claims (jti, scopes, expiry, validation)
- containarium token inspect <token> --secret-file /etc/containarium/jwt.secret
- # Revoke a leaked token by jti (idempotent; reads from `audit query`
- # or `token inspect`)
- containarium token revoke <jti> --reason "leak_2026_05_22"
- containarium token list-revoked
- # Mint a least-privilege token for an agent with only the scopes it
- # needs — server-side gates enforce this even if the agent ignores
- # the filter.
- containarium token generate \
- --username alice-agent \
- --scopes containers:read,containers:write \
- --secret-file /etc/containarium/jwt.secret
- ```
- See [`docs/security/OPERATOR-SECURITY-RUNBOOK.md`](docs/security/OPERATOR-SECURITY-RUNBOOK.md)
- for the full token lifecycle, leak-response playbook, and the agent
- least-privilege scope catalog.
- <!-- claim-exempt: points to the runbook, asserts no property of the product -->
- ---
- ## Deployment
- ### Two binaries: `containarium` vs `containariumd`
- Same convention as `docker`/`dockerd` or `incus`/`incusd`: `containarium`
- is the CLI you run from your laptop (`create`, `list`, `ssh-config`,
- `expose-port`, …); `containariumd` is what runs *on the host* — the
- daemon, the sentinel, and every on-host admin verb (`daemon`,
- `sentinel`, `service install`, `sync-accounts`, `pool join`, `node`,
- `hosting`, `recover`, `doctor`). Install `containarium` wherever you
- want to drive the platform from (your laptop, a jump box); install
- `containariumd` on every host that runs the daemon or sentinel itself.
- A compat symlink (`/usr/local/bin/containarium -> containariumd`) keeps
- existing hosts and scripts that still invoke `containarium <daemon verb>`
- working during the rollout.
- ### Manual install (recommended for getting started)
- ```bash
- curl -fsSL https://containarium.dev/install.sh | sudo bash
- ```
- See [`hacks/README.md`](hacks/README.md) for what the script does.
- ### Terraform (recommended for production)
- ```bash
- cd terraform/gce
- cp examples/single-server-spot.tfvars terraform.tfvars
- vim terraform.tfvars # set project_id, admin_ssh_keys, allowed_ssh_sources
- terraform init
- terraform apply
- ```
- See [`terraform/gce/README.md`](terraform/gce/README.md) for variables.
- ### System requirements
- - **Host OS**: Ubuntu 24.04 LTS or later, or Debian 13 (trixie)
- (containers can be any supported OS). Debian 13 has been verified
- with the installer; Debian 12 is accepted but untested. The ZFS
- kernel module is optional on Debian, where the cloud kernel does not
- ship it; disk quotas then need another storage backend.
- - **Incus 6.19+** required for Docker-in-LXC support. Ubuntu 24.04's
- default repos ship 6.0.0 which has an AppArmor bug
- ([CVE-2025-52881](https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2025-52881));
- use the [Zabbly Incus repository](https://pkgs.zabbly.com/) for
- current builds.
- <!-- claim-exempt: names a vendor CVE that affects installs, asserts no Containarium property -->
- - **ZFS kernel module** (for disk quotas).
- - Kernel modules: `overlay`, `br_netfilter`, `nf_nat` (Docker in
- containers needs these).
- ```bash
- # Quick Incus install via Zabbly
- curl -fsSL https://pkgs.zabbly.com/key.asc | \
- sudo gpg --dearmor -o /usr/share/keyrings/zabbly-incus.gpg
- echo 'deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/zabbly-incus.gpg] \
- https://pkgs.zabbly.com/incus/stable noble main' | \
- sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/zabbly-incus-stable.list
- sudo apt update
- sudo apt install incus incus-tools incus-client
- incus --version # 6.19 or later
- ```
- ---
- ## API
- Containarium exposes:
- - **REST API** at `http://localhost:8080` (gRPC-gateway over the gRPC
- service, JWT auth)
- - **gRPC** at `:50051` (mTLS, primarily used by the CLI)
- - **Two MCP servers**: `mcp-server` (platform) and `agent-box`
- (in-the-box)
- OpenAPI / Swagger UI at
- `http://localhost:8080/swagger-ui/`.
- Token-issuance is **CLI-only** by design; the daemon does not have an
- "issue token via API" endpoint, because if it did, anyone with API
- access could mint admin tokens.
- ---
- ## Hardening notes
- ### SSH key hygiene
- - Each user gets their own keypair. **Never** share keys between users
- — sharing breaks revocation, audit, and per-user fail2ban.
- <!-- claim-exempt: key-handling advice, asserts no property of the product -->
- - The same key can authenticate to both the sentinel proxy account and
- the container. That's the supported flow: simpler for users, no
- security loss because the proxy account is `nologin` and only routes
- through.
- - To rotate: user generates a new key, admin replaces the
- `authorized_keys` content in the container.
- ### Agent-box sandbox
- If you're running an untrusted agent, set `AGENTBOX_ROOT` to a project
- directory:
- ```bash
- # In the container
- export AGENTBOX_ROOT=/srv/project
- agent-box # all file ops now constrained to /srv/project
- ```
- `shell_exec` is intentionally not constrained beyond the LXC container
- boundary itself — by design, that's the tool's contract. If you need
- tighter isolation, run agent-box in a more restrictive container (e.g.
- nested LXC, or chroot the user account further).
- <!-- claim-exempt: disclaims isolation for shell_exec rather than claiming it -->
- ### Network
- - Backend VMs have **no public IP** by default; they reach out via
- Cloud NAT and accept inbound only via sshpiper.
- - Sentinel allowlist: configure `allowed_ssh_sources` in Terraform
- (or firewall rules manually) to lock down who can hit port 22.
- ---
- ## Comparison FAQ
- **Why not Docker / Podman?**
- Docker is for application containers. Containarium uses LXC system
- containers — full Linux OS per container, real `systemd`, native SSH,
- Docker-in-LXC works, persistent filesystem. If your agent will
- `apt install` and reboot, you want LXC.
- **Why not Kubernetes?**
- K8s orchestrates application containers across nodes — that's the
- infrastructure layer. Containarium is the agent runtime that runs *on
- top of* Kubernetes (or LXC), giving each agent a persistent, SSH-native
- box without handing it cluster credentials. If you're already on K8s,
- run `containariumd daemon --runtime=k8s` and use your existing cluster as
- the backend. See the [Kubernetes backend](#kubernetes-backend-experimental)
- section and [docs/KIND-QUICKSTART.md](docs/KIND-QUICKSTART.md).
- **Why not Vagrant?**
- Vagrant orchestrates VMs on a developer's local machine. Containarium
- hosts environments on shared remote infrastructure for many agents.
- **Why not Dev Containers / VS Code Remote Containers?**
- Dev Containers are project-scoped, IDE-coupled, single-developer.
- Containarium gives many users (or many of one user's agents) their own
- persistent boxes on shared infrastructure, IDE-agnostic.
- **Why not Codespaces / Gitpod?**
- Browser-IDE-as-a-Service, per-hour billed, vendor-locked. Containarium
- is self-hosted, persistent, SSH/MCP-based, no per-hour billing in OSS.
- **Why not e2b / Modal / Daytona?**
- Closest peers — sandboxes for AI agents. They're SaaS-only and
- typically optimize for short-lived, process-per-call execution.
- Containarium is self-hostable, MCP-native, and gives you full
- persistent Linux boxes. Pick e2b if you want hosted-only and
- ephemeral; pick Containarium if you want self-hosted, persistent,
- and your data on your infra.
- **Why LXC at all?**
- - Each container runs a full Linux OS with `systemd`.
- - SSH access is first-class.
- - Docker-in-LXC works (vs. fragile Docker-in-Docker).
- - Real persistent filesystem, real users, real `sudo`.
- - "Feels like a VM" for the agent — same surface area as a managed
- cloud VM, fraction of the resource cost.
- ---
- ## Use cases
- - **AI-agent sandboxes** (the lead): Cursor, Claude Code, Cline,
- OpenCode, custom agents — all reach the same MCP surface.
- - **Shared developer environments**: many developers, one host, SSH
- jump server with per-user accounts and containers (isolation
- caveats: [`docs/security/CLAIMS.md`](docs/security/CLAIMS.md)).
- - **ML / GPU experimentation**: GPU passthrough into LXC.
- - **Education, bootcamps, workshops**: per-student isolated Linux
- with no per-student VM.
- - **CI / build infrastructure**: long-lived build hosts that keep
- caches warm across runs.
- - **Demo / testing infrastructure**: spin up a real Linux env, test,
- tear down.
- ---
- ## In the wild
- Where Containarium has been demonstrated live:
- - **2026-08 — COSCUP, Taipei.** *An SSH-native agent runtime, built
- because our hardware was sitting idle* — where utilisation goes on AI
- and VM fleets, why one VM per developer stopped paying for itself, and
- how LXC + sshpiper + persistent disk became Containarium.
- [Slides](https://containarium.dev/talks/coscup2026).
- - **2026-06-04 — AI Agent Night, Taipei.** When the grand-prize
- giveaway (a custom vibe-keyboard) hit a snag — the event had no way
- to run the lucky draw — we fired up Containarium and vibe-coded a
- lucky-draw picker on the spot to save the giveaway. Still live:
- [lucky-draw.demo.containarium.dev](https://lucky-draw.demo.containarium.dev/).
- Demoed Containarium somewhere? Open a PR and add it here.
- ---
- ## Status
- - **Production-deployed** on GCP (multi-region) and bare-metal GPU
- nodes.
- - **APIs are stable** (protobuf-defined with gRPC-gateway).
- - **Apache 2.0**, no CLA, accepting community PRs.
- - Active maintenance: see commit history on `main` and recent
- releases.
- ---
- ## Roadmap
- - **Shipped (2026-06)**: **[Kubernetes backend](#kubernetes-backend-experimental)**
- <!-- claim-row: Kubernetes boxes get a default-deny NetworkPolicy. -->
- — run a box as a pod in a cluster you operate, reached over SSH like an LXC
- box, with the sshpiper gateway, default-deny NetworkPolicy, CSI storage, and
- `nvidia.com/gpu` passthrough. Selected at runtime via `--runtime=k8s` (no
- recompile). End-to-end validated on `kind`; 5-minute local bring-up in
- [docs/KIND-QUICKSTART.md](docs/KIND-QUICKSTART.md). See also
- [docs/K8S-AGENT-BOX-RUNTIME-DESIGN.md](docs/K8S-AGENT-BOX-RUNTIME-DESIGN.md).
- - **Shipped**: `agent-box` MCP, `ssh-config` CLI, `expose-port` CLI, and
- the demo recording — the [Quick start](#quick-start) above is built on
- them.
- - **Q3 2026**: `agent-box` tier-2 (MCP Roots, background process
- management), demo-driven docs and examples.
- - **Q4 2026**: OSS v1.0 cut — stable API surface, contribution
- guide.
- If you want to drive an item, open an issue or PR — community work is
- welcome and we triage weekly.
- ---
- ## Contributing
- - Read [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md) for the CLI-first principle (every new
- platform action lands as `containarium <verb>` first; MCP wraps it).
- - Check [existing issues and PRs](https://github.com/footprintai/Containarium/issues).
- - Add tests for new features.
- - Update docs if user-visible behavior changes.
- No CLA. Apache 2.0 means you can use, modify, and redistribute. We
- welcome PRs that align with the project's positioning and reject
- those that don't (e.g. "let me add multi-tenancy to the OSS daemon"
- goes into the cloud repo discussion, not here).
- ---
- ## License
- Apache License 2.0 — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).
- ---
- ## Acknowledgments
- - [Incus](https://linuxcontainers.org/incus/) — modern LXC manager.
- - [sshpiper](https://github.com/tg123/sshpiper) — SSH reverse proxy.
- - [mcp-go](https://github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go) — Go MCP server library.
- - [Caddy](https://caddyserver.com/) — TLS / reverse proxy with
- PROXY-protocol support.
- - [Cobra](https://cobra.dev/) — CLI framework.
- - [Terraform](https://terraform.io/) — infrastructure as code.
- ---
- ## Support
- - **Project site**: [containarium.dev](https://containarium.dev) — overview, hosted cloud, GitHub Action for CI, PR previews.
- - **Documentation**: [docs/](docs/) directory.
- - **Issues**: [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/footprintai/Containarium/issues).
- - **Demo video**: [55s walkthrough on YouTube](https://youtu.be/IBDDD_tb8FY).
- - **Live demo app**: [helloworld.demo.containarium.dev](https://helloworld.demo.containarium.dev).
- - **Organization**: [FootprintAI](https://github.com/footprintai).
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