cve-intel
Local security intelligence for CVE triage - 34 tools, 25 sources, risk scores and an MCP server for AI agents, all in native Rust. Private by default.
Safety scan
A static text scan, not a guarantee. Select the badge to see what was scanned and every finding.
Check it deeper on your machine
It has changed since its scan on 11 Nov 2026.
As a Claude Code plugin, install it and then ask Claude Code:
/plugin marketplace add keithmackay/mackayi/plugin install scanskillsafety@mackayiDo a deep scan of https://github.com/Fazmin/cve-intel with scanskillsafety
Or from a terminal, clone it and run it:
git clone https://github.com/keithmackay/scanskillsafety-skill ~/.claude/skills/scanskillsafetynode ~/.claude/skills/scanskillsafety/cli.cjs --deep 'https://github.com/Fazmin/cve-intel'
It checks the exact commit: every file, its packages against OSV (api.osv.dev), how it compares with this page's scan (findsafeskills.com receives the repository's address), and, if you agree, Claude reading every file with your own Claude subscription. It never runs the code.
Badge for your README
Markdown
[](/listings/fazmin--cve-intel)HTML
<a href="/listings/fazmin--cve-intel"><img src="/api/listings/fazmin--cve-intel/badge.svg" alt="findsafeskills safety rating" /></a>Install
Install instructions from the README
As written by the repo's author. findsafeskills has not verified these steps.
Download a release
Download the file for your OS from the [latest release](https://github.com/Fazmin/cve-intel/releases/latest). The desktop app, CLI, MCP server and REST API are all **one executable**, with nothing else to install.
| OS | File | How to run | |---|---|---| | Windows | `CVE-Intel_<version>_windows-x64-setup.exe` (or `…-portable.exe`) | Run the installer, then open **CVE Intel** | | macOS (Apple Silicon and Intel) | `CVE-Intel_<version>_macos-universal.dmg` | Drag **CVE Intel** to Applications | | Linux | `CVE-Intel_<version>_linux-x64.AppImage` (or `.deb`) | `chmod +x` the file and run it |
Each file has a `.sha256` checksum next to it. Builds are not code-signed yet, so Windows SmartScreen and macOS Gatekeeper warn on first launch. On macOS, right-click the app and choose **Open**.
Build from source
# Desktop app (debug) cargo build -p cve-intel-desktop ./target/debug/cve-intel-desktop # Installable bundle (.dmg / .exe / .AppImage) cargo install tauri-cli --version "^2" --locked cd apps/desktop/src-tauri && cargo tauri build # Headless binary only (servers, Docker) cargo build --release -p cve-server
Docker
Runs the headless MCP server over HTTP, plus the REST API:
docker build -t cve-intel . docker run --rm -p 127.0.0.1:8000:8000 --env-file .env cve-intel
What was scanned
The files the safety scan read, as written by the repository's author and shown as plain text. Lines with a finding are marked.
README.md · README · 1,443 lines
View this file on GitHub (read at the repository's current version: the scan did not record which commit it read)
This file has changed since it was scanned, so this is not exactly the text that was scanned, and no line is marked. The findings are listed with the safety scan above.
- <h1 align="center">CVE Intel</h1>
- <p align="center">
- Know which vulnerabilities matter, and what to do about them.<br/>
- A private desktop app for vulnerability triage and scanning, written in native Rust, with a CLI, REST API and MCP server for developers and AI agents,<br/>
- and a fleet mode that watches every server you run from one place.<br/>
- 42 MCP tools, 46 data sources, SBOMs in and out, on-device AI.
- </p>
- <p align="center">
- <a href="https://www.rust-lang.org"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Rust-native-orange?style=flat-square&logo=rust" alt="Rust"/></a>
- <a href="https://tauri.app"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Tauri-2-blue?style=flat-square" alt="Tauri 2"/></a>
- <a href="https://modelcontextprotocol.io"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/MCP-Compatible-blue?style=flat-square" alt="MCP compatible"/></a>
- <a href="#license"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT%20OR%20Apache--2.0-green?style=flat-square" alt="License: MIT OR Apache-2.0"/></a>
- </p>
- <p align="center">
- <a href="#what-is-cve-intel">What it is</a> ·
- <a href="#getting-started">Getting started</a> ·
- <a href="#features">Features</a> ·
- <a href="#fleet-mode">Fleet mode</a> ·
- <a href="#install">Install</a> ·
- <a href="#local-ai">Local AI</a> ·
- <a href="#data-sources">Data sources</a> ·
- <a href="#developer-notes">Developer notes</a> ·
- <a href="#citing-and-attribution">Citing</a>
- </p>
- <p align="center">
- <a href="assets/remediation-lab-demo.mp4"><img src="assets/remediation-lab-demo.webp" width="900" alt="Sped-up screen recording of CVE Intel on macOS: triage of CVE-2024-6387 and its How to fix it card, then the Remediation Lab: the plan for openssh on Ubuntu 22.04 with Ubuntu's own build first, ticking the fix and opening its runbook, ticking Ubuntu's mitigation instead and watching the SSVC decision move from Attend to Track, saving that as a decision and finding it in the ledger, then PAN-OS 10.2.8 with its hotfix and workaround, RHEL 8 as not affected, log4j-core, and Plan fix from a scan of lodash 4.17.20"/></a>
- </p>
- <p align="center"><sub>Sped-up demo on macOS (<a href="assets/remediation-lab-demo.mp4">video</a>, or the <a href="assets/remediation-lab-fixed.mp4">full-length recording</a>): from a triage result to a remediation plan for what you run, its runbook, a mitigation tried in What if and saved as a decision, and Plan fix from a scan. A second demo, of the landscape, decisions, scans and the watchlist, is under <a href="#features">Features</a>.</sub></p>
- ## What is CVE Intel?
- Every known software vulnerability gets a public ID, such as CVE-2024-3400.
- For each one, security, IT and development teams face the same question:
- *does this affect us, and do we fix it now or can it wait?* Answering it
- usually means checking NVD, CISA, FIRST, GitHub and vendor advisories by
- hand, one browser tab at a time.
- ### Why it matters now
- CVE publication keeps rising
- ([48,185 in 2025](https://jerrygamblin.com/2026/01/01/2025-cve-data-review/),
- 20.6% more than 2024, and
- [over 86,000 by 27 October 2026](https://craci.com/resources/CVE-publication-trends)),
- and in April 2026
- [NIST said](https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/04/nist-updates-nvd-operations-address-record-cve-growth)
- the National Vulnerability Database cannot keep up, so it will enrich CVEs in
- CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, federal-use software
- and critical software first, and move its unenriched backlog from before
- 1 March 2026 to "Not Scheduled". Meanwhile,
- [Mandiant's M-Trends 2026](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/m-trends-2026)
- estimates the mean time to exploit at −7 days, so exploitation routinely
- begins before a patch is released, and exploits were the most common initial
- infection vector for the sixth year running (32% of intrusions).
- ### What it does
- Give CVE Intel a CVE ID, a project folder, a lockfile or SBOM, a container
- image, the software on this computer, your own domains, or a suspicious IP
- address, file hash or domain. It queries up to 46 public sources, including
- CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and ENISA's EU Vulnerability Database alongside NVD,
- and returns what the vulnerability is, a risk score from 0 to 100, whether
- attackers are already using it, the evidence behind each signal and what to
- do next. It also shows what changed this week across those sources, and
- watches the vendors, products and packages you run.
- - **46 data sources** for vulnerability, exploit, network and threat
- intelligence, listed under [Data sources](#data-sources). Many need no
- API key.
- - **42 MCP tools** for AI agents and coding assistants. The same program is
- also a command line and a REST API (see
- [Developer notes](#developer-notes)).
- - **SBOMs in and out.** It reads CycloneDX and SPDX SBOMs along with
- lockfiles, and **Save SBOM** (or `scan deps . --format cyclonedx`) writes
- any scan as a CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM with the findings, their risk signals and
- your recorded decisions.
- - **Local.** There is no CVE Intel account or hosted service. Lookups go
- straight from your computer to the public sources, and the AI assistant
- runs on a local model unless you choose a remote provider. Fleet mode runs
- on a server you own.
- It is for security analysts, IT and operations teams, developers checking
- their dependencies, and anyone learning vulnerability management.
- ### One machine or a whole fleet
- The desktop app checks the computer it runs on and whatever you give it. To
- watch your servers as well, run **fleet mode**: a small agent on each machine
- sends what is installed there to a CVE Intel server you run. That server
- checks every machine when its software changes and again every day, records
- what became new, riskier or fixed, and answers *which of our machines have
- this CVE?* The desktop app's **Fleet** view shows it all from your own
- computer.
- <p align="center">
- <picture>
- <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="assets/fleet-mode-dark.svg"/>
- <img src="assets/fleet-mode-light.svg" width="900" alt="How fleet mode works: an agent on each machine (web01 on Ubuntu 22.04, app01 on Debian 12, db01 on Ubuntu 24.04) reads its packages, apps and lockfiles offline and sends the inventory over HTTPS to your central server, cve-intel fleet serve. Only the server looks the software up in the public sources (OSV, NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS and exploit feeds). It checks each inventory when it changes and every day, records what is new, riskier or fixed, and answers which machines a CVE is on. The desktop app's Fleet view, webhook alerts to Slack, Mattermost or anything else, and the REST API and command line read the results with a viewer token. Agents never listen, and the machines need no internet access, only a route to your server."/>
- </picture>
- </p>
- [Fleet mode](#fleet-mode) under Features has screenshots and a demo, and
- [the fleet guide](docs/fleet.md) shows how to set it up.
- ### What it helps you do
- - **Decide whether to patch now:** a 0–100 risk score, a plain
- recommendation and the evidence behind it.
- - **Fix it on what you run:** the **Remediation Lab** ranks the fixes and
- workarounds for your distribution, product or package, each with its
- source.
- - **Put a list of CVEs in order:** paste up to 10 from a scanner report and
- get the patch order.
- - **Check your dependencies:** drop a project folder, lockfile or SBOM and
- see the vulnerable packages, riskiest first, with the version that fixes
- each.
- - **Check what you run and ship:** this computer's apps and OS, a container
- image, or what public sources know about your own domains.
- - **See what changed this week** across CISA KEV, EPSS, ENISA, the exploit
- databases and CISA advisories.
- - **Watch the products you run** and hear about new CVEs, KEV listings,
- exploits and fixes.
- - **Remember what you decided** and hear when the reasons stop holding.
- - **Watch every server you run:** which machines a new CVE is on, what
- changed on each since yesterday, and which ones stopped reporting.
- - **Search by product or KEV:** every CVE for a product and version, or
- CISA's exploited list filtered by vendor, ransomware use or date.
- - **Investigate something suspicious:** an IP address, file hash, domain or
- URL.
- - **Ask in plain English:** the assistant looks up the facts first and
- shows its sources.
- - **Give AI coding assistants the same knowledge** through MCP.
- ### Terms you'll see
- | Term | What it means |
- |---|---|
- | **CVE** | A public ID for one known vulnerability, such as CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell). |
- | **CVSS** | A 0–10 severity score: how bad the flaw is if someone exploits it. It says nothing about how likely an attack is. |
- | **EPSS** | The probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the next 30 days, published daily by FIRST. |
- | **CISA KEV** | The US government's catalog of vulnerabilities known to be exploited by attackers. A CVE on this list is urgent. |
- | **ENISA EUVD** | The EU vulnerability database. Its own "exploited" flag is independent of CISA KEV and can raise the SSVC Exploitation input. |
- | **Exploit / PoC** | Public code that demonstrates or carries out an attack. A Metasploit module means the attack is packaged and easy to use. |
- | **SSVC** | A decision method from CISA and CERT/CC that ends in one of four actions: *Act*, *Attend*, *Track\** or *Track*. |
- | **SBOM / lockfile** | A list of every package your software uses, with exact versions. |
- | **MCP** | Model Context Protocol, the standard way AI assistants call outside tools. |
- The **risk score** combines these signals: severity (CVSS), the chance of
- exploitation (EPSS), confirmed exploitation (CISA KEV) and public exploit
- code. Anything on CISA KEV is always CRITICAL. See [Risk score](#risk-score)
- for the formula.
- > CVE Intel helps you decide what to patch. It does not probe, port-scan or
- > attack anything, and it does not apply fixes. Scans read what is already
- > on your machine (dependency files, the software installed on this
- > computer, a container image you choose) and send only package and product
- > names and versions to OSV.dev and NVD. The exposure check is passive: it
- > asks public sources (Shodan, certificate transparency logs) what they
- > already know about domains and addresses you own, and sends nothing to
- > them. Results are only as current as the public sources.
- ## Getting started
- You don't need an account or any API keys to start. Most people are
- looking at their first result within a couple of minutes:
- 1. [Download the app](#install) for your operating system and open it. The
- **Landscape** view loads first: what changed this week across the public
- sources.
- 2. Open **CVE Triage**, type a CVE ID such as `CVE-2024-3400` and press
- **Triage**, or click one of the examples under the search box. Press
- **Watch CVE** (or **Watch** next to the vendor) to be told when it
- changes.
- 3. Drag a project folder onto the window to check its dependencies, or open
- **Scan** and choose **This computer** to check the software installed on
- this machine. Findings come back ranked by real-world risk, with the
- version that fixes each one.
- 4. Press `⌘K` (`Ctrl+K` on Windows and Linux) to open **Quick Find**. Paste
- anything there (a CVE, IP address, file hash, domain, URL or
- `package:ecosystem:version`) and CVE Intel picks the right lookup.
- 5. *Optional:* in **Settings → Data source API keys**, add free API keys for
- faster lookups and more exploit data. See [API keys](#api-keys).
- 6. *Optional:* open **Local Model** and download a model to use **Ask AI**
- with answers that never leave your computer.
- 7. *Optional:* open **MCP Server** to connect your AI coding assistant.
- The buttons at the bottom of the sidebar switch between the light and dark
- themes and make the text larger or smaller. The version you are running is
- shown below them.
- Everything up to [Developer notes](#developer-notes) is about the desktop
- app. To use CVE Intel from a terminal, a script, a CI pipeline or another
- program, go straight to that section.
- ## Features
- <p align="center">
- <a href="assets/core-functions-demo.mp4"><img src="assets/core-functions-demo.webp" width="900" alt="Sped-up screen recording of CVE Intel on macOS: the threat landscape, CVE Triage of CVE-2024-3400 and recording a decision, the decision ledger with stale, expired and review-due examples, a dependency scan of a demo project and its attack chains, and the watchlist's recorded changes"/></a>
- </p>
- <p align="center"><sub>Sped-up demo on macOS (<a href="assets/core-functions-demo.mp4">video</a>): the threat landscape, triage and recording a decision, the decision ledger, a scan and its attack chains, and the watchlist.</sub></p>
- The short version of each feature is below. For every option and caveat,
- see [Features in detail](docs/features.md).
- ### Threat landscape
- What changed recently across independent sources: new CISA KEV entries,
- CVEs ENISA marks exploited that KEV doesn't list, the biggest EPSS rises,
- new Metasploit modules and PoCs, new critical CVEs, Project Zero's
- in-the-wild zero-days and CISA advisories. Your watchlist comes first, then
- CVEs that several panels agree on. **Copy as Markdown** for a weekly note.
- 
- ### Watchlist
- Watch the vendors, products, packages and CVEs you run. Each refresh
- records what changed: new CVEs, KEV listings, EPSS jumps, new exploits,
- CVSS changes and newly available fixes. While the app is open it refreshes
- every 6 hours (change it in **Settings**). The list stays on this machine.
- 
- ### Decisions
- Record what you decided on a CVE (patch now, defer until a date, accept,
- not affected, mitigated) and the assumptions behind it, such as "not in
- CISA KEV" or "not internet-facing". Every refresh re-checks them:
- - **Stale:** an assumption broke. The CVE entered KEV, an exploit or fix
- appeared, or EPSS crossed your threshold.
- - **Expired / review due:** a deferral passed its date, or a manual
- assumption passed its review date.
- - **Calibration:** how your past calls held up, such as how many CVEs you
- held back later entered KEV or gained an exploit, and how soon.
- Export the ledger as OpenVEX or CycloneDX VEX. It stays on this machine;
- AI agents can read it but never change it.
- ### CVE Triage
- One lookup across NVD, CVE.org, EPSS, CISA KEV, ENISA EUVD and the exploit
- databases gives a 0–100 risk score, a recommendation and the evidence
- behind it. Deep triage adds CISA's SSVC decision. Two panels go further:
- - **Who says what:** the sources side by side, and where they disagree
- (scores 2+ points apart, NVD hasn't analysed it, a distribution says
- "not affected"). Marked **Sources agree**, **Sources disagree** or **Thin
- evidence**.
- - **Exploit speed:** how soon an exploit is likely (**Hours**, **Days**,
- **Weeks**), estimated from the public fix commit, the weakness type and
- the CVSS vector, with every reason shown.
- Neither changes the risk score.
- 
- ### Ask in plain language
- Ask *"Which is worse: CVE-2024-3400 or CVE-2023-44487?"* CVE Intel runs the
- lookups first, then the model explains the results and names the tools it
- used. Small local models can get details wrong, so check anything you will
- act on in **CVE Triage**.
- ### Compare and prioritise
- Paste 2 to 10 CVE IDs and get a patch order: CISA KEV first, then the risk
- score, with ties broken by ransomware use, EPSS and exploit maturity. Each
- CVE says why it sits above the next. The side-by-side table highlights the
- riskier values, and a summary shows what the CVEs share (same product,
- reachable without sign-in, public exploits).
- 
- ### Remediation plans
- Say what you run (a distribution package, a vendor product and version, or
- a library) and the **Remediation Lab** merges every source's advice into
- one ranked plan:
- - **Fixes:** your distribution's own build first (Ubuntu and Red Hat
- backport fixes), then the vendor's update or the upstream version.
- - **Workarounds and mitigations** in the vendor's words, with general
- controls ranked last.
- - **Every option names its source.** Nothing is made up, and a source that
- could not be reached is listed as a gap, not as "no advisory".
- Open it with **Open in Remediation Lab** on a triage result, or **Plan
- fix** on a scan finding.
- ```bash
- cve-intel remediate CVE-2024-6387 --distro ubuntu:jammy --package openssh@1:8.9p1-3ubuntu0.6
- cve-intel remediate CVE-2024-3400 --product "PAN-OS@10.2.8"
- cve-intel remediate CVE-2020-28500 --package npm:lodash@4.17.20
- ```
- 
- **What if.** Tick the options you are considering to see what stays exposed
- and how the SSVC decision changes, then **Save as decision…** (`--apply
- <option id> --record` on the command line).
- **Runbooks.** **Runbook…** (`--runbook`) turns the options you chose into
- steps: what to run, how to check it took, and how to back it out. CVE
- Intel never runs them.
- | Written by | What leaves your computer |
- |---|---|
- | Fixed rules (the default) | Nothing |
- | The local model (adds a summary) | Nothing |
- | A cloud provider under **Remote AI** (`--runbook --ai`) | The CVE, the kind of system, the options you chose and their public advisory text |
- A model's steps are checked against the plan's evidence, and risky commands
- (piping a download into a shell, turning off a firewall) are rejected.
- 
- ### Scan dependencies
- Drop a project folder on the window, or paste a lockfile, SBOM or package
- list. CVE Intel finds the npm, Yarn, Python, Rust, Go, PHP, Ruby and Maven
- files and CycloneDX or SPDX SBOMs, and checks the packages with OSV.dev.
- Only package names and versions leave your computer.
- - **Ranked by real risk:** Log4Shell in an old `log4j-core` comes first; a
- CVSS 9.8 nobody exploits does not. Each finding shows the version that
- fixes it.
- - **History:** scan again to see what is new, resolved or riskier. Tick
- **Monitor** to rescan daily, or **Watch all affected** to add the
- packages to the watchlist.
- - **Chains:** links findings into attack chains and names the **break
- point**, the one fix that cuts the most chains.
- - **Save SBOM:** writes the scan as a CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM with the findings,
- their risk signals and your decisions.
- To run the same scan in a CI pipeline, see
- [CI and automation](#ci-and-automation).
- 
- 
- ### Scan this computer
- **Scan → This computer** checks the OS and installed apps: from the
- registry on Windows, Applications and Homebrew on macOS, and the package
- database on Linux. Apps CVE Intel recognises are checked with NVD; Linux
- packages with OSV.dev (Arch with the Arch Linux Security Tracker, matched
- locally). Apps it doesn't recognise are listed as not checked. **List
- installed software** shows what would be checked without contacting
- anything.
- ### Scan a container image
- **Scan → Container image** checks a `docker save` or OCI archive without
- Docker. Its OS packages and any lockfiles inside are checked with OSV.dev.
- Distributions OSV doesn't cover are listed as not checked, never reported
- clean.
- ```bash
- docker save myapp:latest -o myapp.tar
- cve-intel scan image myapp.tar --fail-on kev
- ```
- ### Check your public exposure
- **Scan → Public exposure** shows what public sources already know about
- domains and addresses you own. It finds your host names in certificate
- transparency logs, then asks Shodan what services, versions and CVEs have
- been seen on them. It is passive: CVE Intel never connects to or
- port-scans the targets.
- ```bash
- cve-intel scan exposure example.com --authorized
- ```
- ### Databases and data sources
- Every upstream source, what it provides, whether it needs a key and how
- long results are cached. **Check connectivity** probes them all live.
- 
- ### MCP server for AI agents
- Give Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code, Claude Desktop, Windsurf or any MCP
- client CVE Intel's 42 tools. Start the server from the app and copy the
- setup steps, already filled in. Agents connect over HTTP (local only, port
- 8000 by default) or launch their own copy over stdio, and use your saved
- API keys. To set it up by hand, see [MCP server setup](#mcp-server-setup).
- 
- ### Fleet mode
- <p align="center">
- <a href="assets/fleet-demo.mp4"><img src="assets/fleet-demo.webp" width="900" alt="Screen recording of the Fleet view on macOS: entering the central server's address and a viewer token and connecting; the overview of 5 hosts with 751 findings, 10 in CISA KEV; searching which hosts have CVE-2021-44228, which finds app01 with log4j-core 2.14.1; opening app01 and ticking In KEV only, which leaves Log4Shell, its incomplete fix and Spring4Shell in the billing project; then Plan fix, which opens the Remediation Lab with the upgrade to log4j-core 2.15.0 for that version"/></a>
- </p>
- <p align="center"><sub>Demo on macOS, 38 seconds (<a href="assets/fleet-demo.mp4">video</a>): connecting the Fleet view to a central server, asking which machines have Log4Shell, opening one and planning the fix for the version it runs.</sub></p>
- One CVE Intel server watching many machines. A small agent
- (`cve-intel-agent`, 2 to 4 MB) on each server reports what is installed
- there: its OS packages and apps, and the dependency files of the projects
- you name. Your central server checks every machine's inventory against the
- sources when it changes and again every day, even when nothing on the
- machine changed, and records what became new, riskier or fixed. Ask it
- which machines a CVE is on, hear when one stops reporting, and send alerts
- to a webhook. The agents need no internet access, never listen for
- connections, and hold no vulnerability data.
- The server and the agents run from the command line. The desktop app's
- **Fleet** view shows the fleet from your own computer: every machine and
- its state, each one's findings, which machines a CVE is on and what
- changed, with **Plan fix** opening the Remediation Lab for the version that
- machine runs. See [the fleet guide](docs/fleet.md) to set it up.
- 
- 
- ### Also included
- - **Quick Find** (`⌘K` or `Ctrl+K`): paste a CVE, IP, hash, domain, URL or
- `package:ecosystem:version` and the right lookup runs.
- - **Fixed versions:** the version that fixes every known vulnerability in a
- package. Quick Find `lodash:npm:4.17.15` to see it.
- - **Product and KEV search:** every CVE for a product and version, and
- filters over the CISA KEV catalog.
- - **MITRE ATT&CK mapping** for KEV-listed CVEs, plus inferred techniques,
- labelled as inferred.
- - **IP, hash and domain intelligence** from AbuseIPDB, GreyNoise, Shodan,
- VirusTotal, MalwareBazaar, crt.sh and more.
- - **Activity:** a searchable local history of your lookups and of the tool
- calls agents made.
- - **Local Model:** install the runtime and download a model in one click.
- ## Common uses
- | Situation | What to do in the app |
- |---|---|
- | What happened this week? | Open **Landscape**, or ask *"What's new this week?"* in **Ask AI**. |
- | A new CVE is in the news. Do we drop everything? | Enter it in **CVE Triage**, or ask *"Should we patch CVE-2024-3400 this weekend?"* in **Ask AI**. |
- | We run Fortinet (or another vendor). Tell me when something new hits it. | Add the vendor on **Watchlist**, or press **Watch** next to the vendor on a triage result. |
- | How do we fix this CVE on Ubuntu 22.04, or on the PAN-OS version we run? | Press **Open in Remediation Lab** on the triage result and say what you run. The plan puts the fix for your release or branch first and names its sources. |
- | The fix can't go in this week, or there isn't one yet. What do we do meanwhile? | In **Remediation Lab**, tick the vendor's workaround to see what it leaves exposed, then **Save as decision…**. A deferral is re-checked until its date, and if no fix existed you hear when one ships. **Runbook…** gives you the steps. |
- | We decided not to patch something yet. Tell me if that stops being safe. | Press **Record decision** on the triage result and tick the reasons. **Decisions** marks it stale the moment one of them breaks. |
- | A scanner reported 40 findings. Which come first? | Paste the IDs into **Compare CVEs**, up to 10 at a time. |
- | Checking dependencies before a release. | Drop the project folder on **Scan**, or paste the lockfile or SBOM. Press **Watch all affected** to follow them, or **Monitor** in History to have it scanned again daily. |
- | Is anything installed on this laptop being exploited? | **Scan → This computer**, then **Check**. Findings in CISA KEV come first. |
- | Is the image we ship affected by a new KEV entry? | `docker save` it and drop the `.tar` on **Scan → Container image**. |
- | What does the internet see on our servers? | **Scan → Public exposure** with your domain; passive, nothing connects to your hosts. |
- | Log4Shell is back in the news. Which of our servers have it? | With [fleet mode](#fleet-mode) set up, enter the CVE under **Fleet → Which hosts have a vulnerability?**, then **Plan fix** on a host's finding. |
- | Which version of a library fixes everything? | Open **Quick Find** and paste `lodash:npm:4.17.15`. |
- | What is known about the Tomcat version we run? | Ask *"Which CVEs affect Apache Tomcat 9.0.80?"* in **Ask AI**.¹ |
- | Is anything from a vendor being exploited right now? | Ask *"Which Fortinet vulnerabilities are in CISA KEV?"* in **Ask AI**.¹ |
- | An unknown IP appears in firewall or login logs. | Paste it into **Quick Find**. |
- | EDR flags an unknown file. | Paste its SHA-256 hash into **Quick Find**. |
- | You work in an AI coding tool. | Open **MCP Server**, start the server and copy the setup steps for your agent. |
- | You are new to vulnerability management. | Ask *"Explain EPSS and CISA KEV like I'm new."* |
- ¹ For these questions the model has to pick the right lookup itself, which
- larger local models and cloud providers do more reliably. The same searches
- are always available from the terminal (see [Recipes](#recipes)).
- ## Install
- Download the file for your OS from the
- [latest release](https://github.com/Fazmin/cve-intel/releases/latest). The
- desktop app, CLI, MCP server and REST API are all **one executable**, with
- nothing else to install.
- | OS | File | How to run |
- |---|---|---|
- | Windows | `CVE-Intel_<version>_windows-x64-setup.exe` (or `…-portable.exe`) | Run the installer, then open **CVE Intel** |
- | macOS (Apple Silicon and Intel) | `CVE-Intel_<version>_macos-universal.dmg` | Drag **CVE Intel** to Applications |
- | Linux | `CVE-Intel_<version>_linux-x64.AppImage` (or `.deb`) | `chmod +x` the file and run it |
- Each file has a `.sha256` checksum next to it. Builds are not code-signed
- yet, so Windows SmartScreen and macOS Gatekeeper warn on first launch. On
- macOS, right-click the app and choose **Open**.
- To build it yourself, run the headless server in Docker, or run the desktop
- app in a container and use it from your browser (no install), see
- [Build from source and Docker](#build-from-source-and-docker).
- ## Local AI
- **Ask AI** uses a small language model that runs on your computer, so your
- questions stay private. Before the model runs, CVE Intel finds the CVE IDs,
- IPs, hashes and domains in your question, runs the matching lookups and
- gives the model the results as facts to rely on. If no model is running,
- Ask returns those lookup results directly, so it is useful before any
- download finishes.
- Open the **Local Model** view to install the llama.cpp runtime and download
- a model, one click each (files go under `~/.cve-intel/`). The default is
- Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct, a ~1.9 GB download that needs 6 GB of RAM; the 1B and
- 1.5B models need 4 GB and Qwen 2.5 7B needs 10 GB. On Apple silicon the view
- also offers two MLX models that run on the GPU and answer faster. The model
- server listens on `127.0.0.1` only. Already running Ollama, LM Studio or
- your own llama-server? See
- [Use your own model server](#use-your-own-model-server).
- ### Remote providers (opt-in)
- For stronger answers, open **Configure → Remote AI** and choose OpenAI,
- Anthropic, Google Gemini, or any **OpenAI-compatible** endpoint: a LiteLLM
- proxy, vLLM, Azure OpenAI, OpenRouter, Together, Groq, Ollama behind HTTPS…
- Paste a key (and for an OpenAI-compatible endpoint, its base URL), then pick
- a model. **Save & use** enables the provider and tests it; **Save without
- switching** keeps your current choice. You can switch back to the local
- model at any time.
- | Provider | Default model | Environment variables |
- |---|---|---|
- | OpenAI | `gpt-4o` | `OPENAI_API_KEY` |
- | Anthropic | `claude-opus-5` | `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` |
- | Google Gemini | `gemini-2.5-flash` | `GEMINI_API_KEY` |
- | OpenAI-compatible endpoint (LiteLLM, vLLM, …) | (the server's model name) | `CUSTOM_LLM_BASE_URL`, `CUSTOM_LLM_API_KEY` (optional) |
- **Models** come from the provider itself: once a key is saved, the model
- list is fetched live from the provider's `/models` endpoint, so it shows
- every model your key can use (for OpenAI and Gemini, embedding, speech and
- image models are left out). Press **↻** to refresh it, or choose **Other**
- to type any model ID. Until a key is saved, a few suggestions are shown.
- The same settings work from a terminal:
- ```bash
- cve-intel ai list # every provider, where it sends requests, what it still needs
- cve-intel ai set anthropic --key # hidden prompt
- cve-intel ai models anthropic # every model the key can use, fetched live
- cve-intel ai set anthropic --model claude-opus-5 --use
- cve-intel ai set custom --url https://litellm.example.com/v1 --key --model claude-sonnet-5 --use # LiteLLM, vLLM, …
- cve-intel ai test # one tiny request to the provider in use
- cve-intel ai use local # back to the on-device model
- ```
- `--key` reads the key from a hidden prompt (or stdin when piped), never from
- the command line.
- - **Off by default.** When a remote provider is selected, each question and
- the lookup results gathered for it are sent to that endpoint under its
- operator's terms. The Ask view shows a banner while this is on. A
- [remediation runbook](#remediation-plans) is written by the provider only
- when you ask for one, after the dialog (or the terminal) has shown
- exactly what would be sent.
- - **Where requests go.** OpenAI, Anthropic and Gemini use built-in HTTPS
- addresses. An OpenAI-compatible endpoint must be `https://`; plain
- `http://` is accepted only to this machine (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`). A
- saved key is tied to its URL: changing the URL forgets the key, so it is
- never sent to a new host without being entered again. A key saved while
- the URL comes from `CUSTOM_LLM_BASE_URL` is saved with that URL, and
- `CUSTOM_LLM_API_KEY` is only sent to `CUSTOM_LLM_BASE_URL`. Requests to a
- loopback address skip `HTTPS_PROXY`.
- - **Keys stay local.** Keys are stored in `~/.cve-intel/settings.db` with
- owner-only permissions. They are never shown again in the UI and never
- logged. You can use environment variables instead. See
- [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
- - **No vendor SDK.** Every provider here offers an OpenAI-compatible chat API
- with tool calling. Anthropic describes its compatible endpoint as intended
- mainly for evaluation; for Claude-specific features, use CVE Intel through
- MCP in a Claude client.
- ## Data sources
- The **Databases** view lists all 46 sources, and the CLI, REST API and MCP
- server report the same list.
- | Category | Sources |
- |---|---|
- | Vulnerability intelligence | NVD, NVD change history, CVE.org, CISA Vulnrichment, EPSS (FIRST) and its daily score files, CISA KEV, ENISA EUVD, VulnCheck NVD++, VulnCheck KEV, MSRC, Red Hat, Ubuntu, and CSAF advisories from Red Hat (VEX), SUSE (VEX), Cisco, Siemens and CISA ICS |
- | Exploit intelligence | GitHub PoC search, PoC-in-GitHub (nomi-sec), Exploit-DB, Metasploit modules, Nuclei templates, GitHub commits and pull requests (fix size for the exploit-speed estimate), Project Zero 0day In the Wild |
- | Network intelligence | AbuseIPDB, GreyNoise, Shodan, crt.sh, CIRCL Passive DNS |
- | Threat intelligence | VirusTotal, MalwareBazaar, ThreatFox, URLScan, CISA advisories (RSS), CIRCL Vulnerability-Lookup sightings, Ransomwhere, CIRCL hashlookup |
- | DevSecOps and reference | OSV.dev, Arch Linux Security Tracker, GitHub Advisories, MITRE ATT&CK (STIX), CTID KEV → ATT&CK mappings, MITRE CAPEC, HIBP Pwned Passwords |
- Many tools need no API key at all: EPSS and its daily files, KEV, ENISA
- EUVD, CVE.org and CISA Vulnrichment, OSV, the Arch Linux Security Tracker, CVSS, Exploit-DB, Metasploit,
- PoC-in-GitHub, Project Zero, CISA advisories, CIRCL sightings, ATT&CK,
- CAPEC, crt.sh, Ransomwhere, hashlookup, Pwned Passwords, and NVD at a
- lower rate limit. Large feeds (EPSS daily files, Exploit-DB, Metasploit,
- ATT&CK, CAPEC, the CTID mappings) are downloaded once, reduced to a small
- index, and refreshed daily or every few hours.
- ### Risk score
- ```
- Risk = CVSS×0.20 + EPSS×0.35 + KEV×0.30 + PoC×0.15 (boosters up to ×1.27, capped at 100)
- ```
- - **KEV override:** a CVE in CISA KEV is confirmed exploited, so it is always
- **CRITICAL** with a score of at least 76. Only CISA KEV earns the KEV
- points and the override.
- - EPSS measures the probability of exploitation. CVSS is treated as severity,
- not likelihood.
- - **PoC** is the strongest public exploit evidence. A Metasploit exploit
- module counts as weaponized (the full 15 points); Exploit-DB entries and
- VulnCheck XDB exploits count as public exploits.
- - Deep triage also returns the **SSVC v2** CISA Deployer decision:
- `Act`, `Attend`, `Track*` or `Track`. Its inputs come from CISA's published
- SSVC assessment when there is one. Because that assessment is a snapshot,
- newer evidence can raise Exploitation: a CISA KEV, VulnCheck KEV or ENISA
- EUVD exploited listing, or an EPSS of 0.90 or more, makes it `active`.
- EUVD and VulnCheck do not change the risk score.
- - Bands: 0–25 LOW, 26–50 MEDIUM, 51–75 HIGH, 76–100 CRITICAL.
- - This is scoring version 1.1, reported as `scoring_version` in results.
- ## API keys
- Keys are optional. Each one unlocks more data or raises a rate limit. In the
- app, open **Settings → Data source API keys**, press **Get a key** to open
- the sign-up page, paste the key and press **Save**. The key is used on the
- next lookup, with no restart needed.
- | Key | What it unlocks | Get it |
- |---|---|---|
- | NVD API key | 10× faster CVE lookups | [nvd.nist.gov](https://nvd.nist.gov/developers/request-an-api-key) |
- | GitHub token (no scopes) | Exploit search, Nuclei templates and advisory fixed versions (5,000 instead of 60 requests/hour) | [github.com/settings/tokens](https://github.com/settings/tokens) |
- | VulnCheck token | VulnCheck KEV (exploitation reports and XDB exploit links), and backup CVE data if NVD is down | [vulncheck.com](https://www.vulncheck.com/community) |
- | AbuseIPDB key | IP abuse score | [abuseipdb.com](https://www.abuseipdb.com/api) |
- | GreyNoise key | Whether an IP is harmless background noise | [docs.greynoise.io](https://docs.greynoise.io/docs/using-the-greynoise-community-api) |
- | Shodan key | Open ports and services on an IP | [account.shodan.io](https://account.shodan.io) |
- | VirusTotal key | 70+ antivirus verdicts for a file hash | [virustotal.com](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/my-apikey) |
- | URLScan key | Higher limits for URL checks | [urlscan.io](https://urlscan.io/docs/api/) |
- | abuse.ch Auth-Key | MalwareBazaar and ThreatFox lookups | [auth.abuse.ch](https://auth.abuse.ch/) |
- | CIRCL passive DNS login | Historical DNS records (access by request) | [circl.lu](https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/) |
- Keys are stored in `~/.cve-intel/settings.db` with owner-only permissions
- and shared by the app, CLI, MCP server and REST API on the same machine. A
- key saved in the app takes precedence over an environment variable. Free
- tiers and sign-up steps are set by each vendor, so check their pages. To
- manage keys from a terminal or with environment variables, see
- [Terminal configuration](#terminal-configuration).
- ## Privacy and security
- - All network traffic is outbound HTTPS: to the data sources, to the cloud
- AI provider if you opt in to one, and for the model and runtime
- downloads you start (Hugging Face, the llama.cpp release on GitHub and,
- for MLX, `uv` and a Python 3.12 build from GitHub plus `mlx-lm` from
- PyPI).
- - API keys are never logged, cached, shown in the UI or returned by any tool.
- - Private and reserved IPs are rejected before any network lookup.
- - The local model server and the app's MCP server bind to loopback only.
- - SQLite files are created on first use: `cache.db`, a disposable lookup
- cache; `~/.cve-intel/settings.db`, which holds keys, provider settings
- and the watchlist auto-refresh interval; and `~/.cve-intel/watch.db`,
- the local watchlist (items, snapshots and change events). Clearing the
- cache never touches settings or the watchlist.
- - While the app is open, an optional background task can refresh the
- watchlist (every 6 hours by default). It only contacts the public
- sources needed for the items you watch, and you can turn it off in
- **Settings**. Nothing runs while the app is closed.
- - While the **Fleet** view is connected to a central server, the app asks
- that server for the fleet's state when you open or refresh the view, and
- once a minute to count new changes. It sends the viewer token and nothing
- about your computer. The address and the token are stored in
- `settings.db`, and **Disconnect** removes them.
- - The desktop app keeps an activity log in `~/.cve-intel/activity.db`
- (owner-only). It records what you look up and ask, the answers, setting
- and model changes, the tools agents call through the app's MCP server, and
- which hosts each action contacted. API keys are never recorded, only key
- names. Upstream requests are stored as host and path, without query
- strings. Open **Activity** to search it, pause it or clear it. It keeps
- the latest 20,000 entries. The CLI and `cve-intel mcp` record nothing.
- See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the full security model and how to report
- a vulnerability.
- ## Developer notes
- Everything in this section is for using CVE Intel from a terminal, scripts,
- CI pipelines, other programs or AI agents, and for building it yourself. The
- desktop app needs none of it.
- - [The `cve-intel` executable](#the-cve-intel-executable): where it is and how one file runs every mode
- - [Command line (CLI)](#command-line-cli): every command, with [recipes](#recipes) for common tasks
- - [CI and automation](#ci-and-automation): fail a build, upload SARIF to GitHub code scanning, JSON output
- - [REST API](#rest-api): endpoints and examples
- - [MCP server setup](#mcp-server-setup): connect AI agents by hand
- - [Fleet mode](docs/fleet.md): a central server and agents on other machines
- - [Terminal configuration](#terminal-configuration): keys, environment variables, your own model server
- - [Build from source and Docker](#build-from-source-and-docker)
- - [Architecture](#architecture) and [Development and tests](#development-and-tests)
- ### The `cve-intel` executable
- The desktop app and the command-line tool are the same file. Double-clicking
- it opens the app; running it with any argument starts the CLI, the MCP
- server or the REST server instead.
- | OS | Executable |
- |---|---|
- | macOS | `/Applications/CVE Intel.app/Contents/MacOS/cve-intel` |
- | Windows (default per-user install) | `%LOCALAPPDATA%\CVE Intel\cve-intel.exe` |
- | Linux | `/usr/bin/cve-intel` (`.deb`), or the downloaded `.AppImage` |
- ```bash
- # macOS
- "/Applications/CVE Intel.app/Contents/MacOS/cve-intel" triage CVE-2024-3400
- # Linux
- ./CVE-Intel_<version>_linux-x64.AppImage triage CVE-2024-3400
- # Windows (default per-user install)
- "%LOCALAPPDATA%\CVE Intel\cve-intel.exe" triage CVE-2024-3400
- ```
- > On Windows the executable is a windowed program, so the terminal does not
- > wait for it. To see the output in order, use
- > `start /wait "" "…\cve-intel.exe" triage CVE-2024-3400`, or in PowerShell
- > `& "…\cve-intel.exe" … | Out-Host`. MCP clients start it directly and are
- > not affected.
- For servers and containers there is also a headless build without the GUI
- (`cargo build --release -p cve-server`, which produces
- `target/release/cve-intel`). From a source checkout, replace `cve-intel`
- with `cargo run -p cve-server --`. The examples below assume `cve-intel` is
- on your `PATH`.
- ### Command line (CLI)
- ```bash
- cve-intel triage CVE-2024-3400 --depth deep
- cve-intel ask "Should we patch CVE-2021-44228?" --model qwen2.5-3b
- cve-intel quick-find 185.220.101.34
- cve-intel scan deps . # every lockfile, manifest and SBOM here, ranked by risk
- cve-intel scan deps . --fail-on kev # exit 3 if anything is in CISA KEV
- cve-intel fix lodash npm 4.17.15 # version that fixes every known vulnerability
- cve-intel remediate CVE-2024-6387 --distro ubuntu:jammy --package openssh@1:8.9p1-3ubuntu0.6
- cve-intel product confluence_data_center --vendor atlassian --version 8.5.0
- cve-intel kev-search --vendor microsoft --ransomware-only --epss
- cve-intel landscape --days 7 # what's new; --markdown for a ticket
- cve-intel watch add vendor fortinet
- cve-intel watch refresh && cve-intel watch changes --unread
- cve-intel decide record CVE-2025-12345 --verdict defer --until 2026-12-31 --auto --note "waiting for the vendor"
- cve-intel decide list --state needs_attention # decisions whose reasons stopped holding
- cve-intel decide calibration # how your decisions held up
- cve-intel compare CVE-2024-3400 CVE-2023-44487
- cve-intel password-check # hidden prompt; only a 5-character hash prefix is sent to HIBP
- cve-intel sources --probe # every data source, with live status
- cve-intel tls-check # HTTPS diagnosis: proxy, CA store, certificate chain, verdict
- ```
- | Command | What it does |
- |---|---|
- | `triage <CVE> [--depth quick\|standard\|deep]` | Risk score, recommendation, KEV, EPSS and exploit evidence; `deep` adds SSVC |
- | `lookup <CVE>` | The NVD and CVE.org record |
- | `search <keyword> [--severity …] [--limit N]` | Keyword search in NVD |
- | `compare <CVE> <CVE> … [--json]` | Compare 2–10 CVEs: patch order with the reason for each place, and what they have in common |
- | `epss <CVE,CVE,…>` | EPSS scores |
- | `kev <CVE>` | CISA KEV status, and VulnCheck KEV with a token |
- | `kev-search [--vendor] [--product] [--keyword] [--ransomware-only] [--added-since] [--due-before] [--epss]` | Filter the CISA KEV catalog, newest first |
- | `landscape [--days N] [--markdown]` | Threat briefing for the last 1–30 days |
- | `watch add vendor\|product\|package\|cve …` | Watch a vendor, product, package or CVE |
- | `watch list\|remove\|refresh\|changes` | List items, stop watching, refresh, or show recorded changes |
- | `product <name> [--vendor] [--version] [--cpe]` | CVEs affecting a product, KEV-listed first |
- | `fix <package> <ecosystem> <version>` | The version that fixes every known vulnerability |
- | `remediate <CVE> [--distro …] [--package …] [--product …] [--apply <option id>]… [--record] [--runbook [--ai] [--out file.md]] [--json]` | The remediation plan for what you run: fixes, workarounds and mitigations in order, each with its sources. `--apply` shows what the options would change, `--record` saves the choice as a decision, `--runbook` writes the steps |
- | `scan deps <path>… [--format text\|json\|sarif\|markdown\|cyclonedx] [--fail-on …] [--fail-on-severity …]` | Scan files or folders (`-` for stdin); findings ranked by risk; `cyclonedx` writes an SBOM with the findings in it. See [CI and automation](#ci-and-automation) |
- | `scan-deps <file> [--sarif]` | Scan one lockfile, SBOM, manifest or package list; prints JSON |
- | `scan exposure <domain\|ip>… --authorized [--no-subdomains] [--max-ips N] [--list-only]` | Passive public exposure: certificate logs, DNS, and what Shodan or InternetDB has seen on your addresses |
- | `scan image <file or folder> [--platform os/arch] [--list-only]` | A container image (`docker save`, OCI archive or folder): OS packages and lockfiles, checked with OSV |
- | `scan host [--list-only] [--lookup-unknown] [--max-products N]` | This computer's OS and installed apps, checked with NVD; `--list-only` contacts nothing |
- | `scans list\|show <id\|latest>\|forget <key>` | Saved scans (`scan … --save` and the app), each with what changed since the scan before |
- | `cvss <vector>` | Score a CVSS vector |
- | `quick-find <anything>` | Detect the input type and run the right lookup |
- | `ip <address>`, `hash <hash>`, `domain <name>` | Threat intelligence for an IP, file hash or domain |
- | `password-check` | Check a password against HIBP Pwned Passwords |
- | `ask "<question>" [--model …] [--provider …]` | Ask a question; `--provider openai\|anthropic\|gemini\|custom` uses a remote model |
- | `ai list\|set\|models\|use\|remove-key\|test` | Configure remote AI for `ask`: OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint such as LiteLLM; `models` lists what your key can use (see [Remote providers](#remote-providers-opt-in)) |
- | `models list\|download\|remove`, `llama status\|install\|install-mlx` | Set up the local model and its runtime (`install-mlx` on Apple silicon) |
- | `keys list\|links\|set\|remove` | Manage API keys (see [Terminal configuration](#terminal-configuration)) |
- | `sources [--probe]`, `health`, `clear-cache` | Data sources, health check, clear the lookup cache |
- | `tls-check [host…] [--json]` | For each host (default: the core sources): the proxy used, the CA store read, the certificate chain presented and whether it verifies. See [HTTPS, proxies and private CAs](#https-proxies-and-private-cas) |
- | `mcp`, `serve` | Start the MCP server over stdio, or the HTTP server (MCP and REST) |
- | `fleet serve\|enroll\|hosts\|host\|cve\|events\|check\|token\|revoke\|forget` | [Fleet mode](docs/fleet.md): run the central server that agents report to, enroll machines, and see which machines a CVE is on |
- `triage`, `fix`, `remediate`, `product`, `kev-search`, `landscape`, `watch`,
- `sources` and `ask` print readable text; add `--json` for JSON. `lookup`,
- `epss` and `kev` print text, and the other lookup commands print JSON, ready
- for `jq`. Run `cve-intel <command> --help` for every option.
- #### Recipes
- | Situation | Command |
- |---|---|
- | What happened this week? | `cve-intel landscape --days 7` (add `--markdown` for a ticket) |
- | Watch Fortinet and see what changed | `cve-intel watch add vendor fortinet` then `cve-intel watch refresh` and `cve-intel watch changes --unread` |
- | A new CVE is in the news. Do we drop everything? | `cve-intel triage CVE-2024-3400 --depth deep` |
- | A scanner reported 40 findings. Which come first? | `cve-intel compare CVE-… CVE-…` |
- | Which version of a library fixes everything? | `cve-intel fix lodash npm 4.17.15` |
- | How do I fix this CVE on what I run? | `cve-intel remediate CVE-2024-3400 --product "PAN-OS@10.2.8"` (or `--distro ubuntu:jammy --package name@version`, or `--package npm:name@version`) |
- | What is known about the Tomcat version we run? | `cve-intel product tomcat --vendor apache --version 9.0.80` |
- | Is anything from a vendor being exploited right now? | `cve-intel kev-search --vendor fortinet --added-since 2026-01-01` |
- | An unknown IP appears in firewall or login logs. | `cve-intel ip 185.220.101.34` |
- | EDR flags an unknown file. | `cve-intel hash <sha256>` checks MalwareBazaar, VirusTotal and CIRCL hashlookup. |
- | Checking dependencies before a release. | `cve-intel scan deps .` |
- ### CI and automation
- Fail a CI build on the findings that matter. `scan deps` takes files and
- folders (searched like the app does), ranks the findings by risk and exits
- with code 3 when a gate trips:
- ```bash
- cve-intel scan deps . --fail-on kev # anything in CISA KEV
- cve-intel scan deps . --fail-on exploited # in KEV, or a public or weaponized exploit
- cve-intel scan deps . --fail-on high # risk HIGH or CRITICAL
- cve-intel scan deps . --fail-on-severity critical # the advisory's own rating, ignoring risk
- ```
- | Exit code | Meaning |
- |---|---|
- | 0 | No gate tripped |
- | 1 | An error; or `--strict` and something could not be checked; or a KEV-based gate when CISA KEV could not be loaded |
- | 2 | Wrong command-line arguments |
- | 3 | A gate tripped (change it with `--exit-code N`) |
- The risk score weighs exploitation, so a CVSS 9.8 that nobody exploits can
- rank LOW. Use `--fail-on-severity` to gate on advisory severity instead, or
- both. Without `--strict`, anything that could not be checked (a package OSV
- rejected, EPSS or the exploit indexes unreachable) is reported on stderr and
- does not fail the build. `--enrich basic` skips the exploit indexes (about
- 50 MB, downloaded once a day); on CI runners, cache `CACHE_DB_PATH` to avoid
- fetching them on every run.
- `--format markdown` writes a summary table for `$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY` or a
- pull request comment, `--format json` the full result for `jq`,
- `--format cyclonedx` a CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM of everything scanned with each
- finding, its risk signals and your decisions attached (for Dependency-Track,
- a release artifact or an auditor; it works for `scan image` and `scan host`
- too), and `-o FILE` writes to a file:
- ```bash
- cve-intel scan deps . --format markdown >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
- cve-intel scan deps requirements.txt --format json | jq '.summary'
- cve-intel scan deps . --format cyclonedx -o sbom.cdx.json
- ```
- Show the findings in GitHub code scanning (the **Security** tab and pull
- request annotations) by uploading SARIF:
- ```yaml
- # .github/workflows/dependencies.yml
- on: [push, pull_request]
- permissions:
- contents: read
- security-events: write
- jobs:
- scan:
- runs-on: ubuntu-latest
- steps:
- - uses: actions/checkout@v4
- - name: Scan the dependencies with CVE Intel
- run: cve-intel scan deps . --format sarif -o cve-intel.sarif
- - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
- with:
- sarif_file: cve-intel.sarif
- category: cve-intel
- ```
- This assumes `cve-intel` is on the runner's `PATH` (for example the release
- AppImage, or `cargo build --release -p cve-server`). Each vulnerability is a
- rule with an OSV link and a `security-severity`. Each result points at the
- file and line that declares the package, names the advisory and the fixed
- version, and carries the risk score, KEV status and EPSS. Findings in KEV or
- with HIGH or CRITICAL risk are errors whatever the advisory's own rating.
- Get a machine-readable verdict for a ticket or dashboard:
- ```bash
- cve-intel triage CVE-2024-3400 --depth deep --json | jq '.risk | {risk_score, risk_label, urgency}'
- ```
- ### REST API
- `cve-intel serve` starts an HTTP server on `127.0.0.1:8000` (set `HOST` and
- `PORT` to change it, and see [Serving HTTPS](#serving-https) for TLS) with
- the REST API under `/api/v1` and MCP at `/mcp`.
- The server the desktop app starts from **MCP Server** serves the same
- endpoints.
- | Method and path | Returns |
- |---|---|
- | `GET /health` | Version, scoring version, NVD and KEV status (with OAuth on, just `{"status":"ok"}`) |
- | `GET /api/v1/health` | The same report, always in full |
- | `GET /api/v1/triage/{cve_id}?depth=quick\|standard\|deep` | The full triage report |
- | `GET /api/v1/cves/{cve_id}` | The NVD and CVE.org record |
- | `GET /api/v1/remediation/{cve_id}?distro=…&package=…&product=…&exposure=…` | The remediation plan, for what you run when a context is given |
- | `GET /api/v1/search?q=…&severity=…&limit=…` | NVD keyword search |
- | `POST /api/v1/quick-find` with `{"input": "…"}` | Auto-detected lookup |
- | `GET /api/v1/kev` | CISA KEV catalog summary |
- | `GET /api/v1/landscape?days=7` | The threat-landscape briefing (`format=markdown` for Markdown) |
- | `GET /api/v1/watch` | The local watchlist (read-only) |
- | `GET /api/v1/watch/changes?unread_only=true` | Recorded watchlist changes (read-only) |
- | `GET /api/v1/scans`, `GET /api/v1/scans/{id}`, `GET /api/v1/scans/findings?min_risk=HIGH` | Saved scans and their findings (read-only; only on the server the app starts) |
- | `GET /api/v1/tools` | The tools with their input schemas: 42 on the server the app starts, 37 from `cve-intel serve`, which leaves out the tools that read your saved scans and decisions |
- | `POST /api/v1/tools/{name}` with the tool's arguments | Runs any tool |
- | `GET /api/v1/sources`, `POST /api/v1/sources/probe` | The source catalog, and live connectivity checks |
- | `DELETE /api/v1/cache` | Clears the lookup cache |
- | `GET /api/v1/models` | The local model catalog |
- | `POST /api/v1/ask` with `{"question": "…"}` | An Ask answer from the local model |
- | `POST /mcp` | MCP over streamable HTTP |
- Errors return HTTP 400 with `{"error": "…"}`.
- ```bash
- curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1/triage/CVE-2024-3400?depth=deep" | jq '.risk'
- curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1/tools/find_fixed_version \
- -H 'content-type: application/json' \
- -d '{"package": "lodash", "ecosystem": "npm", "version": "4.17.15"}'
- curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1/tools/get_attack_mapping \
- -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"cve_id": "CVE-2024-34102"}'
- ```
- - `/api/v1/ask` only uses the local model (or `CVE_LLM_BASE_URL`), never a
- remote provider, so a caller cannot spend your remote-AI key.
- - By default `cve-intel serve` has no authentication and allows
- cross-origin requests, so browser front ends can call it. That also means
- any web page open in your browser can reach it while it runs, so by
- default it only binds to loopback. To serve other machines, turn on OAuth
- (see [Securing the HTTP server](#securing-the-http-server)). The server
- the desktop app starts refuses web pages instead (see below).
- ### Securing the HTTP server
- To run `cve-intel serve` for a team or in production, put it behind your
- organisation's identity provider. The server then acts as an **OAuth 2.1
- resource server**: every request needs an access token except `/health`
- and the discovery document, and MCP clients (Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code, …)
- discover where to log in from the server itself
- ([RFC 9728](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9728) protected-resource
- metadata, as the MCP authorization spec requires). `/health` stays open for
- load balancers but only answers `{"status":"ok"}`; the full health report
- (NVD and KEV status, which API keys are set) moves to `GET /api/v1/health`,
- which needs a token. Each accepted request is logged with the user and
- client it came from, and each MCP tool call with the tool's name.
- The server never issues tokens, never sees a password and needs no client
- secret. It checks each token's signature against the issuer's published
- keys (JWKS, found through OIDC discovery and cached), and its `iss`, `aud`,
- `exp`, `nbf`, `iat`, `sub` and optional scopes. Only asymmetric algorithms
- (RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512, ES256, ES384, EdDSA) are accepted, and a
- token with a `crit` header is refused. So is an OpenID Connect ID token:
- one with a Keycloak `typ` other than `Bearer`, a Cognito `token_use` other
- than `access`, or a `nonce`, `at_hash`, `c_hash` or `s_hash` claim. The
- check relies on those markers alone, so an ID token that has none of them
- gets in if its `aud` matches. That can only happen when the expected
- audience is the ID of a client that users sign in to, which is easy to set
- up by accident with Entra ID (see the Entra note below).
- | Variable | Meaning |
- |---|---|
- | `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_ISSUER` | The authorization server's issuer, exactly as in its tokens' `iss` (keep or omit a trailing slash to match). Setting it turns OAuth on. |
- | `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_RESOURCE` | The public URL of the MCP endpoint, e.g. `https://cve.example.com/mcp`. Required with the issuer. |
- | `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_AUDIENCE` | Expected `aud`, comma-separated for several. Default: the resource URL. |
- | `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES` | Scopes every token must carry (`403 insufficient_scope` otherwise), separated by spaces or commas. Default: none. Set but empty (`""`, `,`) is an error. |
- | `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_SCOPES_SUPPORTED` | Scopes advertised to clients, separated by spaces or commas. Default: `openid` plus the required scopes. |
- | `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_REQUIRED_ROLES` | Who may use the server: roles or groups, separated by commas (a name may contain spaces, e.g. `CVE Admin,/Security Team`); a user needs **any one** of them. Default: none, so any valid token gets in. Set but empty (`""`, `,`) is an error. |
- | `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_JWKS_URI` | Use this JWKS instead of discovering it. |
- | `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_LEEWAY_SECS` | Clock-skew allowance for `exp`, `nbf` and `iat`, 0–600 seconds. Default `60`. |
- | `CVE_INTEL_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED` | `1` to serve a non-loopback `HOST` **without** OAuth, for example behind your own authenticating proxy. |
- Without OAuth, `cve-intel serve` refuses to start on a non-loopback address
- (including Docker's `0.0.0.0`) unless `CVE_INTEL_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1` is
- set. At startup with OAuth on, it fetches the issuer's discovery document
- and keys, and refuses to start if they can't be loaded, if none of the keys
- can verify tokens, or if the issuer in the discovery document doesn't match
- `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_ISSUER` exactly. Keys the server doesn't understand (an
- ES512, ECDH-ES or ML-DSA key, say) are skipped. The keys are refetched every
- hour and when a token names an unknown key; if the issuer moves its keys,
- discovery runs again. While the issuer is unreachable, the keys already
- held keep working for up to four hours; after that, requests get `503`
- until it is back.
- Each connection must send a complete request header within 10 seconds of
- connecting (or of its previous response), and the server holds at most 512
- connections at once, counting those still in the TLS handshake. At the
- limit it stops accepting until one closes, and logs a warning at most once
- a minute. The connection limit is fixed.
- The same 10 seconds also close an idle keep-alive connection. A load
- balancer that keeps idle connections to the server open longer (AWS ALB
- does for 60 seconds by default) can send a request on one just as the
- server closes it, and answer that request with a `502`. Behind one, set
- `CVE_INTEL_HEADER_TIMEOUT_SECS` (1–3600 seconds) above the load balancer's
- idle timeout, e.g. `65` for an ALB. A longer timeout also gives a client
- that never finishes its header longer to hold a connection, so raise it
- only when a proxy or load balancer stands between the server and its
- clients. `serve` prints the value at startup when it isn't the default.
- **Keycloak example.** With a realm `acme` at `https://sso.example.com` and
- the server at `https://cve.example.com/mcp`:
- 1. Create a client for the resource server, e.g. `cve-intel` (no secret
- needed; it only represents the audience). Create a client scope, e.g.
- `cve-intel-audience`, with an **Audience** mapper whose *Included Custom
- Audience* is exactly `https://cve.example.com/mcp`. Without it,
- Keycloak's tokens carry `aud: account` and are rejected.
- 2. Let your MCP clients register (dynamic client registration) or create a
- public client for them with that scope available.
- 3. Configure the server:
- ```bash
- export CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_ISSUER=https://sso.example.com/realms/acme # no trailing slash
- export CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_RESOURCE=https://cve.example.com/mcp
- export CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_SCOPES_SUPPORTED="openid offline_access profile cve-intel-audience"
- HOST=0.0.0.0 cve-intel serve
- ```
- Or put the three settings in `.env` (without `export` and without the
- comment), since `cve-intel` reads it at startup.
- 4. Check it:
- ```bash
- curl -s https://cve.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- curl -si -X POST https://cve.example.com/mcp -d '{}' | grep -i www-authenticate
- claude mcp add --transport http cve-intel https://cve.example.com/mcp # then /mcp to log in
- ```
- **Troubleshooting.** `cve-intel serve` logs each rejected token's reason
- (`wrong audience`, `token expired`, …). `cve-intel --debug serve` logs the
- whole exchange: its discovery and JWKS fetches (URLs, status, the
- advertised issuer and endpoints, each key's id, type and algorithm), the
- metadata it served, and for every request the client, the token's header
- and standard claims (`iss`, `aud`, `sub`, `azp`, `scope`, times; control
- characters and bidi overrides shown as `\u{..}`), what the server
- expected, each check's result and the challenge it sent back. Tokens appear
- only as a fingerprint (`tok:` and 12 hex digits of their SHA-256) so one
- token can be followed across lines; the token, its signature and the
- `Authorization` header are never logged. A Keycloak token with
- `aud="account"` in that log means the audience mapper or the
- `<client>-audience` scope is missing, and `not an access token` means the
- client sent its ID token instead. Without `--debug`, only cve-intel's own
- lines appear; messages from the TLS, HTTP and proxy libraries (a scanner's
- illegal SNI, say) need `--debug`.
- Notes for other providers: Entra ID puts scopes in `scp` (accepted) and
- uses `api://<app-id>` or the app ID as audience, so set
- `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_AUDIENCE`; Auth0's issuer ends in `/`. Serve the public
- URL over HTTPS, from cve-intel itself ([Serving HTTPS](#serving-https)) or
- from a proxy in front of it; the URLs in the
- metadata and the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge come from
- `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_RESOURCE`, never from request headers. If the proxy does
- its own authentication, exempt `/mcp`, `/api/v1` and
- `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource*` so its challenge doesn't replace
- the server's.
- **Entra ID and ID tokens.** An Entra ID token's `aud` is the client ID of
- the app the user signed in to, and one from the code exchange carries no
- `at_hash` or `c_hash`, and no `nonce` unless the client sent one. If the
- MCP client signs in with the API's own app registration, so that
- `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_AUDIENCE` is that client's ID, its ID token passes every
- check. Prevent it in one of two ways:
- - Give the API its own app registration, separate from the clients'. A
- client's ID token then carries the client's ID, not the API's, and fails
- the audience check.
- - Set `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES` to a scope the API exposes (e.g.
- `access_as_user`). Entra puts `scp` only in access tokens issued to
- users, so an ID token never has it. This also refuses app-only
- (client-credentials) tokens, which carry `roles` instead of `scp`.
- `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_REQUIRED_ROLES` doesn't help here, because Entra puts the
- user's app roles in ID tokens too.
- **Who may use it.** Without `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_REQUIRED_ROLES`, any valid
- token for this server gets in. Set it to restrict the server to users who
- hold one of the listed roles or groups:
- ```bash
- CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_REQUIRED_ROLES=cve-intel-user,secops
- ```
- Separate entries with commas only, because role and group names may
- contain spaces (`CVE Admin,/Security Team` is two entries).
- Each entry is matched exactly (case-sensitive) against the token's:
- | Claim | Write it as | Comes from |
- |---|---|---|
- | `realm_access.roles` | `cve-intel-user` | Keycloak realm roles (the `roles` client scope) |
- | `resource_access.<client>.roles` | `cve-intel:admin` (`client:role`) | Keycloak client roles; only that client's roles count |
- | `groups` | `secops` or `/org/secops` | Keycloak's group membership mapper (the `microprofile-jwt` scope, or a mapper you add), Okta; a top-level group's leading `/` is optional, a nested group needs its full path |
- | `roles` | `CveIntel.User` | Entra ID app roles |
- A user who authenticates but holds none of them gets a plain `403
- access_denied`, with no bearer challenge (logging in again wouldn't help)
- and without the list of allowed roles. The server logs who was refused,
- and `--debug` shows which role and group claims the token carried. For
- Keycloak, make sure the clients your users connect with receive the
- `roles` scope (or your group mapper), or the claims won't be in the token;
- adding `roles` to `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_SCOPES_SUPPORTED` asks clients for it.
- Saved scans and decisions are never served by `cve-intel serve`, so a
- permitted user can use every tool the server offers.
- #### Serving HTTPS
- OAuth providers and MCP clients expect the server's URL to be `https://`.
- `cve-intel serve` can serve HTTPS itself, with no reverse proxy, given a
- certificate and its private key:
- | Variable | Meaning |
- |---|---|
- | `CVE_INTEL_TLS_CERT` | The certificate chain in PEM: the server's certificate first, then any intermediates (certbot's `fullchain.pem`). |
- | `CVE_INTEL_TLS_KEY` | Its private key in PEM, unencrypted (certbot's `privkey.pem`): RSA of 2048 bits or more, ECDSA P-256 or P-384, or Ed25519. |
- ```bash
- CVE_INTEL_TLS_CERT=/etc/cve-intel/tls/fullchain.pem \
- CVE_INTEL_TLS_KEY=/etc/cve-intel/tls/privkey.pem \
- HOST=0.0.0.0 PORT=8443 cve-intel serve
- # [cve-intel] MCP at https://0.0.0.0:8443/mcp · …
- # [cve-intel] HTTPS on: certificate "/etc/cve-intel/tls/fullchain.pem" (SHA-256 3F:A2:…), reloaded when it changes
- ```
- - Set both or neither. If only one is set, a file can't be read, or the
- key doesn't belong to the certificate, `serve` refuses to start rather
- than fall back to plain HTTP. With TLS on, the port speaks only HTTPS.
- - The files are read again every minute, and a renewed certificate is used
- for new connections without a restart; the log shows its fingerprint
- (compare with `openssl x509 -noout -fingerprint -sha256 -in <file>`). If
- the new files don't load, for example while the certificate has been
- replaced but the key not yet, the server logs why once and keeps serving
- the previous certificate.
- - HTTPS protects the connection, not who may use it: a non-loopback `HOST`
- still needs OAuth (or `CVE_INTEL_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1`).
- - Clients must trust the certificate, so use a public CA such as Let's
- Encrypt, or your organisation's CA installed on each client (Node-based
- clients also read `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`). A self-signed certificate
- works only where each client is set up to trust it. The certificate's
- names must include the host in `CVE_INTEL_OAUTH_RESOURCE`.
- - cve-intel doesn't obtain certificates itself. Get them with certbot (a
- standalone or DNS challenge), your CA or cert-manager. The user running
- `cve-intel` must be able to read the key, and certbot's keys are readable
- only by root, so copy them on each renewal, for example with
- `certbot certonly … --deploy-hook 'install -m 0640 -g cve-intel "$RENEWED_LINEAGE/fullchain.pem" "$RENEWED_LINEAGE/privkey.pem" /etc/cve-intel/tls/'`.
- - Ports below 1024 need privileges. Use a high port with a port forward
- (Docker: `-p 443:8000`), or on Linux grant the binary
- `cap_net_bind_service` with `setcap`.
- - TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only (rustls). `cve-intel --debug serve` logs each failed
- handshake and its reason, such as a client that doesn't trust the
- certificate.
- ### MCP server setup
- MCP is an open protocol and works with many clients, not only Claude. The
- easiest setup is the **MCP Server** view in the desktop app (see
- [MCP server for AI agents](#mcp-server-for-ai-agents)). To configure it by
- hand:
- ```bash
- # HTTP: connect to the server started from the app, or from `cve-intel serve`
- claude mcp add --transport http cve-intel http://127.0.0.1:8000/mcp
- # stdio: the agent launches its own copy (macOS app path shown)
- claude mcp add cve-intel -- "/Applications/CVE Intel.app/Contents/MacOS/cve-intel" mcp
- # stdio, using the headless binary
- claude mcp add cve-intel -- /absolute/path/to/target/release/cve-intel mcp
- ```
- Ready-made configs for Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code and
- other clients are in [`examples/mcp/`](examples/mcp/).
- The server exposes 42 tools, resources (`kev://catalog`,
- `epss://scores/{cve_id}`, `manifest://tool-hash`) and prompts
- (`patch_decision`, `compare_and_prioritize`, `dependency_triage`,
- `remediation_runbook`). It never
- registers a sampling handler or issues `sampling/createMessage`. Older tool
- names that duplicated other tools (`prioritize_cves`,
- `check_exploit_availability`, `scan_container_packages`,
- `scan_repo_secrets`) are no longer listed but still work. The watchlist
- tools (`list_watchlist`, `get_watchlist_changes`) are read-only: agents
- cannot add, remove or refresh items. The scan history tools (`list_scans`,
- `get_scan_findings`) are read-only too, and only answer local callers: MCP
- over stdio and the server the app starts. `cve-intel serve` accepts
- requests from any web page, so it does not serve saved scans.
- The server started from the app always binds to `127.0.0.1` and checks the
- `Host`, `Origin` and `Sec-Fetch-Site` headers to refuse cross-site browser
- requests, which protects against DNS rebinding. It has no sign-in, so any
- program on the same computer can use it with your saved keys. Stop it when
- you don't need it.
- ### Terminal configuration
- Manage API keys without the app:
- ```bash
- cve-intel keys list # which keys are set and where from (never prints values)
- cve-intel keys links # where to get each key
- cve-intel keys set SHODAN_KEY # hidden prompt, keeps the key out of shell history
- echo "$KEY" | cve-intel keys set SHODAN_KEY # or pipe it in from a script
- cve-intel keys remove SHODAN_KEY
- ```
- For headless use, copy [`.env.example`](.env.example) to `.env`, or set
- environment variables. Everything works without keys, with fewer results. A
- key saved in the app takes precedence over an environment variable.
- In `.env`, one `KEY=value` per line, optionally after `export`. Quote a
- value that contains ` #`: unquoted, a `#` after whitespace starts a comment
- (`PASS=#abc` keeps its `#`). Inside double quotes, `\"` and `\\` stand for
- `"` and `\`; single quotes are literal. If a line is ignored, or text is cut
- from a value (a comment, or text after the closing quote), `cve-intel`
- prints a warning naming the line and key, never the value.
- | Purpose | Variables |
- |---|---|
- | Data sources | `NVD_API_KEY`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `VULNCHECK_TOKEN`, `ABUSEIPDB_KEY`, `VIRUSTOTAL_KEY`, `SHODAN_KEY`, `GREYNOISE_API_KEY`, `URLSCAN_KEY`, `CIRCL_PDNS_USER`, `CIRCL_PDNS_PASS`, `ABUSECH_AUTH_KEY` |
- | Remote AI | `OPENAI_API_KEY`, `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `GEMINI_API_KEY`, `CUSTOM_LLM_BASE_URL`, `CUSTOM_LLM_API_KEY` |
- | Local AI | `CVE_LLM_BASE_URL`, `CVE_LLM_MODEL`, `LLAMA_SERVER_BIN`, `MLX_LM_SERVER_BIN` |
- | Storage and server | `CACHE_DB_PATH`, `CVE_INTEL_HOME`, `HOST`, `PORT`, `CVE_INTEL_HEADER_TIMEOUT_SECS`, `REQUEST_TIMEOUT` |
- #### HTTPS, proxies and private CAs
- Certificates are checked by the operating system's verifier, so a CA you
- installed in the OS is trusted, including the CA of a TLS-inspecting proxy:
- the macOS keychains, the Windows certificate store, or on Linux the system
- bundle (`update-ca-trust` on RHEL/Amazon Linux, `update-ca-certificates` on
- Debian/Ubuntu). `SSL_CERT_FILE` / `SSL_CERT_DIR` replace the Linux bundle.
- `HTTPS_PROXY`, `ALL_PROXY` and `NO_PROXY` are honoured.
- If a lookup fails with `invalid peer certificate: UnknownIssuer`, run
- `cve-intel tls-check`. It shows the issuer at the top of the chain the
- server sent, which is the CA missing from your store. Add `--debug` to any
- command to log TLS and connection details to stderr.
- #### Use your own model server
- Set `CVE_LLM_BASE_URL` to any OpenAI-compatible endpoint, such as Ollama
- (`http://127.0.0.1:11434/v1`), LM Studio or your own llama-server, and
- optionally `CVE_LLM_MODEL` to the model name. Ask then uses it instead of
- the built-in runtime. To use a `llama-server` or `mlx_lm.server` you
- installed yourself, set `LLAMA_SERVER_BIN` or `MLX_LM_SERVER_BIN` to its
- path. To use a remote provider from the CLI, configure it with `cve-intel ai`
- (see [Remote providers](#remote-providers-opt-in)), then
- `cve-intel ask "Should we patch CVE-2024-3400?" --provider anthropic`.
- ### Build from source and Docker
- ```bash
- # Desktop app (debug)
- cargo build -p cve-intel-desktop
- ./target/debug/cve-intel-desktop
- # Installable bundle (.dmg / .exe / .AppImage)
- cargo install tauri-cli --version "^2" --locked
- cd apps/desktop/src-tauri && cargo tauri build
- # Headless binary only (servers, Docker)
- cargo build --release -p cve-server
- # The fleet agent, small and stripped (target/agent/cve-intel-agent)
- cargo build --profile agent -p cve-agent
- ```
- The same code also builds as a separate application, with the working name
- CVE Intel Fleet, that installs next to CVE Intel with its own name and data
- folder (`~/.cve-intel-fleet`). Add `--features edition-fleet` to the
- commands above, and for the installable bundle
- `--config tauri.fleet.conf.json` as well. See
- [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md#the-fleet-edition-the-same-code-as-a-separate-application).
- Docker runs the headless MCP server over HTTP, plus the REST API. The
- container listens on `0.0.0.0`, so it needs OAuth, or an explicit opt-out
- when only this machine can reach it:
- ```bash
- docker build -t cve-intel .
- # Production: OAuth settings in .env (see "Securing the HTTP server")
- docker run --rm -p 8000:8000 --env-file .env cve-intel
- # Local only: published on the host's loopback, no sign-in
- docker run --rm -p 127.0.0.1:8000:8000 -e CVE_INTEL_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED=1 --env-file .env cve-intel
- # HTTPS from the container itself (see "Serving HTTPS")
- docker run --rm -p 443:8000 --env-file .env \
- -v /etc/cve-intel/tls:/tls:ro --group-add "$(getent group cve-intel | cut -d: -f3)" \
- -e CVE_INTEL_TLS_CERT=/tls/fullchain.pem -e CVE_INTEL_TLS_KEY=/tls/privkey.pem cve-intel
- ```
- For HTTPS, mount the directory that holds the certificate and key, not
- the files themselves: a renewal replaces the files, and a single-file
- mount keeps showing the old one. The container runs as an unprivileged
- user, so `--group-add` gives it the group that may read the key.
- To run the desktop app without installing it, use the container below and open http://127.0.0.1:6080 to see it over noVNC:
- ```bash
- docker build -f Dockerfile.desktop -t cve-intel-desktop .
- docker run --rm -p 127.0.0.1:6080:6080 --env-file .env -v cve-intel-data:/home/app cve-intel-desktop
- ```
- - noVNC asks for a password. The container prints a random one to its log at start-up. To pick your own, pass `-e VNC_PASSWORD=...` (VNC only checks the first 8 characters).
- - Keep `127.0.0.1:` in the `-p` flag. Without it, anyone on your network can reach the app.
- ### Architecture
- ```
- crates/cve-core Harness-agnostic engine: the source clients, risk scorer,
- SSVC, CVSS, validators, lockfile/SBOM parsers, SARIF
- and CycloneDX output, SQLite cache, settings DB, activity log and
- watchlist, decisions, landscape briefing, source catalog,
- remediation evidence, plans and runbooks, the CSAF
- reader, llama.cpp and MLX manager, cloud-provider
- settings, the Ask agent and fleet mode (its protocol,
- database, checks and agent logic). No MCP, Tauri or CLI
- types.
- crates/cve-server The cve-intel binary: MCP (stdio and streamable HTTP),
- REST (/api/v1), the CLI and the fleet server, as thin
- adapters over cve-core.
- crates/cve-agent The cve-intel-agent binary: the fleet agent. It links only
- cve-core's inventory readers and fleet client, so it is a
- fraction of the size.
- apps/desktop Tauri app linking cve-core and cve-server natively. The
- same executable runs the GUI, the CLI and the MCP server,
- and can host MCP over HTTP in-process. The model server
- (llama-server, or mlx_lm.server on Apple silicon) is the
- only child process. The Fleet view is ui/fleet.js and
- src-tauri/src/fleet.rs.
- examples/mcp Client configs for common MCP clients.
- examples/fleet systemd units for the fleet server and agent.
- ```
- ### Development and tests
- ```bash
- cargo test -p cve-core -p cve-server -p cve-agent # scorer, SSVC, CVSS, validators, cache, parsers, agent routing, source catalog, fleet
- cargo test -p cve-core -p cve-server -- --ignored # live checks against the real sources (network)
- cargo build --release # cve-intel and the desktop binary
- ```
- See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) for the full development setup and
- the checks CI runs.
- ## Citing and attribution
- ### Citing results in a report or ticket
- CVE Intel gathers facts from public sources; it is not the source. When you
- record a decision, cite the **primary source and the retrieval date**, not
- the app or the AI's wording:
- > *Example (illustrative values):* CVE-2021-44228: CVSS 10.0 (NVD); listed in
- > CISA KEV, added 2021-12-10 (CISA); EPSS 0.94 as of 2026-10-18 (FIRST).
- > Retrieved 2026-10-18 with CVE Intel 0.3.0, scoring v1.1.
- - **Scores change.** EPSS updates daily, KEV grows and NVD entries are
- revised. Results are cached for minutes to hours, and up to a day for some
- feeds. The **Databases** view shows each source's cache time.
- - **The risk score is CVE Intel's own.** Cite it as *"CVE Intel risk score
- (scoring v1.1)"* alongside the underlying CVSS, EPSS and KEV values.
- `cve-intel health` and the **System** view show the version.
- - **An AI answer is not evidence.** Local or cloud, a model can be wrong.
- Cite the data shown beside the answer and verify it against the source.
- ### Citing this software
- ```bibtex
- @software{cve_intel,
- title = {CVE Intel: local security intelligence for CVE triage},
- author = {{CVE Intel contributors}},
- year = {2026},
- version = {0.3.0},
- url = {https://github.com/Fazmin/cve-intel},
- license = {MIT OR Apache-2.0},
- note = {Native Rust desktop app, CLI, MCP server and REST API}
- }
- ```
- Use the version you ran (`cve-intel --version`).
- ### Data source terms
- CVE Intel only queries these services. It does not own or republish their
- data, and their terms apply to anything you copy out of the app. Check each
- provider's current terms, especially before commercial use. This is not
- legal advice.
- | Source | Credit and terms |
- |---|---|
- | **NVD** (NIST) | Products using the NVD API should state: *"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD."* See the [terms of use](https://nvd.nist.gov/developers/terms-of-use). |
- | **EPSS** (FIRST) | Attribute FIRST and link [first.org/epss](https://www.first.org/epss/). Daily score files are hosted at [epss.empiricalsecurity.com](https://epss.empiricalsecurity.com). |
- | **CVSS** (FIRST) | [first.org/cvss](https://www.first.org/cvss/) |
- | **CISA KEV** | Credit CISA: [Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog). |
- | **ENISA EUVD** | EU Vulnerability Database: [euvd.enisa.europa.eu](https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/). Subject to ENISA's terms. |
- | **CISA advisories** | RSS feed of CISA alerts and ICS advisories: [cisa.gov](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories). |
- | **PoC-in-GitHub** | Repository index by [nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub](https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub). Repositories are listed, not scanned. |
- | **Project Zero 0day In the Wild** | Google Project Zero's public spreadsheet: [0day.html](https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/0day.html). |
- | **CIRCL Vulnerability-Lookup** | Sightings from [vulnerability.circl.lu](https://vulnerability.circl.lu/). |
- | **CVE.org** | CVE records are provided under the [CVE Terms of Use](https://www.cve.org/Legal/TermsOfUse). CVE® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. |
- | **CISA Vulnrichment** | CISA's ADP enrichment (SSVC, CVSS, CWE), released under CC0 1.0: [github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment](https://github.com/cisagov/vulnrichment). |
- | **SSVC** | CERT/CC and CISA: [github.com/CERTCC/SSVC](https://github.com/CERTCC/SSVC) |
- | **VulnCheck KEV, XDB and NVD++** | Shown with VulnCheck's attribution, *"VulnCheck KEV (VulnCheck Known Exploited Vulnerabilities), https://vulncheck.com/kev"*. Use is subject to [VulnCheck's terms](https://vulncheck.com/terms). |
- | **Metasploit Framework** | Module metadata from [rapid7/metasploit-framework](https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework), BSD-3-Clause. |
- | **MITRE ATT&CK®** | Registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation. See the [terms of use](https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/). |
- | **MITRE CAPEC™** | Attack patterns from [capec.mitre.org](https://capec.mitre.org); see the [terms of use](https://capec.mitre.org/about/termsofuse.html). |
- | **CTID Mappings Explorer** | KEV → ATT&CK mappings by the Center for Threat-Informed Defense, Apache-2.0: [mappings-explorer](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/mappings-explorer). |
- | **Arch Linux Security Tracker** | Advisory groups published by the Arch Linux Security Team at [security.archlinux.org](https://security.archlinux.org). |
- | **OSV.dev**, **GitHub Advisory Database** | Attribution varies by database; the GitHub Advisory Database is CC BY 4.0. See [osv.dev](https://osv.dev) and [github.com/advisories](https://github.com/advisories). |
- | **abuse.ch** (MalwareBazaar, ThreatFox) | Community data; see [abuse.ch](https://abuse.ch). |
- | Others | VirusTotal, Shodan, AbuseIPDB, GreyNoise, URLScan, CIRCL, Red Hat, Ubuntu, Microsoft MSRC, crt.sh, Exploit-DB, Ransomwhere and HIBP each have their own terms and rate limits. Free tiers are often limited to non-commercial use. |
- **Local AI models** are not part of this project and carry their own
- licences, such as the Llama 3.2 Community License and size-dependent Qwen
- licences. Read the model's page before commercial use. GGUF files come from
- the Hugging Face repositories listed in `crates/cve-core/src/llm.rs` (the
- vendors' own for Qwen, bartowski's builds for Llama), and MLX builds from
- the [mlx-community](https://huggingface.co/mlx-community) conversions. The
- runtimes are [llama.cpp](https://github.com/ggml-org/llama.cpp) (MIT) and,
- on Apple silicon, [mlx-lm](https://github.com/ml-explore/mlx-lm) (MIT).
- ## Community
- - [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md): development setup and pull request guidelines
- - [CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md): community standards
- - [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md): reporting a vulnerability privately
- ## License
- Copyright 2024-2025 Fazmin Nizam. Licensed under either of
- - Apache License, Version 2.0 ([LICENSE-APACHE](LICENSE-APACHE) or
- <https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0>)
- - MIT License ([LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT) or
- <https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>)
- at your option. See also [NOTICE](NOTICE).
- These licenses cover the CVE Intel code. Data and models the app downloads
- keep their own terms; see [Data source terms](#data-source-terms).
- Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally
- submitted for inclusion in the work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0
- license, shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or
- conditions.
Ratings and comments
Sign in to rate this skill.
Sign inFree to use. If it’s helped, pass it on.