raptor-loop-hunt
RAPTOR autonomous looping multi-altitude security vulnerability hunt — Claude Code skill
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Install instructions from the README
As written by the repo's author. findsafeskills has not verified these steps.
**As a plugin — no clone needed.** Add the marketplace and install; Claude Code fetches it for you:
/plugin marketplace add dinosn/raptor-loop-hunt /plugin install raptor-loop-hunt@raptor
Then `/reload-plugins` (or restart). The skill auto-triggers on audit requests, or invoke it directly.
**Or drop it in as a personal skill** — clone into your Claude Code skills directory and it is discovered automatically on the next session:
git clone https://github.com/dinosn/raptor-loop-hunt ~/.claude/skills/raptor-loop-hunt
What was scanned
The files the safety scan read, as written by the repository's author and shown as plain text. Lines with a finding are marked.
.claude-plugin/marketplace.json · Manifest · 15 lines
View this file on GitHub (read at the repository's current version: the scan did not record which commit it read)
- {
- "name": "raptor",
- "owner": {
- "name": "Nicolas Krassas"
- },
- "description": "RAPTOR security-research skills for Claude Code.",
- "plugins": [
- {
- "name": "raptor-loop-hunt",
- "source": "./",
- "description": "Autonomous looping multi-altitude vulnerability hunt (generate -> judge -> verify).",
- "version": "1.0.1"
- }
- ]
- }
README.md · README · 148 lines
View this file on GitHub (read at the repository's current version: the scan did not record which commit it read)
- # raptor-loop-hunt
- An autonomous, looping, multi-altitude **security vulnerability hunt** for a codebase, packaged as a
- Claude Code **skill**. It replaces the model's default "single pass, summarize, stop" behaviour with an
- explicit search procedure: traverse every altitude, generate candidates, adversarially verify them
- *from raw source*, run isolated parallel reasoners, and keep a persistent ledger so each loop is
- net-new coverage instead of rediscovery. In practice it finds far more real bugs than a one-shot scan —
- the "Karpathy auto-research" methodology.
- It triggers whenever you point Claude at source code and want vulnerabilities found — "audit this",
- "find every bug", "security-review it", "find anything exploitable".
- ## Install
- **As a plugin — no clone needed.** Add the marketplace and install; Claude Code fetches it for you:
- ```
- /plugin marketplace add dinosn/raptor-loop-hunt
- /plugin install raptor-loop-hunt@raptor
- ```
- Then `/reload-plugins` (or restart). The skill auto-triggers on audit requests, or invoke it directly.
- **Or drop it in as a personal skill** — clone into your Claude Code skills directory and it is
- discovered automatically on the next session:
- ```bash
- git clone https://github.com/dinosn/raptor-loop-hunt ~/.claude/skills/raptor-loop-hunt
- ```
- ## Use
- Invoke it explicitly:
- ```
- /raptor-loop-hunt
- ```
- …or just describe an audit task ("audit ./src for security", "find every exploitable bug in this
- service") and the skill triggers on its own. Point it at a repo, a service, a module, or a directory.
- ## What it does
- - **Multi-altitude generate → judge → verify loop.** Candidates are generated at every altitude
- (whole-system down to a single function), then *adversarially* judged and verified from raw source —
- never from the generator's own summary.
- - **Isolated parallel reasoners** so independent findings don't contaminate one another.
- - **Monotonic-scrutiny knowledge base** (`raptor-loop-kb`) that can only ever *raise* scrutiny across
- runs, never lower it — each loop is net-new coverage rather than rediscovery.
- - **Disposition ledger** (`raptor-loop-ledger`) — an engagement-scoped state machine that certifies
- every disposition transition (confirm / reject / downgrade / sweep) against an evidence receipt, so a
- real bug can't be quietly rejected and a severe finding can't be laundered down to Low.
- - **Fresh-operator handoff gate** — records tacit workarounds and their resolutions, then independently
- replays an immutable PoC/lab package without author coaching. Technical validity and owner-delivery
- readiness remain separate outcomes.
- - **Execution-auth broker** (`raptor-loop-exec`) — a live-PoC command runs only under a typed,
- least-privilege capability grant.
- - **Eval trap battery** (`eval/`) — 12 deterministic and orchestrator-driven axes (recall,
- FP-resistance, false-rejection, counterfeit-evidence, coverage-honesty, severity-downgrade
- integrity, …).
- **The prompt is the program.** In an agentic system the model's "algorithm" is whatever you tell it to
- be; this skill specifies that algorithm. The quality comes from the structure, not from any single
- clever instruction.
- ## Layout
- | Path | Purpose |
- |------|---------|
- | `SKILL.md` | The skill itself — methodology, altitudes, generate→judge→verify loop, severity rubric. |
- | `references/vuln-class-discovery.md` | Leaf-level per-class search procedure (source → sink → oracle → variants). |
- | `references/kb-schema.md` | Schema + storage for the monotonic-scrutiny cross-run knowledge base. |
- | `references/ledger-schema.md` | Schema + the disposition-time transition gate (candidate ledger + evidence receipts). |
- | `references/handoff-reproducibility.md` | Fresh-operator replay, intervention receipts, and owner-delivery readiness. |
- | `scripts/raptor-loop-kb` | Deterministic cross-run KB helper (can only ever raise hunt scrutiny). |
- | `scripts/raptor-loop-ledger` | Candidate state machine — certifies each disposition against an evidence receipt. |
- | `scripts/raptor-loop-exec` | Execution-auth broker — least-privilege sandbox plan for live PoCs. |
- | `scripts/test-*` | Self-contained tests (no network, no external imports). |
- | `eval/` | The 12-axis trap battery. |
- The scripts are pure-stdlib Python and self-contained; the execution broker will optionally use a host
- RAPTOR checkout's sandbox when one is present (`RAPTOR_DIR`), and refuses to run live commands
- otherwise.
- ## Track record
- **So far: 200+ verified vulnerabilities across 40+ real-world codebases (Dec 2025 – Jul 2026).**
- Run against C network daemons, message brokers, routing stacks, web apps, language runtimes, and media
- libraries, the skill has surfaced original, verified vulnerabilities across most of them. Findings are
- listed by title and class only; **exploit mechanics and PoCs are withheld**, and outcomes are stated at
- their true strength (a proven DoS is not called an RCE; unweaponized primitives are labelled as such).
- All have been reported to or communicated with the respective vendor / maintainer.
- ### Original findings
- | Target | Highest verified outcome | Class | Status |
- |--------|--------------------------|-------|--------|
- | memcached | pre-auth heap buffer overflow, default config, client-reachable | memory-corruption | Fixed upstream, finder credited |
- | Immich | unauth restore endpoint → OS-command-exec RCE (container-root) + broken-authorization / IDOR cluster | authz / command-exec | Disclosed |
- | RustDesk (client + server) | malicious-host file-transfer path-traversal → RCE on controller; secure-channel / persistent-ID-hijack primitives | path-traversal / crypto | Reported |
- | Samba 4.25 (master) | 2× pre-auth memory-corruption crash (DNS TSIG underflow; LDAP type-confusion) — DoS-grade | memory-corruption | Reported |
- | Apache Kafka (trunk / 4.0.0) | pre-auth secret / file disclosure + static-init RCE-class primitive | authz / code-load | Reported |
- | FRR (master) | pre-auth EIGRP authentication bypass + ASAN-proven FPM stack overflow | auth-bypass / memory-corruption | Reported |
- | Redis (unstable / 8.8.0) | pre-auth AUTH/ACL bypass + RCE-grade primitives (not weaponized to full shell) | auth-bypass / memory | Reported |
- | Linux XDP zero-copy | OOB over-copy in `xdp_build_skb_from_zc`; root RCE demonstrated on an instrumented rig | memory-corruption | Reported |
- | Apache ActiveMQ 5.19.6 | authenticated RCE + multiple authz-bypass / IDOR primitives (incl. a pre-auth connection-kill) | authz / deser | Reported |
- | LimeSurvey 7.0.1 | unauth time-based SQL injection + zip-slip → webroot RCE | injection / path-traversal | Reported |
- | Apache Axis 1.x / 2 | unauth deserialization RCE (lab-proven) | deserialization | Reported |
- | Apache Tomcat 12 (dev) | unauth blind SSRF / DNS-exfil (Medium) | SSRF | Reported |
- | Quagga 1.2.3 / 1.2.4 bgpd | pre-auth stack OOB write + use-after-free (DoS-confirmed) | memory-corruption | Reported |
- | llama.cpp | pre-auth process-crash DoS (RCE escalation hypothesized, not proven) | memory-safety | Reported |
- | Fastjson 1.2.83 | RCE (lab-proven) | deserialization | Public |
- | Pillow 12.3.0 | blind-calibration run: rediscovered a real heap-OOB write + 4 net-new ASan-confirmed bugs | memory-corruption | Reported |
- **Adversarial rigor, not just recall.** The judge/verify half of the loop is built to *refute*, so it
- also kills bad findings: it disproved a fabricated pre-auth RCE exploit package live, and corrected an
- over-stated public "ASLR bypass" down to what actually reproduces.
- ### Public CVEs reproduced / validated
- Independent labs, PoCs, and patch analysis — validations of already-public issues, not original
- discoveries:
- | ID | Component | Class | Notes |
- |----|-----------|-------|-------|
- | CVE-2026-42588 / -42253 | Apache ActiveMQ | Jolokia → XBean RCE; header-injection / XSS | reproduced end-to-end |
- | CVE-2026-15583 | Grafana MCP (`mcp-grafana` ≤ 0.17.1) | confused-deputy SA-token exfil | reproduced; fixed 0.17.2 |
- | CVE-2026-20230 | Cisco CUCM 14 / 15 | pre-auth SSRF → Axis 1.4 → JSP webshell | reproduced (in-the-wild chain) |
- | CVE-2026-4282 | Keycloak < 26.5.7 | PAR `request_uri` → forged OAuth code → admin token | lab A/B validated |
- | CVE-2024-21182 | Oracle WebLogic 12.2.1.4 / 14.1.1 | T3 / IIOP JNDI-injection RCE | reproduced; public lab repo |
- | CVE-2025-13673 | Tutor LMS (WordPress) ≤ 3.9.7 | unauth SQLi via `coupon_code` | UNION exploit + Docker lab |
- | MDEV-39493 (ZDI-CAN-30333/4) | MariaDB ≤ 11.4.10 | FILE-priv bypass via CTE `INTO OUTFILE` | reproduced; fixed 11.4.11 |
- | CVE-2026-6479 | PostgreSQL | pre-auth SSL/GSS unbounded recursion (DoS) | reproduced (needs `-O0` build) |
- | ZDI-CAN-30607 | dnsmasq | `find_soa()` out-of-bounds read | ASan-confirmed + 22-site variant sweep |
- | CVE-2026-4176 | Perl `Compress::Raw::Zlib` ≤ 2.219 | `crc32_combine` DoS | reproduced; reachability assessed low |
- | CVE-2026-27654 | nginx (WebDAV COPY/MOVE) | heap overflow | reproduced; fixed 1.29.7 |
- | CVE-2026-42945 (Rift) | nginx | primitive-recovery chain | partial; corrected the public ASLR-bypass framing |
- | CVE-2026-35273 | Oracle PeopleSoft (PSEMHUB) | unauth SSRF → XXE → webshell | analysis-only (JAR patch-diff) |
- ## Scope
- For defensive security research, education, and authorized penetration testing only.
- ---
- > Oh — and RAPTOR is required. Obviously. It's right there in the name. 🦖
- > Go feed the bird → [github.com/gadievron/raptor](https://github.com/gadievron/raptor)
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