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pricklypair

FIDO, passkey, dice checkpoints; operation approvals; agent grants

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README.md · README · 77 lines
  1. # pricklypair
  2. `npx pricklypair` · `brew install colony-technology/tap/pricklypair`
  3. $7/month: https://buy.stripe.com/dRmcN491I2kf2bM2RB6c00c
  4. Source: https://github.com/colony-technology/pricklypair
  5. **Naming invariant:** spell the product `pricklypair` in lowercase in all source, API surfaces, documentation and published copy.
  6. Public, inspectable source for the **colony.technology** pricklypair product. The repository contains experimental security code, reproducible checks and source receipts.
  7. **One authorization interface for many separate keys, any finite permission graph, and many credential surfaces.** The owner-selected product price is **$7 USD/month**, one complete plan for individuals, agents and institutions. No add-on tiers. Payment collection is not active in the preview. The experience is a single API request for humans, AI agents and infrastructure. Independent signers check the complete operation and policy before producing a standard per-protocol signature and a portable proof receipt.
  8. ## The primitive
  9. **North:** an authorized caller describes what an operation must do.
  10. **South:** an independent decoder derives what the exact operation bytes will do.
  11. **Seam:** a retained observation boundary verifies north and south equivalence, mirrored chart consistency, policy approval, replay state and threshold signer authorization. Every signer checks the contract locally.
  12. The current mathematical basis is the formally proved Unifier quotient and Winding and Mirrored involution. The mirror identity provides a public, exact consistency witness. Cryptographic isolation comes from reviewed threshold signature shares across independent systems, not from a hidden mirror coordinate.
  13. Each tenant can register arbitrarily many separately scoped key groups. Nested policies combine all, any and t-of-n actors and signers; policies may require several key groups jointly. One visible identity can manage many RP-specific passkeys, wallets and roles without reusing one cryptographic secret across incompatible protocols.
  14. **Threat-model objective:** replace physical air-gap procedures for a declared threshold-compromise model through continuously connected, independently governed signers. Legacy authenticator constraints, hardware user presence and third-party controls still apply.
  15. ## Repository
  16. - [docs/PRIMITIVE.md](docs/PRIMITIVE.md): mirrored semantic seam and cryptographic separation
  17. - [docs/PUBLIC-STATE.md](docs/PUBLIC-STATE.md): copyable public world coordinates, fresh physical witnesses and remote verifier sockets
  18. - [docs/PHYSICAL-ROOT.md](docs/PHYSICAL-ROOT.md): physical factor rules, mirror failure dual, and session threat model
  19. - [docs/QUANTUM-AUTHORITY.md](docs/QUANTUM-AUTHORITY.md): compiler for arbitrary permissions into no-cloning-compatible quantum sectors
  20. - [docs/SURFACES.md](docs/SURFACES.md): agents, Bitcoin, passkeys/FIDO, password managers, TOTP, release signing and machine identity
  21. - [docs/BITCOIN-BIP.md](docs/BITCOIN-BIP.md): Taproot/PSBT compatibility, signer rules and possible future BIP
  22. - [docs/API.md](docs/API.md): versioned API contract and current self-hosted endpoints
  23. - [docs/AGENT-DELEGATION.md](docs/AGENT-DELEGATION.md): physical approval, key-bound agent delegation, conditional policies, bounded autonomous operation and revocation
  24. - [docs/THREAT-MODEL.md](docs/THREAT-MODEL.md): assumptions and adversarial gates
  25. - [docs/MARKET.md](docs/MARKET.md): first-party competitor evidence and price anchors
  26. - [docs/GO-TO-MARKET.md](docs/GO-TO-MARKET.md): buyers, offers and 30-day distribution gates
  27. - [examples/authority_fabric.py](examples/authority_fabric.py): executable multi-key authority fixture
  28. - [examples/public_sync_socket.swift](examples/public_sync_socket.swift): real Ed25519 signatures, public copyable state, emulated physical devices and an operation-bound remote session
  29. - [examples/physical_root_gate.swift](examples/physical_root_gate.swift): real Ed25519 signature checks under several physical-device policies, with emulated hardware
  30. - [research/dual_access_lattice.py](research/dual_access_lattice.py): exhaustive security/availability mirror over 189 monotone access structures
  31. - [research/quantum_access_compiler.py](research/quantum_access_compiler.py): minimally partition policies into no-cloning-compatible quantum-state sectors
  32. - [research/qss_2of3_f5.py](research/qss_2of3_f5.py): standard 2-of-3 quantum-state-sharing simulator, all single-share and decoder checks
  33. - [research/MIRROR-SEAM-001.md](research/MIRROR-SEAM-001.md): prior finite model receipts and research lineage
  34. - [src/vault.mjs](src/vault.mjs): encrypted local vault and optional X25519 sealed export (experimental)
  35. - [src/agent.mjs](src/agent.mjs): operation-bound conditional agent grants and replay/usage protection
  36. - [src/delegation.mjs](src/delegation.mjs): client-initiated agent grant request and scoped protocol
  37. - [test/agent-delegation.test.mjs](test/agent-delegation.test.mjs): physical-checkpoint-to-agent-signature HTTP journey
  38. - [test/browser-journey.mjs](test/browser-journey.mjs): real browser WebAuthn with virtual FIDO authenticator
  39. - [CURRENT.md](CURRENT.md): verified status, owner and next cursor
  40. ## Observed reference execution
  41. Run `python3 examples/authority_fabric.py`. The in-repository model passes 4 separate key groups, 2 individual authorizations, 1 atomic two-key authorization, 6 adversarial rejection cases, distinct-actor quorum enforcement and 2,728 exact mirror-index involution checks. It emits **no cryptographic signature**; signer approvals are simulated inputs. An earlier Chat research note described 450 toy finite-field signatures, but its executable and receipt were not reproduced in this repository; those historical numbers are excluded from the current acceptance record.
  42. ## Research receipt: public synchronization and quantum access
  43. The new `public_sync_socket.swift` reference sends an identical 467-byte public coordinate to multiple hypothetical clients and verifies that no authorization follows from the coordinate itself. Fresh operation-bound Ed25519 device signatures allow an approved session; eleven invalid requests are rejected. Its hardware and receiver-channel identity are simulated and must be verified on real authenticators.
  44. The quantum-permission compiler checked all 189 nonconstant monotone policies on up to four devices, providing a no-cloning-compatible decomposition. The q=5 2-of-3 quantum secret sharing state-vector simulator verified 75 single-share independence equations and 15 coherent decoder equations. This is conventional quantum secret sharing mathematics composed into a new product research design, with no quantum hardware yet.
  45. ## Working developer preview (0.2.0)
  46. The public installation page is [colony.technology/pricklypair](https://colony.technology/pricklypair/). The operator runs the worker on its own machine and gives a recipient a single temporary link to add a FIDO key, phone passkey or dice-derived checkpoint. The same CLI can initiate a physically approved agent delegation and then accept fresh Ed25519-signed actions from that agent, limited to operation, audience, resource, declared environment, time, amount, use count and revocation. No customer signup or centrally hosted key vault.
  47. The experimental local vault stores AES-256-GCM encrypted JSON credentials and supports explicitly requested X25519 sealed export. If a credential reaches an untrusted agent, that agent can copy it. The preferred future full password-manager route uses verified service-specific brokers instead of exporting raw reusable credentials. Browser autofill, real provider login, vault recovery/backup, passkey management across all relying parties and independent security audit are open engineering gates. The preview has no production security certification. The owner set a single $7 USD/month subscription; checkout and customer-independent license receipts must use the verified colony Stripe account.
  48. Run `npm test` for two complete HTTP journeys, and `node test/browser-journey.mjs` on a Mac with Brave/Chromium to exercise virtual-FIDO registration and authorization.
  49. ## Product gate
  50. A production version requires reviewed FROST/DKG or equivalent protocol-compatible threshold signing, independent signer hosts, raw transaction decoders with source-bound equality checks, secure hardware/OS integration where required, a recovery process, a full adversarial assessment, real signature verification and independent pilot acceptance.
  51. Current status: **public research and executable self-hosted developer preview; no production signing security certification, no verified revenue, and no completed physical-device acceptance.** This README is the source of truth for product scope. See CURRENT.md for the next cursor.

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