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clawdstrike

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Agentic AI EDR for developer workstations and autonomous agent swarms. Build Swarm Detection & Response platforms with Clawdstrike.

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As a Claude Code plugin, install it and then ask Claude Code:

/plugin marketplace add keithmackay/mackayi/plugin install scanskillsafety@mackayiDo a deep scan of https://github.com/backbay-labs/clawdstrike with scanskillsafety

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git clone https://github.com/keithmackay/scanskillsafety-skill ~/.claude/skills/scanskillsafetynode ~/.claude/skills/scanskillsafety/cli.cjs --deep 'https://github.com/backbay-labs/clawdstrike'

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Install

Install instructions from the README

As written by the repo's author. findsafeskills has not verified these steps.

Install via your preferred package manager:

brew install backbay-labs/tap/clawdstrike   # macOS, Linux
npm  install @clawdstrike/sdk               # TypeScript
pip  install clawdstrike                    # Python
cargo add clawdstrike                       # Rust
go   get github.com/backbay-labs/clawdstrike-go

Scaffold a project and start the daemon:

clawdstrike init --keygen
# writes policy.yaml, config.toml, keys/clawdstrike.key{,.pub}

clawdstrike daemon start && clawdstrike daemon status
# Status: healthy | Version: 0.2.7 | Uptime: 2s

Three denials, each signed:

$ clawdstrike check --action-type file --ruleset strict ~/.ssh/id_rsa
BLOCKED [Critical]: Access to forbidden path: ~/.ssh/id_rsa

$ clawdstrike check --action-type egress --ruleset strict api.openai.com:443
BLOCKED [Error]: Egress to api.openai.com blocked by policy

$ clawdstrike check --action-type mcp --ruleset strict shell_exec
BLOCKED [Error]: Tool 'shell_exec' is blocked by policy

Verify the policy itself compiles and is internally consistent:

$ clawdstrike verify --policy strict
Consistency:  PASS  (47 formulas, 0 conflicts)
Completeness: PASS  (4/4 action types covered)
Inheritance:  PASS  (0 weakened prohibitions)

Run a real agent under enforcement:

clawdstrike run --policy clawdstrike:strict -- python my_agent.py

The agent runs normally. Every tool call hits the engine first. Denials raise a typed error in your SDK and emit a signed receipt.

Cluster: Helm chart and control plane

For fleet deployments, install the Helm chart. `hushd` and the Spine signers are fail-closed and need keys at install time, so pre-create the Secrets and reference them from the chart:

NS=clawdstrike-system
kubectl create namespace "$NS"

kubectl -n "$NS" create secret generic clawdstrike-hushd-auth \
  --from-literal=CLAWDSTRIKE_API_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
  --from-literal=CLAWDSTRIKE_ADMIN_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
  --from-literal=CLAWDSTRIKE_AUTH_PEPPER="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"

kubectl -n "$NS" create secret generic clawdstrike-spine \
  --from-literal=SPINE_LOG_SEED_HEX="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
  --from-literal=SPINE_WITNESS_SEED_HEX="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"

helm install clawdstrike \
  oci://ghcr.io/backbay-labs/clawdstrike/helm/clawdstrike --version 0.2.0 \
  --namespace "$NS" \
  --set hushd.auth.existingSecret=clawdstrike-hushd-auth \
  --set spine.secrets.existingSecret=clawdstrike-spine

That brings up `hushd`, the Spine checkpointer + witness, and bundled NATS JetStream. The Control API (enrollment, posture commands, signed completion bundles back) and the Tetragon/Hubble telemetry bridges are opt-in.

See the [chart README](infra/deploy/helm/clawdstrike/README.md) for the full parameter set, and [Enterprise enrollment](docs/src/guides/enterprise-enrollment.md) for end-to-end agent onboarding.

---

What was scanned

The files the safety scan read, as written by the repository's author and shown as plain text. Lines with a finding are marked.

.claude-plugin/marketplace.json · Manifest · 29 lines

View this file on GitHub (read at the repository's current version: the scan did not record which commit it read)

  1. {
  2. "name": "clawdstrike",
  3. "owner": {
  4. "name": "Backbay Labs",
  5. "email": "hello@backbay.io"
  6. },
  7. "metadata": {
  8. "description": "ClawdStrike security plugins for Claude Code — runtime policy enforcement, threat hunting, and audit tools.",
  9. "version": "0.1.0"
  10. },
  11. "plugins": [
  12. {
  13. "name": "clawdstrike",
  14. "source": "./clawdstrike-plugin",
  15. "description": "Runtime security enforcement for AI coding agents — policy hooks, audit receipts, threat hunting, and 15 MCP security tools.",
  16. "version": "0.1.0",
  17. "author": {
  18. "name": "Backbay Labs",
  19. "email": "hello@backbay.io"
  20. },
  21. "homepage": "https://github.com/backbay-labs/clawdstrike",
  22. "repository": "https://github.com/backbay-labs/clawdstrike",
  23. "license": "Apache-2.0",
  24. "keywords": ["security", "policy", "audit", "edr", "agent-security", "mcp", "threat-hunting"],
  25. "category": "security",
  26. "tags": ["security", "policy-enforcement", "audit-trail", "threat-hunting", "mcp-tools"]
  27. }
  28. ]
  29. }
README.md · README · 368 lines · 1 finding marked

View this file on GitHub (read at the repository's current version: the scan did not record which commit it read)

  1. <p align="center">
  2. <img src=".github/assets/clawdstrike-hero.png" alt="Clawdstrike" width="900" />
  3. </p>
  4. <p align="center">
  5. <a href="https://github.com/backbay-labs/clawdstrike/actions"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/actions/workflow/status/backbay-labs/clawdstrike/ci.yml?branch=main&style=flat-square&logo=github&label=CI" alt="CI"></a>
  6. <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/@clawdstrike/sdk"><img src="https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@clawdstrike/sdk?style=flat-square&logo=npm&label=npm" alt="npm"></a>
  7. <a href="https://pypi.org/project/clawdstrike/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/dynamic/json?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpypi.org%2Fpypi%2Fclawdstrike%2Fjson&query=%24.info.version&prefix=v&label=PyPI&logo=python&logoColor=white&color=fe7d37&style=flat-square" alt="PyPI"></a>
  8. <a href="LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0-blue?style=flat-square" alt="License: Apache-2.0"></a>
  9. <a href="https://discord.gg/fdbCZHm8zM"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/discord-join-5865F2?style=flat-square&logo=discord&logoColor=white" alt="Discord"></a>
  10. <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/MSRV-1.93-orange?style=flat-square&logo=rust" alt="MSRV: 1.93">
  11. </p>
  12. <h1 align="center">Clawdstrike</h1>
  13. <p align="center">
  14. <strong>EDR for the age of the swarm.</strong><br/>
  15. <em>Fail closed. Sign the truth.</em>
  16. </p>
  17. > **Status: pre-1.0 beta.** Public APIs are stable; defaults may still tighten before 1.0.
  18. Clawdstrike is a policy engine, an EDR, and a signed audit chain in one binary. An AI agent's `tool_call` sits in the same event taxonomy as a kernel-level `file_access`, `process_exec`, `network_flow`, `dylib_load`, or `launch_persistence`. One policy engine evaluates them. One Ed25519-signed causal graph records them. Defaults fail closed.
  19. The same engine ships as a Rust crate, a TypeScript SDK, a Python package, a Go module, a CLI, a desktop EDR agent (macOS Endpoint Security + Network Extension; Linux Tetragon + Hubble), and an enterprise control plane.
  20. <p align="center">
  21. <a href="#quick-start">Quick Start</a>
  22. &nbsp;·&nbsp;
  23. <a href="#guards">Guards</a>
  24. &nbsp;·&nbsp;
  25. <a href="#policies">Policies</a>
  26. &nbsp;·&nbsp;
  27. <a href="#formal-verification">Formal Verification</a>
  28. &nbsp;·&nbsp;
  29. <a href="#enterprise">Enterprise</a>
  30. &nbsp;·&nbsp;
  31. <a href="#design-principles">Design</a>
  32. </p>
  33. ---
  34. ## Quick Start
  35. Install via your preferred package manager:
  36. ```bash
  37. brew install backbay-labs/tap/clawdstrike # macOS, Linux
  38. npm install @clawdstrike/sdk # TypeScript
  39. pip install clawdstrike # Python
  40. cargo add clawdstrike # Rust
  41. go get github.com/backbay-labs/clawdstrike-go
  42. ```
  43. Scaffold a project and start the daemon:
  44. ```bash
  45. clawdstrike init --keygen
  46. # writes policy.yaml, config.toml, keys/clawdstrike.key{,.pub}
  47. clawdstrike daemon start && clawdstrike daemon status
  48. # Status: healthy | Version: 0.2.7 | Uptime: 2s
  49. ```
  50. Three denials, each signed:
  51. ```bash
  52. $ clawdstrike check --action-type file --ruleset strict ~/.ssh/id_rsa
  53. BLOCKED [Critical]: Access to forbidden path: ~/.ssh/id_rsa
  54. $ clawdstrike check --action-type egress --ruleset strict api.openai.com:443
  55. BLOCKED [Error]: Egress to api.openai.com blocked by policy
  56. $ clawdstrike check --action-type mcp --ruleset strict shell_exec
  57. BLOCKED [Error]: Tool 'shell_exec' is blocked by policy
  58. ```
  59. Verify the policy itself compiles and is internally consistent:
  60. ```bash
  61. $ clawdstrike verify --policy strict
  62. Consistency: PASS (47 formulas, 0 conflicts)
  63. Completeness: PASS (4/4 action types covered)
  64. Inheritance: PASS (0 weakened prohibitions)
  65. ```
  66. Run a real agent under enforcement:
  67. ```bash
  68. clawdstrike run --policy clawdstrike:strict -- python my_agent.py
  69. ```
  70. The agent runs normally. Every tool call hits the engine first. Denials raise a typed error in your SDK and emit a signed receipt.
  71. ### Cluster: Helm chart and control plane
  72. For fleet deployments, install the Helm chart. `hushd` and the Spine signers are fail-closed and need keys at install time, so pre-create the Secrets and reference them from the chart:
  73. ```bash
  74. NS=clawdstrike-system
  75. kubectl create namespace "$NS"
  76. kubectl -n "$NS" create secret generic clawdstrike-hushd-auth \
  77. --from-literal=CLAWDSTRIKE_API_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
  78. --from-literal=CLAWDSTRIKE_ADMIN_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
  79. --from-literal=CLAWDSTRIKE_AUTH_PEPPER="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
  80. kubectl -n "$NS" create secret generic clawdstrike-spine \
  81. --from-literal=SPINE_LOG_SEED_HEX="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
  82. --from-literal=SPINE_WITNESS_SEED_HEX="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
  83. helm install clawdstrike \
  84. oci://ghcr.io/backbay-labs/clawdstrike/helm/clawdstrike --version 0.2.0 \
  85. --namespace "$NS" \
  86. --set hushd.auth.existingSecret=clawdstrike-hushd-auth \
  87. --set spine.secrets.existingSecret=clawdstrike-spine
  88. ```
  89. That brings up `hushd`, the Spine checkpointer + witness, and bundled NATS JetStream. The Control API (enrollment, posture commands, signed completion bundles back) and the Tetragon/Hubble telemetry bridges are opt-in.
  90. See the [chart README](infra/deploy/helm/clawdstrike/README.md) for the full parameter set, and [Enterprise enrollment](docs/src/guides/enterprise-enrollment.md) for end-to-end agent onboarding.
  91. ---
  92. ## How it works
  93. ```mermaid
  94. flowchart LR
  95. A[Agent / sensor] --> B[Canonical event]
  96. B --> C[Policy engine + guard stack]
  97. C -->|allow| D[Action runs]
  98. C -->|deny| E[Blocked, fail-closed]
  99. C --> F[Ed25519 receipt]
  100. F --> G[Causal graph]
  101. G -.->|enterprise| H[Spine audit chain]
  102. ```
  103. SDK adapters and OS-level sensors feed the same canonical event into the policy engine. Adapters cover AI agent tool calls; kernel sensors (macOS Endpoint Security and Network Extension, Linux Tetragon and Hubble) cover file, process, network, dylib, and persistence events. The guard stack returns a verdict, the verdict ships with an Ed25519 receipt, and each receipt is content-hashed into a per-session causal graph that threads agent identity through downstream OS events.
  104. When a decision crosses a response threshold the engine emits a signed effect: quarantine a file, restrict an egress destination, suspend a process tree, revoke a previously-issued approval. Effects are reversible where possible. Past observations stay on a disk-backed flight recorder, so a tightened policy can be simulated against last week's state before it ships. In enterprise mode the receipt chain ships over NATS to the Spine checkpointer; an independent witness co-signs each batch.
  105. > *Logs are stories; proof is a signature.*
  106. ---
  107. ## Guards
  108. Each guard is a composable check at the tool boundary. Returns a verdict with evidence. Fail-fast or aggregate; configured per-policy.
  109. | Guard | Catches |
  110. |---|---|
  111. | `ForbiddenPathGuard` | Access to `.ssh`, `.env`, `.aws`, credential stores, registry hives |
  112. | `PathAllowlistGuard` | Whitelisted file access for least-privilege agents |
  113. | `EgressAllowlistGuard` | Outbound network calls by domain (deny-by-default or allowlist) |
  114. | `SecretLeakGuard` | AWS keys, GitHub tokens, private keys, API secrets in file writes |
  115. | `PatchIntegrityGuard` | Dangerous patches like `rm -rf /`, `chmod 777`, `disable security` |
    • Dismissed after review: Runs `rm -rf` against a root or home-directory path
    • Line 156 on GitHub
  116. | `ShellCommandGuard` | Dangerous shell commands before execution |
  117. | `McpToolGuard` | MCP tool invocations, with confirmation gates |
  118. | `PromptInjectionGuard` | Injection attacks in untrusted input |
  119. | `JailbreakGuard` | 4-layer detection: heuristic + statistical + ML + optional LLM judge |
  120. | `ComputerUseGuard` | CUA actions: remote sessions, clipboard, input injection, file transfer |
  121. | `RemoteDesktopSideChannelGuard` | Clipboard, audio, drive mapping, file transfer in CUA sessions |
  122. | `InputInjectionCapabilityGuard` | Input injection capability restrictions for CUA environments |
  123. | `SpiderSenseGuard` | Hierarchical threat screening: vector similarity, optional LLM escalation |
  124. Source of truth: [`crates/libs/clawdstrike/src/guards/`](crates/libs/clawdstrike/src/guards/).
  125. ---
  126. ## Policies
  127. Versioned, deterministic policy-as-code. Schema `1.5.0` (backward-compatible with `1.1.0`+). Supports `extends` from built-ins, local files, remote URLs, and git refs. Remote `extends` is host-allowlisted and integrity-pinned via `#sha256=<64-hex>`.
  128. Built-in rulesets: `permissive` · `default` · `strict` · `ai-agent` · `ai-agent-posture` · `cicd` · `remote-desktop` · `remote-desktop-permissive` · `remote-desktop-strict` · `spider-sense`.
  129. The operational loop (observe, synth, tighten):
  130. ```bash
  131. # Generate a least-privilege candidate from observed events
  132. clawdstrike policy synth run.events.jsonl \
  133. --extends clawdstrike:default --out candidate.yaml
  134. # Replay the events against the candidate
  135. clawdstrike policy simulate candidate.yaml run.events.jsonl --fail-on-deny
  136. # Diff the candidate against the baseline
  137. clawdstrike policy diff clawdstrike:default candidate.yaml
  138. ```
  139. See [policy schema](docs/src/reference/policy-schema.md), [posture schema](docs/src/reference/posture-schema.md), and the [observe, synth, tighten guide](docs/src/guides/observe-synth.md).
  140. ---
  141. ## Formal verification
  142. The policy engine's core decision logic is specified in Lean 4 and differentially tested against the Rust implementation via the [Aeneas](https://github.com/AeneasVerif/aeneas) translation pipeline.
  143. **Proved in Lean (5 properties across 44 of 45 core functions):**
  144. - Deny monotonicity: any guard denial denies the overall verdict
  145. - Severity total order: ordering is consistent and transitive
  146. - Cycle rejection: circular `extends` chains are always caught
  147. - Signature roundtrip: Ed25519 sign-then-verify succeeds
  148. - Disabled-guard allow: a disabled guard cannot produce a phantom deny
  149. **Out of scope of the proof:** guards beyond the core decision logic, IO, network, and the crypto primitives themselves (we rely on `ed25519-dalek`).
  150. ```bash
  151. clawdstrike verify --policy strict # Z3 policy analysis
  152. cargo test -p formal-diff-tests # nightly differential tests
  153. cd formal/lean4/ClawdStrike && lake build
  154. ```
  155. See the [formal verification guide](docs/src/formal-verification.md).
  156. ---
  157. ## Receipts
  158. Every verdict ships with an Ed25519-signed attestation containing the decision, the policy that made it, and the evidence. Receipts are canonicalised with RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization, so a signature verifies byte-identically in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
  159. Enterprise deployments forward receipts through [Spine](crates/libs/spine/), an Ed25519-signed and hash-chained envelope log. Tamper any record and every later record fails verification.
  160. ---
  161. ## SDKs
  162. ### TypeScript
  163. ```bash
  164. npm install @clawdstrike/sdk
  165. ```
  166. ```typescript
  167. import { HushEngine, loadPolicy } from "@clawdstrike/sdk";
  168. const engine = new HushEngine(await loadPolicy("clawdstrike:strict"));
  169. const verdict = await engine.check({
  170. actionType: "file",
  171. target: "~/.ssh/id_rsa",
  172. });
  173. // verdict.decision === "deny"
  174. // verdict.receipt is Ed25519-signed
  175. ```
  176. ### Python
  177. ```bash
  178. pip install clawdstrike
  179. ```
  180. ```python
  181. from clawdstrike import HushEngine, load_policy
  182. engine = HushEngine(load_policy("clawdstrike:strict"))
  183. verdict = engine.check(action_type="file", target="~/.ssh/id_rsa")
  184. # verdict.decision == "deny"
  185. ```
  186. ### Rust
  187. ```toml
  188. [dependencies]
  189. clawdstrike = "0.2"
  190. ```
  191. ```rust
  192. use clawdstrike::{HushEngine, Policy, Action, Decision};
  193. let policy = Policy::load_builtin("strict")?;
  194. let engine = HushEngine::new(policy);
  195. let verdict = engine.check(&Action::file("~/.ssh/id_rsa"))?;
  196. assert_eq!(verdict.decision, Decision::Deny);
  197. ```
  198. ### Go
  199. ```bash
  200. go get github.com/backbay-labs/clawdstrike-go
  201. ```
  202. ```go
  203. engine, _ := clawdstrike.NewEngine(clawdstrike.LoadBuiltin("strict"))
  204. verdict, _ := engine.Check(clawdstrike.FileAction{Target: "~/.ssh/id_rsa"})
  205. // verdict.Decision == clawdstrike.Deny
  206. ```
  207. ---
  208. ## Plugins
  209. | Plugin | Install |
  210. |---|---|
  211. | **Claude Code** | [`clawdstrike-plugin/`](clawdstrike-plugin/) |
  212. | **Cursor** | [`cursor-plugin/`](cursor-plugin/) |
  213. | **OpenClaw adapter** | `npm install @clawdstrike/openclaw` ([guide](docs/src/guides/openclaw-integration.md)) |
  214. | **Desktop Agent** | [`apps/agent/`](apps/agent/) |
  215. ---
  216. ## Enterprise
  217. The same engine plus a managed control plane: Control API, NATS JetStream transport, Spine audit chain, and a Control Console for SOC workflow. Enrolment over mTLS, posture commands with request/reply acks, signed completion bundles back to the API.
  218. See [enterprise enrollment](docs/src/guides/enterprise-enrollment.md) and [adaptive architecture](docs/src/concepts/adaptive-architecture.md).
  219. ---
  220. ## Compliance
  221. Clawdstrike is **not** a certified product. It produces evidence that maps to standard control frameworks: signed action attestations, integrity-chained audit trails, deterministic policy evaluation.
  222. | Framework | Evidence the engine produces |
  223. |---|---|
  224. | SOC 2 (CC6.1, CC7.2) | Logical access controls and signed audit trail |
  225. | HIPAA §164.312(b) | Audit controls with non-repudiable receipts |
  226. | PCI-DSS 10.5 | Tamper-evident, hash-chained logs |
  227. Compliance mappings are draft. Open an issue if you need a framework formalised.
  228. ---
  229. ## Design principles
  230. **Fail closed.** Invalid policies reject at load time. Evaluation errors deny access. Missing config defaults to restrictive. Security degradation requires explicit, auditable action.
  231. **Proof, not logs.** Ed25519 receipts are cryptographic attestations, not log lines someone can edit. Canonical JSON (RFC 8785) ensures signatures verify identically in Rust, TypeScript, and Python.
  232. **Same envelope, any pipe.** A signed Spine envelope is byte-identical whether it travels over NATS at 100K msg/sec, libp2p gossipsub over residential internet, or a LoRa radio at 1,200 bps. The transport is invisible to the truth layer.
  233. **Attenuation only.** Agents delegate subsets of their capabilities, never escalate. Delegation tokens carry cryptographic capability ceilings. Privilege escalation isn't prevented by policy; it's prevented by math.
  234. **Own your stack.** Apache-2.0. Self-hostable. No vendor dependency for security-critical infrastructure. The same engine runs on a developer laptop, an enterprise fleet, and a Raspberry Pi on a radio mesh.
  235. ---
  236. ## Documentation
  237. | | |
  238. |---|---|
  239. | **Getting Started** | [Rust](docs/src/getting-started/quick-start.md) · [TypeScript](docs/src/getting-started/quick-start-typescript.md) · [Python](docs/src/getting-started/quick-start-python.md) |
  240. | **Concepts** | [Design Philosophy](docs/src/concepts/design-philosophy.md) · [Enforcement Tiers](docs/src/concepts/enforcement-tiers.md) · [Multi-Language](docs/src/concepts/multi-language.md) |
  241. | **Framework Guides** | [OpenAI](packages/adapters/clawdstrike-openai/README.md) · [Claude](packages/adapters/clawdstrike-claude/README.md) · [Vercel AI](docs/src/guides/vercel-ai-integration.md) · [LangChain](docs/src/guides/langchain-integration.md) · [OpenClaw](docs/src/guides/openclaw-integration.md) |
  242. | **Reference** | [Guards](docs/src/reference/guards/README.md) · [Policy Schema](docs/src/reference/policy-schema.md) · [Repo Map](docs/REPO_MAP.md) |
  243. | **Enterprise** | [Enrollment Guide](docs/src/guides/enterprise-enrollment.md) · [Adaptive Architecture](docs/src/concepts/adaptive-architecture.md) |
  244. ---
  245. ## Security
  246. If you discover a vulnerability:
  247. - Sensitive: email [connor@backbay.io](mailto:connor@backbay.io). 48-hour response.
  248. - Non-sensitive: open a [GitHub issue](https://github.com/backbay-labs/clawdstrike/issues) with the `security` label.
  249. See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) and [`THREAT_MODEL.md`](THREAT_MODEL.md).
  250. ## Contributing
  251. See [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md).
  252. ```bash
  253. cargo fmt --all && cargo clippy --workspace -- -D warnings && cargo test --workspace
  254. ```
  255. ## License
  256. Apache License 2.0. See [`LICENSE`](LICENSE).

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